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PREFACE 
I have been interested in the concepts of the social milieu and lifestyle since I came to 
Bonn in 1992 in order to collect material for my graduate thesis. Even then I was told that 
this was no subject of discussion as the lifestyle concept was too ambiguous to contribute 
to the social sciences, especially in the field of electoral research. Furthermore, no analysis 
of the social milieus seemed necessary because research had proven that their impact on 
the German population’s voting behaviour had decreased.  
Nevertheless, for several reasons, I was too fascinated to just drop the topic. Firstly, when I 
looked at the concepts in 1992, I already considered the definitions as rather indistinct; not 
much effort was put into explaining how the concepts differ from and resemble each other. 
I figured that if this was worked out in more detail, the concepts would perhaps prove to be 
more fruitful than generally assumed. Such a detailed examination of concepts may seem 
rather unnecessary, but the more I studied the concepts the more I realised how closely the 
concepts relate to the societal changes that took place during the last centuries. Thus, the 
concepts and their application to social research reflect to a certain extent the development 
of the German state and its party system, the cleavages, social conflicts, social milieus, 
lifestyles, socio-economic and socio-cultural transformations over the past two centuries. 
The second reason for getting involved in this topic was with the aim to understand how 
historical developments influenced Germany and made it the way we know it today. 
Obviously, only major developments which are of particular interest for my research 
question can be presented in this thesis. Finally, the analysis of social milieus and lifestyle 
groups in Germany is still flourishing, ignoring critical voices, and this convinced me that 
some of my ideas and thoughts developed over the past few years, as well as the empirical 
results of my analyses, may contribute to the ongoing dispute. 
When I was first confronted with the concepts of the lifestyle and the social milieu in 
electoral research, they were completely new to me. However, I soon realised that a huge 
number of publications and analyses existed in this field, but all, except a few, were 
written in German. Since I have found this topic very interesting, I thought that other, non-
German speaking social scientists, might find it interesting, too. Thus, although my native 
language is Norwegian, I have decided to write my thesis in English in order to open the 
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topic to a broader scientific community. Of course, many nuances of the German language 
are difficult to translate, but I hope the main contents are clearly presented and pleasant to 
read. Quotations are kept in the original language, but in most cases I have added an 
English translation that gives the essence of the original quotation.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
On December 2, 1990 the first general election of reunified Germany took place. Both 
national and international election researchers followed the outcome with great interest. For 
the first time in European history a people who shared the same historical roots and political 
developments, but who were then in the course of history separated into two completely 
different political regimes for over forty years, were reunited and were to decide on the 
composition of a shared parliament. How would the people of the former German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) vote in this first free election since the state elections in 1946? Would they 
take up where they left off in 1946 or had identification with the parties been completely 
disrupted during the decades of dictatorship? Or would the eastern Germans take over the 
party system that had developed in West Germany during the past few decades? These and 
many other questions were of interest for the researchers, as theories generally used in 
explaining voting behaviour could hardly be applied in this extraordinary situation. Whereas, 
for example, in the old Länder1 the impact of the Catholic and workers’ milieus, established 
during the German Empire and Weimar Republic, still influenced voting behaviour even in 
1990, this was not the case in the new Länder2. This was confirmed by the election outcome: 
the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) won the election, also receiving the highest support in 
the former GDR, even though the Social Democratic Party (SPD) had been expected to have a 
strong structural basis of support given the large working class and the insignificant number of 
Catholics in the new Länder. 
In the meantime, research has shown that the first general election of reunified Germany took 
place under very special circumstances. The voters’ evaluation of the candidates and parties’ 
trustworthiness and capabilities, especially regarding the reunification of East and West 
Germany and the economic future of reunified Germany, was important to the outcome (cf. 
Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 1990; Kaltefleiter 1991). The coalition parties in West Germany 
                                                 
1 This expression is being used when referring to the states (Länder) of the Federal Republic of Germany 
before unification including Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, Nordrhein-Westphalia, Palatinate, 
Hesse, Bavaria, Saarland, Bremen, Baden-Württemberg, Hamburg and West-Berlin.   
2 This expression is being used when referring to the states (Länder) of the former GDR including 
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt, Saxony, Thuringia and East-Berlin.  
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since 1983, the CDU/CSU3 and the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), received the highest 
scores in these categories and won the election (cf. Kaltefleiter 1991). Thus, this election was 
more or less based on issue voting with party identification and social structural characteristics 
playing no or only a minor role, in particular in the former GDR (cf. Roth 1990:371).  
Also developments since the first general election prove that this election was an exception 
and should not be used to generally predict future voting patterns of both the eastern and the 
western German electorate. The 1994 and 1998 general elections have, for example, shown 
that the Bündnis 90/die Grünen4 and the successor of the GDR Communist party, the German 
Socialist Unity Party (SED), the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), have not disappeared 
from the political landscape. On the contrary, their political power has increased and since the 
1998 general election the Bündnis 90/die Grünen is even - for the first time in their history - in 
power, forming a coalition with the SPD. The PDS managed the 5% election threshold and 
has its own faction in parliament.  
Does this development indicate the rise of new social milieus in the electorate of reunified 
Germany in which the Bündnis 90/die Grünen, for example, represent the “environmental 
milieu“ and the PDS a “regional milieu“? 
In this thesis, I will analyse existing, traditional milieus and try to identify rising new social 
milieus in reunified Germany. The following questions will form the centre of analysis: 
• do the traditional social milieus which were established in the German Empire and Weimar 
Republic still exist in the old and new Länder? 
• have any new social milieus arisen in the old and new Länder?  
And finally, based on the answers found to the above questions 
• can social milieus contribute to understand voting behaviour in Germany? 
                                                 
3 The CSU is only present in Bavaria, where it stands at elections instead of the CDU and the parties co-
operate at the national level.  
4 The Greens were established in 1980 as a federation of regional formations formerly constituting the 
Other Political Union, the Greens (cf. Caramani 2000:398). Since 1993 the Greens form a party together 
with Bündnis’90 which was established in East Germany in 1990 from a number of formations (cf. 
Caramani 2000:396).  
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1.1 Background of the research question: The rise and fall of social milieus 
In 1933 Germany was marked by a scattered party system and a break up of the close 
relationship between social milieus and parties established at the time of the German Empire 
and the Weimar Republic. According to Lepsius (1993:11ff., first published 1966), the four 
milieus which until then had been decisive for the development of the German party system, 
were the Catholic, the Conservative-Protestants, the Protestant-bourgeois and the Socialist 
workers and manual workers. The social milieus were established due to the existence of 
social conflicts and were represented by their respective political elite. All milieus were 
sharply separated from each other by moral barriers. Lepsius defines milieus as  
"…Bezeichnungen für soziale Einheiten, die durch Koinzidenz mehrerer Strukturdimensionen wie 
Religion, regionale Tradition, wirtschaftliche Lage, kulturelle Orientierung, schichtspezifische 
Zusammensetzung der intermediären Gruppen, gebildet werden. Das Milieu ist ein sozio-kulturelles 
Gebilde, das durch eine spezifische Zuordnung solcher Dimensionen auf einen bestimmten 
Bevölkerungsteil bestimmt wird" (Lepsius 1993:38).5  
Lepsius uses the stability of the close relationship between the social milieus and the parties to 
explain the instability of the German democratic system. The parties were the political 
representatives of these highly complex social milieus and their political activity was caught in 
the interest of the milieus (Lepsius 1993:37). In the German Empire the segregation of 
political blocs led to a lack of democratisation. This resulted in the splitting of the electorate 
and political elite holding uncompromising positions. In the Weimar Republic these milieus 
lost their unifying force and could no longer absorb voters who were not tied to a milieu or 
who had detached from their milieu (cf. Best 1989:8). This orientation vacuum provided a 
chance for the National Socialists (NSDAP) to gain votes.  
After the Second World War and the division of Germany, two milieus were still dominant in 
West Germany, the Catholic and the workers' milieu. They were based on the religious 
cleavage which had changed from being one between Catholics and Protestants to one 
between religious and secular citizens and the cleavage between employers and workers (cf. 
a.o. Linz 1967; Pappi 1976; Pappi/Terwey 1982; Kühnel/Terwey 1990; von Alemann 1992). 
                                                 
5  English translation: „…. characteristics of social units which are established through the coincidence of 
several structural dimensions such as religion, regional tradition, economic position, cultural orientation, 
the class composition of the intermediate groups. A milieu is a socio-cultural object which is defined by 
the specific arrangement of these dimensions on a certain part of the population”.  
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Both milieus had maintained their party ties - the Catholics to the CDU/CSU6 and the workers 
to the SPD. In both milieus clear party loyalties existed and voting behaviour could be 
predicted based on religious belief and trade union membership.  
1.2 The process of individualisation and the pluralisation of lifestyles  
In the following decades, West Germany was marked by severe socio-economic 
transformations which enabled the individual to loosen the ties with the primary social 
environment and thus leave his milieu. Increasingly, the individual could freely choose his 
actions and way of life which again, according to many social scientists, led to a process of 
individualisation7 (Beck 1986). Individualisation can be defined as „the process by which an 
individual acquires his or her unique characteristics which distinguish him or her from other 
persons“(Koschnick 1992:496). These characteristics are therefore no longer solely 
„inherited“ from the social environment the individual was brought up in. Individualisation 
thus implies that the individuals of a modern society can belong to a growing number of 
different, sometimes contradictory and also changing, groups. Consequently, the impact each 
of these groups has on the behaviour of the individual decreases (Schnell/Kohler 1995:635).  
In the case of voting behaviour a decrease in the impact of traditional milieus was stated. The 
milieus had shrunk due to social transformations8 and no longer sufficiently explain the 
different attitudes and actions of a more complex West German electorate. In any case, new 
approaches which could explain individual and group behaviour beyond class and strata were 
increasingly demanded.  
The lifestyle concept has been quite dominant in West Germany since the 1980s; it 
emphasises the individuals’ distinctive, but recognisable way of living. Several analyses were 
                                                 
6 The CDU/CSU was newly founded after the war, resuming the traditions of the purely Catholic party, the 
Centre Party (Zentrum) and the Bavarian People’s Party (BVP). Furthermore, it offered an attractive new 
platform for conservative Christian middle-class voters in the Protestant regions of West Germany (Pappi 
1992:179). 
7 Whether an individualisation process has actually taken place is not the focus of this work. Nevertheless, 
it must be emphasised that the scientific community has different opinions on this matter. Problems in 
empirically testing the individualisation thesis arise in the definition and operationalisation of the concept 
as well as the availability of variables over time which are needed in a longitudinal analysis. For further 
discussions on this topic in Germany see, among others, Schnell/Kohler 1995; Müller 1997, 
Jagodzinski/Quandt 1997; Beck/Sopp 1997 and Friedrichs 1998.  
8 A summary of the most important social transformations in West Germany and the GDR will be given in 
Chapter 4. 
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made in order to categorise different lifestyle groups with the purpose of finding specific 
group preferences in, for example, the field of consumption, leisure, life quality and voting 
behaviours (cf. Becker/Nowak 1982; SPD 1984; Gluchowski 1987; Lüdtke 1989; Schulze 
1992a; Giegler 1994; SPD 1984; Spellerberg 1996; Otte 1997; Oedegaard 2000). Whereas the 
traditional social structural approach only considers objective, often economic factors, the 
lifestyle concept also includes common behaviour and values of major groups in a society (cf. 
Spellerberg 1997:25). The lifestyle concept may thus be understood as a modern concept of 
social structure in which the expressed lifestyle is related to the economic capital and social 
asset of an individual, thus reflecting the social fragmentation of today’s population better. 
Lifestyle analyses, for example, show that the social structural cleavages between religious 
and non-religious people and between workers and employers are reflected in the analysis of 
lifestyle groups (cf. SPD 1984; Gluchowski 1987, 1989, 1991). The lifestyle analyses also 
indicate other latent cleavages, for example, advancing conflicts between rich and poor 
people, between old and young people, between representatives of modern versus 
representatives of traditional values and between eastern and western Germans (cf. 
Gluchowski 1987,1989, 1991; Becker/Becker/Ruhland 1992; Vester 1993, 1995; Oedegaard 
1994, 2000; Spellerberg 1996).  
The most important difference between West Germany and the GDR was the strong state 
control in the latter. The emergence of lifestyles in the west was a result of increased 
individual freedom, whereas social developments in the east were controlled by the state. Both 
Germanys had the same historical roots, but the traditional milieus that continued in the west 
after the Second World War, abruptly ended in the GDR. Although a worker-based milieu 
continued, its primary aim was to legitimise the SED-regime, and thus cannot be compared to 
the west. The meaning of life was to be found in Marxism and Socialism. Religion was thus 
opposed by the state and religious life only existed to a limited extent. However, the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the reunification clearly showed that the East German population’s views had 
changed over the decades too. The support for the official state ideology had continuously 
declined, especially amongst the younger population who asked for more individual freedom, 
although they could not freely express themselves. It was, among other things, the regime's 
disregard of the people's desire for change that finally led to its collapse (Glaeßner 1991:25). 
Since the reunification, the eastern German population has also been categorised into lifestyles 
(cf. Becker/Becker/Ruhland 1992; Vester 1992; Vester/von Oertzen/Geiling/Hermann/Müller; 
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Ueltzhöfer/Flaig 1993; Vester/Hoffmann/ Zierke; 1995; Spellerberg 1996, 1997) and can be 
compared with the western German population in order to investigate how the population in 
two states has differently or similarly developed over the past 40 years.  
1.3 Research question and framework of analysis 
In today’s research, the concept of the social milieu and the lifestyle concept are often treated 
as equal and used interchangeably (cf. Gluchowski 1989; Koch/Kurz/Mahr-Georg/Wasmer 
1999). Analyses include an extensive number of variables and by using, for example, cluster 
analysis individuals are grouped by means of statistical procedure. The milieus or lifestyle 
groups are then defined, based on the homogeneity of various individual characteristics. 
Social milieus defined on such a basis have quite different implications for individual 
behaviour if they are compared with Lepsius’ usage of the social milieu as presented in 
Chapter 1.1; a statistically identified milieu may assume joint action between its members, but 
it cannot prove it. I will go into further details regarding these concepts, its similarities and 
differences, in Chapter 2 of this thesis. Nevertheless, for the formulation of the research 
question, I already need to emphasise the basic differences between the concepts of the milieu 
and the lifestyle at this point. As can be seen from Figure 1.1, the traditional social milieus of 
Lepsius are used as the starting point (1). In these traditional milieus the lifestyle of the 
members within each milieu was more or less identical. They participated in the same 
activities, dressed more or less the same way, spoke the same dialect, shared the same 
interests, values etc. The milieu was also closely connected to a region and a high level of 
interaction between the members of a milieu took place. There was a close relationship 
between the social milieus, (local) organisations and specific political parties, representing the 
interest of “their milieu” too. 
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Figure 1.1 The transition of social milieus  
 
Traditional social milieus (1) 
  Social transformations (2) 
Individualisation (3) 
Declining or dissolving of 
traditional social milieus (4) 
Pluralisation of lifestyles (5) 
 
Rise of new social milieus (6) 
 
Especially in the post World War II decades extensive social transformations took place in 
both Germanys, even though these were stronger in the west than in the east; economic 
growth, expansion of education, technological developments etc. facilitated – at least in the 
west - geographical and social mobility (2). More or less simultaneously a value change 
started to take place, shifting the individual aims in life. Consequently, the society became 
more differentiated; the so-called individualisation process took place (3). This process 
resulted in the decrease of the large milieus with rather homogenous lifestyles, organisational 
memberships and party preferences among its members (4) and the rise of several new, more 
differentiated lifestyles which were not related to either specific organisations or political 
parties (5). The assumption is that some of these lifestyle groups may indicate the rise of what 
may be considered new social milieus (6). 
The general research question of this thesis thus is: 
Do social milieus still exist in reunified Germany and if so, do the old and new Länder 
differ with respect to the existence of social milieus? 
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As the social developments in the east and west since World War II have been of different 
natures the following assumptions will be made: 
In the old Länder the traditional milieus still exist, i.e. the religious and the workers’ 
milieu, and there will also be signs of new milieus with features typical for a modernised 
society, for example, post-materialist features.  
In the new Länder the traditional social milieus will no longer exist in the population, 
social milieus which are typical for an advanced industrialised society will not exist 
either, but milieus will exist covering specific eastern German features. 
The research question thus covers two components, a geographical and a time aspect. It deals 
with both the differences between the old and new Länder and the socio-economic changes 
that took place, particularly since the Second World War. The social changes are considered 
the reason for changing social milieus. Due to the lack of suitable data, the empirical analysis 
itself will be based on only one point in time, the 1998 German General Social Survey 
(ALLBUS). Nevertheless, other data, results and information – going as far back as to the 
German Empire and Weimar Republic - will be presented throughout the work to emphasise 
the proposed arguments.  
Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical framework. The definition of the most frequently used 
concepts and theories in the sociological approach of voting behaviour will be discussed. It 
will focus on the social milieu and two concepts closely related to it; the cleavage and the 
lifestyle concept. Furthermore, two theories of value change will be discussed, as these seem 
to be essential for understanding the driving forces behind the changing milieus and thus 
changing voting patterns. In the following chapter the establishment of the most dominant 
cleavages and social milieus in the German Empire and Weimar Republic will be presented as 
well as their changes after the Second World War (Chapter 3). An outline of the most 
important differences in the social transformations in the old and new Länder until the 
reunification follows in Chapter 4. It gives some background information on how different or 
similar the two Germanys developed during the past few decades. This is - of course - 
important for understanding similarities and differences in the existing and developing social 
milieus and voting behaviour in the two states. Chapter 5 includes a presentation of social 
milieus or lifestyle groups in other empirical studies. With regard to the western German 
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population studies exist which relate lifestyle groups to party preference. Such studies are not 
available regarding the eastern German population. Nevertheless, the results allow some 
hypothetical reasoning, i.e. lifestyle groups showing certain party preferences.  
Before presenting the results of the empirical analysis in Chapter 7, the hypotheses will be 
elaborated in Chapter 6 and an introduction of the data and variables as well as the strategy of 
data analysis will be given. Finally, in Chapter 7 social milieus will be analysed. Different 
analyses will be carried out for the eastern and western population due to their different 
political and historical developments from the end of the Second World War until the 
reunification. The analyses are based on the 1998 ALLBUS survey because this survey 
includes a special module of lifestyle questions. This study also has an extensive list of both 
past and present memberships in organisations of the respondent as well as information 
concerning voting behaviour. This information is fundamental for the analysis because it 
offers a connection between individuals sharing a similar lifestyle and a (possible) social 
milieu. In conclusion, a summary and discussion will follow (Chapter 8). 
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2. SOCIAL STRUCTURE, VALUE CHANGE AND VOTING 
BEHAVIOUR 
Three different approaches are traditionally used in explaining voting behaviour. These are the 
sociological approach usually called the social structural approach with the Columbia-school 
and the circle of Paul F. Lazarsfeld and the cleavage theory of Lipset and Rokkan as the most 
prominent representatives, the social-psychological approach which is often referred to as the 
Michigan-school and finally the theory of the rational voter with Anthony Downs as the 
founding father (cf. Dalton/Wattenberg 1993; Roth 1998:23ff.). These approaches are often 
used complimentary in the study of voting behaviour, even though researchers tend to prefer 
one rather than the other in the conception of their research framework. 
In particular, the social structural approach seems to be no longer interesting to electoral 
researchers. The social and economic processes which have taken place in western 
democracies during the past few decades have reduced the impact of the traditional social 
structural characteristics as, for example, occupation and denomination. Simultaneously, no 
new social structural characteristics with equal significance to explaining voting behaviour 
have emerged, even though new characteristics have been searched for like, for example, 
gender, private versus public employment and education (cf. a.o. Ola Listhaug 1989; 
Dalton/Wattenberg 1993; Hayes 1997; Falter/Gehring 1998).  
Nevertheless, in combination with other characteristics such as value positions, social and 
political attitudes and behaviour, social structural characteristics may still contribute to 
explaining different voting patterns of social groups in the modern society.  In this chapter, I 
will present in further detail the social structural approach and develop a theoretical 
framework in which it can (still) be useful to electoral research. The three concepts which 
were already introduced in Chapter 1, the cleavage, the milieu and the lifestyle concepts, will 
be in the centre of this presentation. The cleavage concept is probably the most known concept 
and was used by Lipset/Rokkan (1967) and Rokkan (1970) in order to explain the 
development of the European party system until the 1960s. The concept of the social moral 
milieu does not have the same international significance in election research as the cleavage 
concept. However, it has been used and still is used to explain the development of and changes 
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in the German party system (cf. Lepsius 1993; Pappi 1976; Best 1989; Schmitt 1989,1997; 
Zelle 1994).  
The lifestyle concept is not a typical election research concept and has only been used to 
explain voting behaviour to a limited extent (cf. SPD 1984; Gluchowski 1987,1989,1991; 
Vester 1993; Otte 1997; Oedegaard 1994, 2000). However, as will also be analysed in this 
thesis, it might prove quite helpful in explaining voting behaviour in modernised societies 
featured by social fragmentation.  
As I pointed out in Chapter 1, these concepts differ quite significantly but are to - some extent 
- also related. By showing their most important differences and similarities, I will work out 
this relationship. Furthermore, this chapter presents two theories of value change, Inglehart’s 
theory of post-materialism and value change in the light of the secularisation process. It is 
often assumed that the stated decrease in impact of the traditional cleavages, the declining of 
social milieus, the process of individualisation and the pluralisation of lifestyles were - if not 
triggered - at least reinforced by value changes in the society. Finally, the use of the milieu 
concept and its application in this work together with the lifestyle and cleavage concept will 
be discussed. 
2.1 Theories of social structure and voting behaviour 
2.1.1 Political cleavages and social milieus 
The social structural approach is often divided into the micro and macro level. The micro level 
approach is represented by the Colombia-school; its theory is based on the „social circles“ first 
mentioned by Georg Simmel (cf. Roth 1998:23). Applied to voting behaviour the theory 
implies that the voter lives in a certain context where the social circles of the voter are defined 
by economic status, religion, place of residence, occupation, age etc. These social circles 
influence the voter’s decisions. Every social circle has its own norms and sticking to this norm 
is awarded with integration. Thus, the social structure is the individual's attachment to his 
social environment which again influences the individual's political attitudes. The different 
social influences are assumed to be either compatible and therefore reinforcing political 
attitudes, cumulatively or contradictory, thereby developing cross-pressure situations (cf. 
Lazarsfeld/Berelson/Gaudet1968:58; Tingsten 1963:230).  
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The macro sociological approach from Lipset/Rokkan (1967; Rokkan 1970) is based on the 
assumption that fundamental social conflicts exist within society which cause tensions. The 
individuals involved in these conflicts form groups with the purpose of promoting common 
interests. On the national level the interest groups search for partners, i.e. parties, trade unions 
and other organisations in order to influence the political decision-making processes. 
Consequently, members of certain social groups will vote for the party representing their 
interests. (cf. Pappi 1976; Dalton/Wattenberg 1993; Roth 1998). In their well-known study, 
Party Systems and Voter Alignments, Lipset/Rokkan (1967) explain the development of party 
systems in Western Europe according to different constellations of social conflicts, the so 
called cleavages existing in the societies: 
"Conflicts and controversies can arise out of a great variety of relationships in the social structure, but 
only a few of these tend to polarize the politics of any given system. There is a hierarchy of cleavage 
bases in each system and these orders of political primacy not only vary among polities, but also tend to 
undergo changes over time" (Lipset/Rokkan 1967:6) 
Although Lipset and Rokkan do not give a definition of a cleavage, three criteria are in 
general considered essential (Aardal 1997:215): 1. The contradictions usually have a socio-
economic basis or a connection to identifiable social groups. There are, however, examples of 
cleavages which do not have such an embedment. 2) The contradictions must have been 
exposed to a process of ideological consciousness, that is voters who are influenced must 
realise that there exists a collective interest community and 3) the cleavage does not get 
institutionalised before parties, trade unions or other organisations are established. Concerning 
the question which cleavages are to be identified and how many, Rae and Taylor argue that: 
“Cleavages are the criteria which divide the members of a community or sub community into groups and 
the relevant cleavages are those which divide members into groups with important political differences 
at specific times and places” (Rae/Taylor 1970:1). 
Thus, the politically relevant cleavages may change over time and the question is how to 
possibly identify those cleavages which are politically significant at different times.  
Several redefinitions of the cleavage concept have been made in West German scientific 
literature as, for example, the one by Pappi (1983:185) who defines cleavages as follows 
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“(...) generell können soziale Konflikt- und Spannungslinien als dauerhafte Konfliktpotentiale bestimmt 
werden, die in sozialstrukturellen Gruppierungen einer Gesellschaft verankert sind und wegen ihrer 
Politisierung bei Wahlen und Abstimmungen ihren Ausdruck finden.“9 
Pappi (1992:190) sees a social cleavage as a lasting coalition between a population group 
and a political party. Since a population group is not a political actor, the interests of the 
group are represented by an organisation whose leaders form a coalition with a political 
party. He defines two such coalitions for the West German party system: the coalition of 
the Catholic Church with the CDU/CSU and the trade unions with the SPD.  
In addition to cleavages which have their basis in the social structure, the argument is that 
ideological cleavages have become more important in recent decades (Aardal 
1994:228ff.). According to Aardal, Valen introduced the concept in 1981 to distinguish 
between cleavages which originate from socio-economic structures and cleavages which to 
a lesser extent can be traced back to such structures. Valen defines ideological cleavages as 
“contradictions which exist in the consciousness of individuals and which can be identified 
on the basis of their opinion and evaluation of certain issues” (cf. Aardal 1994:229).  
I would say that the question of whether Norway should join the EU or not is an example 
of such a cleavage which is neither established on a socio-economic basis or has a 
connection to just one social group. The alliance of the no-side consists both of farmers, 
business men, academics and people living in the periphery as well as in northern Norway. 
In the 1993 parliamentary election the agrarian-protectionist anti-EU Centre Party 
(Senterpartiet) received 16.7% of the votes and became the third strongest party in 
parliament (cf. Aardal 1999:12). The election was considered to be an indicator for the EU 
referendum in November 1994. At the referendum 47.8% voted for EU-membership and 
52.2% against. In the meantime the support of the Centre party has dropped significantly, 
as the EU-issue has withdrawn into a state of latency. However, it might rise again as it did 
in the early 1990s after about 20 years of latency after the first EU-referendum in 1972 (cf. 
Aardal 1994:237).     
Aardal emphasises that it is necessary to distinguish between short-term issues and more 
permanent ideological contradictions which may be considered as cleavages, though. 
                                                 
9  English translation: „(…) in general social conflicts and tensions may be considered lasting conflict 
potentials which are fixed in the social structural groupings of a society and which are expressed at 
elections due to their politicisation.“  
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Empirically such dimensions have been analysed on the basis of issues by means of, for 
example, factor analysis. However, Aardal suggests calling these attitudinal dimensions 
rather than cleavages to emphasise that it is not yet clear whether these dimensions actually 
represent independent cleavages (Aardal 1994:230). As it is the aim of this thesis to 
analyse whether new cleavages exist or may develop which are of a different kind than the 
traditional ones usually applied in analyses of cleavages in the German society, the 
empirical analysis in Chapter 7 includes issues which are assumed to measure such 
ideological cleavages. I would like to emphasise already at this point, though, that 
although I will refer to these issues as cleavages, only future analyses including more 
relevant variables for the measurement of attitudinal dimensions are needed in order to test 
empirically to which extent these ideological cleavages may actually be considered 
cleavages or whether they are short-term issues.   
According to Hradil (Hradil 1992a:21) Hippolyte Tain is generally considered the original 
founder of the milieu concept in the social sciences. He emphasised the contextual fusion 
of numerous heterogeneous objective and subjective components in the environment which 
are considered causal for the everyday pattern of living. Emile Durkheim put the milieu 
concept in a theoretical framework by separating the outer social environment or society 
from the inner social milieu which is the immediate community surrounding the individual 
(cf. Hradil 1992a:21ff). 
In political science Rainer M. Lepsius' theory of the social moral milieu is most important in 
contributing to the understanding of the development of the German party system in the time 
of the German Empire and the Weimar Republic. The political milieus were formed as a result 
of the influence of several factors such as religion, regional traditions, cultural orientation, 
class/strata etc. The sub-cultural infrastructure was important for the political social milieus. 
Institutions like parties, trade unions and church associations had a unifying function. The 
milieu concept is quite closely related to the cleavage concept as it also focuses on the 
interests of specific social groups and their alliances with political parties representing their 
respective interests. However, Lepsius’ social moral milieus are to a larger extent connected to 
local or regional traditions than the cleavage concept (Lepsius 1993; cf. Pappi 1976:617). This 
implies that the norms of the milieus are basically established through direct social interaction 
whereas the similar political attitudes of the cleavage groups come into existence by pure 
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identification with political aims and norms. In the case of the social milieus the regional party 
traditions are also important to the voting pattern of the electorate and Lepsius shows how 
differently similar socially structured regions developed in the years towards the end of the 
Weimar Republic (Lepsisus 1993)10.  
Even though Lepsisus’ applied the concept of the social moral milieu in order to describe the 
problems of the development of the German party system and the lack of democratisation in 
the Weimar Republic, the concept is also used today and helps to explain long lasting group 
attachments and party identification as well as the decline in this area. However, when 
applying concepts under different conditions than they were initially intended for, changes in 
definition will necessarily occur although the main implications remain. I will return to the 
milieu concept and the way it will be applied in this thesis later in this chapter. 
Lepsius' theory of the social moral milieu has been particularly criticised in one aspect. The 
definition of social milieus as a synthesis of several dimensions of social structure conceals the 
fact that in complex societies individuals usually belong to several intermediate groups. These 
have different and sometimes contradictory expectations of their members (Best 1989:12). If it 
is anticipated that the configuration of group memberships and their different strengths and 
effects of loyalty produce a connection between social structure and politics, it is thus 
necessary to study the importance of the role of elites in the perception of cleavages and the 
formation of milieus.  
 This development takes place through the process of communalisation (Vergemeinschaftung) 
and aggregation (Vergesellschaftung) (Weber 1976, first published 1922). Weber's 
terminology is reminiscent of the differentiation made by Tönnies in his pioneering work 
Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (1971, first published 1887). Tönnies uses the concepts to 
explain social transformations that took place in the history of western societies from the early 
Middle Ages to his lifetime. The communities (Gemeinschaften) were characterised by a close 
relationship between individuals. The individualisation process dissolved these ties and in the 
society (Gesellschaft) human behaviour was marked by the individual's free choice of means 
to reach the desired goal. This again resulted in the formation of new unities through groups 
and organisations, replacing the old ties of the primary social environment. These 
                                                 
10 Further details on the development of cleavages and social milieus in the German Empire and Weimar 
Republic will be given in Chapter 3. 
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developments must be seen in a dynamic relationship to one another, with the Community 
defined as a precondition for shaping the Society.  
According to Best, the relationship between cleavages and milieus can be studied in five 
phases and is based on Weber's differentiation between communalisation and aggregation. In 
the first phase, differences between social categories exist, but they have not (yet) developed 
into political communities or manifest conflicts, i.e. the cleavages are latent. Subjective 
solidarity in the sense of communalisation is felt without leading to a collision of interests - 
communalisation is a result of emotional or traditional attachments of the participants (Best 
1989:14ff.).  
The second phase is one of definition. Differences are perceived either as advantage or 
disadvantage. This starts the process of a development to a rationally motivated union of 
interests in the sense of aggregation. The aggregation of social relationships is the result of 
reconciliation and balancing of interests which are motivated either by rational value-
judgements or expediency. This implies that the subjective meaning of a social relationship 
may change from being one based on solidarity into one based on conflict. In this phase a 
relationship between latent interest groups and the elite divisions is drawing to an end.  
An extensive structure of unions and associations with special political affiliations arises in the 
third phase, i.e. the cleavages become manifest. If they fully developed, they form social moral 
milieus. In the end of their development these political communities reach their highest point 
of capacity and readiness for conflict. The fragmentation of the elite reflects the segmentation 
of the population. The elite is more interested in maintaining its autonomy in the milieus than 
integrating into the all-society (Gesamtgesellschaft). This situation leads to the fourth phase 
which has two possible outcomes. One outcome is based on conflict: the milieus are either 
concentrated in territorial strongholds or organised at the trans-regional level. The other 
possible outcome is a peaceful settlement of interests within the concordant solution of the 
proportional democracy.  
The last and fifth phase starts with the break-up of subcultures; a process of de-segmentation 
of the cleavages begins. The cleavages can have an underlying effect on political behaviour 
even if the differences that had caused them, vanished. The cleavages which have been 
eliminated from a present conflict situation, can also proceed to a state of latency. An adequate 
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example is the revival of the religious cleavage in Germany in the 19th century after almost 
200 years of latency. Figure 2.1 shows the five phases described above.  
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Figure 2.1 The dynamics between cleavages, social milieus and elites 
Phase 5: Sub-cultures break up and a de-
segmentation of cleavages takes place. The cleavages 
proceed in a state of latency  
Phase 4: Rigidity of elite and lack of social 
integration at the institutional level. Possible 
outcomes: conflict or democratic settlement. 
Phase 3: Structure of unions and associations with 
special political affiliations arises – if these become 
fully developed they constitute social moral milieus. 
In this phase cleavages become manifest. Social 
conflicts may arise. 
Phase 2: Process of Vergesellschaftung: The social 
group perceives differences as advantage or 
disadvantage. A development of a rationally 
motivated union of interests takes place. Relationship 
between interest group and elite division develop. 
Phase 1: Process of Vergemeinschaftung: subjective 
solidarity between members of the same group – 
awareness of social differences between groups but 
no conflict exists. Cleavages are latent. 
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2.1.2 Lifestyle as a modern concept of social structure  
With the complete success of the industrialised society, milieus and cleavages retreated into 
the background and the occupational status moved to the foreground. Based on the idea that 
das Sein das Bewußtsein bestimmt the analysis of social structure was strongly influenced by 
the anticipation that objective factors like age, sex, income, profession and education also 
determined the mind and actions of the individual (Hradil 1992a:9). Although voting 
behaviour was still explained by church attendance and membership in trade unions, the 
noticeable reduction of these groups together with the growth of a new middle class, led to an 
increased focus on the individual's placement in the class/strata hierarchy.  
In the late 1960s the impression grew that the objective features alone were insufficient in 
order to explain individual behaviour and attitudes. Changes in the society like expansion of 
education, mobility, urbanisation, increase in resources, decrease in working hours and 
thereby increased leisure time, welfare services etc., had resulted in a process of 
individualisation, pluralisation in the ways of living and changes in value orientations (Beck 
1986). Increasingly, the lifestyle concept was used in the study of the social structure. 
The emergence of the lifestyle concept can be traced back to the beginning of the 20th 
century. Like the micro-level approach of the social structure used by Lazarsfeld et.al. (cf. 
Chapter 2.1.1 ) it is also based on Georg Simmel’s theories (1968). Simmel argued that 
modern society increasingly confronts the individual with different social groups; the 
individual is part of the environment he grows up in and later part of his own family, as well 
as part of other social groups encountered through occupation or memberships in different 
organisations etc. The individual can, by acquiring certain qualities, turn to a more distant 
group which has characteristics that are different from the primary social group the individual 
belongs to. This results in an individualisation process and the development of lifestyles which 
are not forced out of external living conditions and original group attachments. In The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1989, first published 1904-05), Weber, for 
example, emphasises the impact of social value orientations on the lifestyles of religious 
groups.  
It was the marketing field in the USA in the 1960s which first reintroduced the lifestyle 
concept. It realised that objective features were no longer sufficient to distinguish between 
consumer groups. Danielsen (1991:853) sees this growing interest for lifestyle studies as a 
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sign of a new paradigm for sociological analysis of modern societies that reflects current 
trends in marketing and the turbulent life of complex societies generally. 
The importance of class/strata has, however, not vanished with the increasing focus on 
lifestyles. On the contrary, lifestyles are used to explain how differences between classes 
continue and how these differences develop. Already in the 1930s Geiger (1967:5) observed 
specific mentalities in the different social classes stating  
"(...) daß ein Bevölkerungsteil von bestimmter ökonomisch-sozialer Lage typisches Rekrutierungsfeld 
einer Schicht von bestimmter Mentalität ist." 11 
According to Bourdieu (1982) three important resources are unequally distributed in the 
population: the economic, the cultural and the social capital (i.e. social relations). The different 
distribution of these capitals decides which class the members of society belong to. By 
growing up in different living conditions certain class-specific forms of Habitus emerge which 
influence the thoughts, perceptions and values of the individual resulting in different patterns 
of everyday life and different ways of action thus resulting in class-specific lifestyles.  
Since the 1980s the lifestyle concept experienced a renaissance in West Germany, too. The 
first study was conducted by Sinus (Becker/Nowak 1982). By using cluster-analysis consumer 
groups were categorised based on factors that influenced the individual's everyday life: work, 
family, leisure, plans for the future, dreams and concerns, subjective variables that again 
explain attitudes, values and actions.  
The growing tendency of volatility in the electorate and the rise of post-materialistic value 
orientations resulted in an increased popularity of lifestyle studies also in political science. The 
first categorisation of the West German voters was carried out by Sinus (SPD 1984) on behalf 
of the SPD with the aim to track down new potential voters for the party. A study followed by 
Gluchowski (1987), who focused on the change of the traditional support base for the 
CDU/CSU. He categorised the electorate into political generations and divided them into 
traditional and modern lifestyles. According to Gluchowski there are many different 
definitions of lifestyles. He thus proposes that 
                                                 
11  English translation: “(…) that a part of the population with a specific economic-social position is a 
typical field of recruitment for a specific class mentality. 
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"...als kleinster gemeinsamer Nenner aller Lebensstil Definitionen der verschiedenen 
Forschungsrichtungen kann gelten, daß der Lebensstil als eine typische unverwechselbare Struktur von 
im Alltagsleben sichtbaren Verhaltensweisen bei Individuen oder Gruppen von Individuen angesehen 
wird" (Gluchowski 1991:212).12 
The list of definitions is endless; basically they all express the same expectations: lifestyles are 
to be understood as manifest, not imposed patterns of behaviour which are characterised by a 
high degree of self-reflection and expressive symbolism (Hradil 1992a:29). Furthermore, all 
lifestyle definitions generally assume that social participants in general orientate socially by 
their lifestyles and at the same time dissociate themselves through their lifestyle from other 
participants and groups (cf. Otte 1997:304; Hölscher 1998:16). 13 
The lifestyle concept tries to include all factors which might influence the individual's 
thoughts and actions. These factors form part of two opposing points (Müller 1992): The 
materialistic point which determines the basis for individual action. Objective social structural 
features such as social background, profession, income and fortune, age, sex and nationality 
are located here. Opposite the ideal point is located which determines the situation of 
individual action. Here the impact of the social environment on individual action can be found. 
Social environment influencing individual behaviour are according to Müller, for example, 
social background and family and socialisation through school, work and other group 
attachments etc. In Figure 2.2, I have tried to summarise Müller’s arguments graphically. As 
shown in Figure 2.2 the materialistic and ideal points may be understood as the foundation for 
the expressed lifestyle. Values are positioned in the middle of the diagram because they are a 
product of both the materialistic and the ideal point. 
                                                 
12 English translation: „(…) the lowest common denominator of all lifestyle definitions in the different 
research areas may be that a lifestyle is seen as a typical, unmistakable structure of visible attitudes by 
individuals or groups of individuals in everyday life.“  
13 Several books have been published which discuss the application of the lifestyle approach in the social 
sciences, for example, Berger/Hradil 1990; Hradil (ed.) 1992a and Schwenk (ed.) 1996. See also the 
summary of lifestyle surveys presented in Chapter 5.1. 
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Figure 2.2 The formation of the individual lifestyle 
 
2.1.3 Social milieus and lifestyles in the former GDR 
Since the reunification the study of social milieus and lifestyles has received growing attention 
in the new Länder. This is probably due to the limited possibilities during the SED regime to 
conduct research regarding changes in mentality and the social structure of the eastern German 
population during the time of the SED regime. With the fall of the Berlin Wall the research 
into different and similar developments in the eastern and western population was made 
possible, using theories and methods employed in the West during the last decades.   
The main questions in the first years after the reunification were the following: where those 
social milieus and lifestyles that existed in the former GDR before the reunification similar to 
those which had been found in West Germany (Ritschel 1992:293)? And what would happen 
to the milieus and lifestyles in the new Länder after the reunification? In this respect Vester 
(1992:347) argued that the milieus or lifestyles which might develop in the eastern German 
population would depend on how the members of every social group managed to handle the 
rapid changes that took place in the eastern German social structure.   
lifestyle 
situation of action basis of action 
materialistic point ideal point 
values
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Two aspects need special consideration when the concepts of the milieu and the lifestyle are 
applied to the former GDR. The first focuses on the difference in the modernisation processes 
of West and East Germany. It was in the field of values and norms, thinking and actions of the 
individual that the social structure in the West changed. Hradil (1992b:13) argues that at the 
time of the reunification, West Germany had left the stage of the typical industrial society and 
had reached a new level of modernisation, one of a developed industrial society. However, 
modernisation did not just occur in a positive sense through, for example, state benefits and a 
general increase in the standard of living. A subjectivisation took place based on the failures of 
modernisation. The everyday functionalism of the individual in society caused so many 
negative aspects that neither state nor market; only individual control could remove them. 
In contrast, the former GDR focused on an objective modernisation where individual 
possibilities, means and ends were objectively measured. This kind of modernisation aimed at 
an extensive functionality, expediency and protection against failure. This policy damaged the 
economy, the environment and creativity to the same extent. In the worst case this meant that 
lifestyles did not develop in the GDR. The social movements of the younger generation, those 
born after the formation of the GDR, can, however, be traced back to the mid-1980s. They 
basically reflected a growing criticism of the system. Young people realised the inconsistency 
of the official ideology in the GDR and their real experiences in everyday life (Gensicke 
1992,1993).  
The second aspect emphasises the difficulty in judging the long-term significance of lifestyles 
in the eastern German population. Even now, a decade after the reunification, extreme changes 
occur in the lives of individuals. Many feel insecure about the future and have partly lost 
control over their situation. Thus, analyses of the eastern Germans' changing behaviour need 
to be treated carefully because noticeable attitudes and mentalities, including the ability to 
handle a crisis, might only be temporary (cf. Schweigel/Segert/Zierke 1992:61). With the 
reunification the three sources which are according to Bourdieu necessary to keep the social 
status were devaluated in the new Länder (Vester 1995:9); the economic capital was 
devaluated through de-industrialisation, the educational capital through downgrading and the 
social capital through political and social patronisation.  
Increasingly, the eastern Germans focus on their own regional and social group values; they 
combine structures and experiences from both the old and new society. Due to the historical 
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preconditions, however, most of the eastern Germans will not be able to catch up with the 
modernisation of the western Germans; the coincidence of the economic boom, more chances 
and social integration does not exist anymore. On the contrary, especially the eastern German 
workers’ milieu is confronted with a declining industry and agriculture, thus loosing its social 
structural basis ( Vester 1995:10ff.). Thus, even now a decade after the reunification, analyses 
of lifestyles in the new Länder should take into consideration the still ongoing changes in the 
eastern German population when trying to predict future behaviour. A summary of some 
lifestyle studies conducted in the eastern and western German population will be presented in 
Chapter 5. 
2.2 Theories of value change 
The change in values is often considered a consequence of the modernisation process14 that 
took place in western industrialised democracies over the past few decades. This 
modernisation process changed the preconditions of the materialistic and ideal points 
presented in Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2.1.2, thus influencing the development of and change in 
values, lifestyles and social milieus (cf. also Figure 1.1, Chapter 1.3).  
Before presenting two theories that seem significant for explaining value change in Western 
Germany over the past few decades, it should be emphasised that the debate on values and 
value change is characterised by different and even sometimes contradictory arguments. It is, 
for example, questioned how values and value change are to be defined and measured and 
what the consequences of these processes are, both at the individual and at the societal level 
(cf. a.o. Inglehart 1977, 1989, 1997; Klages 1984,1992; Meulemann 1992,1996; Bürklin/Klein 
1998; Hammes 1996). Nevertheless, it is important for the further discussion in this work that 
research results have proven that value orientations may be considered a universal key in 
understanding social attitudes and behavioural dispositions (Klages 1992:9). Thus, it might be 
assumed that changes in values may also change social attitudes and behavioural dispositions 
on the individual level which then might have significant impact on the collective level.   
 
                                                 
14 A detailed presentation and discussion of social transformations in both eastern and western Germany 
will be given in Chapter 4. 
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The two theories which shall be presented in further detail in the following sections are value 
changes in the light of Inglehart's theory of post-materialism and Maslow's motivation theory 
and an approach which relates changing value orientations with the secularisation process in 
post-war West Germany. Although both theories have their origin in western democracies of 
the post World War II era, research indicates that the preconditions for value change were also 
fulfilled in the former GDR, although not with the same strength and not in all fields 
(Gensicke 1992; Klages/Gensicke 1993).     
2.2.1 Maslow's motivation theory and Inglehart's theory of post-materialism 
Maslow's (1954) motivation theory emphasises the fact that value changes take place when 
certain needs have been satisfied. The needs are placed on different levels in a value 
hierarchy. When basic needs, i.e. need of survival, are fulfilled the individual will move 
onto the next level. Other values like security and stability will then become important. On 
the third level, when the needs on the second level are fully satisfied, the individual will 
strive for acknowledgement, status, independence and freedom, respect etc. In the end, the 
highest level expressed by self-realization, is reached.  
Inglehart (1977) used this theory in order to explain changing political values. The value 
orientations can be classified into two big groups: the materialist, seeking materialistic supply 
and security and the post-materialist characterised by the struggle for self-realization. The 
transition of the groups is based on the thesis of shortage and socialisation. Materialistic needs 
will lose their priority among individuals whose needs have already been satisfied. Those who 
have not yet reached the level of materialistic satisfaction will give top priority to it.  
In advanced industrial societies, the material needs of the population are basically satisfied and 
they therefore, receive less attention compared to the new, post-materialistic values. The older 
generation often experienced economic difficulties or insecurity during their formative years 
and will thus give a relatively high priority to materialistic and military security. Post-war 
generations were brought up during a period of unprecedented affluence, economic well-being 
and personal security and turn their attention to post-materialistic goals 
(Dalton/Flanagan/Beck 1984:20). Issues of post-materialism are, for example, environmental 
interest, peace and solidarity with the Third World. Inglehart assumes that the following 
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generation will keep the same list of priorities. This generation thesis thus anticipates that 
throughout the years post-materialists will dominate the society.  
Both theories have frequently been criticized. Firstly, an individual can have needs of different 
levels simultaneously, for example, an individual may want higher materialistic satisfaction 
and security as well as respect and self-realization (Bürklin/Klein 1998:142). Secondly, value 
orientations shift during the different phases of life. This phenomenon is also known as life 
cycle thesis and is empirically proven. The number of post-materialists does therefore not 
increase as Inglehart assumes; on the contrary, it remains rather constant (cf. Bürklin 
1988:108; Klages 1992:21). The proportion of mixed value types, i.e. West Germans having a 
preference for both materialist and post-materialist values, seems to have increased during the 
past 25 years from 42% in 1970 to 55% in 1994 (Bürklin/Klein 1998:151). More aspects of 
the above theories have been criticized, particularly regarding the validity and reliability of the 
measurement instrument of post-materialism (for details on this debate see a.o. Klages 1992; 
Bürklin/Klein 1998:148ff.). 
Although as shown above, several aspects of Inglehart’s and Maslow’s theories can be 
questioned, I will also assume that a link between the satisfaction of materialistic needs and 
value orientations exists. It helps to explain plausibly differences in value orientations between 
the two Germanys. The eastern Germans, in all probability, have not yet reached a level of 
materialistic satisfaction. Thus, it can contribute to understand the existence of different 
lifestyle groups and social milieus in the old and new Länder. It should be emphasised, 
though, that the first level of Maslow's theory is based on a minimum level of existence 
which is not characteristic for the situation in either Germany.  
The concepts of materialism and post-materialism expressing value changes are often used 
interchangeably with value changes as a movement away from the values of duty and 
acceptance, towards an increased impact on self-realization and self-development (Klages 
1984). Klages distinguishes between four value types: the conventionalists, characterised by a 
traditional values system (acceptance and security), the realists, who cherish both traditional 
values as well as values emphasising self-realization and engagement, the resigned, who deny 
values altogether and finally the idealists, who are characterised by self-realization and 
engagement. In summary, Klages’ conventionalist may be compared to Inglehart’s materialists 
and the idealists to the post-materialists (cf. Schorpp 1989:23f.; Hammes 2002:53). According 
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to Klages, however, value change is no linear development, for example towards post-
materialism. Klages argues that value change is influenced by different forces and tendencies 
in society and depending on the circumstances will take place in phases or be of a cyclic or 
waveformed character. With time he expects a synthesis of values in which an integration of 
materialist and post-materialist values takes place (Klages 1988). Such a development towards 
and increase of mixed values types was confirmed in a survey he conducted in 1987/88. As 
can be seen from Figure 4.4 in Chapter 4.3.1 an increase in mixed value types in the western 
German population from approximately the mid 1980s can be confirmed on the basis of the 
Eurobarometer surveys as well.    
From now the concepts materialism/post-materialism and duty and acceptance/self-
realization and self-development will be used interchangeably. 
2.2.2 Value change in the light of the secularisation process 
According to Meulemann, sociology has developed an own perspective on values. Since 
values determine the actions of individuals, they function as a mechanism for social 
integration in the society and are thus important to the holding together of society (1996:49). 
Meulemann (1985,1992,1996) distinguishes between four values he considers important to 
social integration15; equality, achievement, co-determination and acceptance.  
Equality presents fairness and equal treatment or equal chances. Equality as a value is 
irrefutable, but so is its level of realization. If everybody approves of a certain value, each 
individual can still differently perceive its level of realization. 
Achievement the second value is what can be considered as the result of one's own efforts. 
Achievement is a medium for self-realization. In a society with a highly developed division of 
work, specialised functions have to be fulfilled. Individuals, however, will only carry out 
specialised tasks if they are considered as personal achievements. Thus, society has to make 
achievements possible in order to tie the individuals to them.  
 
                                                 
15 Meuelmann understands social integration as the holding together of the society which is not based on 
force, but on consensus of the members of the society (1996:48). 
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Co-determination is a value in all fields were power is being fought for. This is, in particular in 
the political field, but also in economy and upbringing and education. In modern societies 
individuals' opportunities are - to a large extent - determined by social institutions which the 
individual can neither overlook nor influence. Co-determination helps to soften the feeling of 
alienation which is unavoidable in industrialised and bureaucratic societies.  
Finally, traditional values can justify an individual’s destiny that cannot be explained in any 
other way. These traditions are based on the confidence and the beliefs of the individuals. This 
implies that if a tradition is no longer followed, it cannot be restored or imposed through 
coercion or persuasion. Meulemann characterises the existence of such values as acceptance. 
Acceptance itself is, however, not a value; it reflects a certain attitude to institutions and 
the norms and values they embody (Meulemann 1996:73). In every society inequalities and 
misfortunes occur which cannot be explained by the failure or fault of the individual or of 
society. These realities are easier to accept if explained by destiny – acceptance can thus 
facilitate social integration where the other values fail (cf. Meulemann 1996:74).   
In this sense the continuation of traditional values differ very much from that of the social 
moral milieu because the acceptance of traditional values is not solely based on the transfer 
from the immediate social environment; rather it has been individually chosen as valuable. In 
traditional as well as modern society, religion plays an important role. Therefore, the degree of 
acceptance can indirectly be estimated by the significance of religion. Meulemann anticipates 
that the traditional values in the population have decreased parallel to a decline in church 
attendance. With the decrease of religion as a value the individual has to find the meaning of 
life by himself. Some people seek it in their professional life, but work is also decreasingly 
considered an end in itself and thus insufficient in fulfilling the wish for a meaningful life. The 
individual can do his duties, but does not necessarily consider it as a meaning of life. It can 
seek the meaning of life in two remaining areas: identification with family and participation in 
politics, i.e. the meaning of life can be found in both the private and the public sphere.  
Empirical results on the development from materialism to post-materialism as well as in the 
four fields of social integration will be presented in further detail in Chapter 4.  
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2.3 The differentiation between lifestyle groups and social milieus – the impact of 
organisational membership 
One of the problems in evaluating the contribution of milieus and lifestyles to the 
understanding of voting behaviour is the interchangeable use of the concepts in modern 
sociology (Otte 1997:306; Hartmann 1999:71; Oedegaard 1994, 2000; Zerger 2000:79). On 
the one hand, Schulze (1992b) talks about the transformations of milieus which today are 
characterised by individuals who choose their social circles independently and selectively. The 
social milieus are large groups of people with similar characteristics and intensified internal 
communication. On the other hand, Gluchowski (1989) sees the development as a change 
from traditional milieus to modern lifestyles. Others again define a milieu as a lifestyle group 
which is (statistically) as homogeneous as possible (Blasius 1994:237).   
This mixture of definitions and ways of perceiving milieus and lifestyles may not be 
significant for distinguishing between consumer groups or explaining inequality among social 
groups. However, when used in election research, milieus and lifestyles have different 
meanings regarding the tenacity of party preferences. Social milieus should be considered in 
the light of Lepsius' definition. The social milieus express the presence of a long-lasting 
adherence to traditions, values and party affiliations which are not easily influenced by 
changes in society (cf. also Hörning/Michailow 1990:504). Their intermediate level of 
associations like trade unions, church organisations, environmental organisations etc 
strengthens these milieus. In the old Länder, milieus that can be traced back to the German 
Empire and the Weimar Republic still exist and political parties are still supported by their 
traditional milieus. Although these milieus have decreased in size over the last few decades, 
traditional milieus still exist. Bürklin (1988:79) states 
" (...) daß die gruppenbezogenen Bestimmungsgründe des Wahlverhaltens in ihren Grundstrukturen 
gegenüber sozialem Wandel relativ hartnäckig sind."16  
In order to be able to distinguish clearly between these concepts, lifestyles should be regarded 
as phenomena which long lasting impact still have to be proven (Diewald 1990:22). Firstly, 
lifestyles are easier exposed to social developments and value changes which can cause the 
rise and fall of lifestyle groups. Secondly, some groups are based on features that 
                                                 
16 English translation: „(…) that group related voting decisions are in their basic structure relatively 
resistant to social change.“  
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characterise an individual in a certain life situation. In the long run, these lifestyle groups 
will probably continue, but are not necessarily made up of the same individuals. Is it likely, 
for instance, that the young, unmarried, post-materialistic university student, who votes for 
the Greens, will do this for the rest of his life? He will, most certainly not, be in the same 
life situation all his life. However, as emphasised in Chapter 1.3 and showed in Figure 1.1 
some of these lifestyle groups might also be developing social milieus.  
As discussed above the lifestyle concept in election research is often criticised (cf. Müller-
Rommel/Poguntke; Roth 1998:32) because it is difficult to clarify how the empirically 
established homogenous lifestyle groups can contribute to explaining voting behaviour as can 
be done with the social milieus. Lifestyle groups are based on certain homogenous factors of 
their members. But these factors do not necessarily have the same meaning or importance for 
each individual member. For example, we do not know whether a lifestyle group dominated 
by singles indicates the individual’s preference for this way of living or whether they simply 
cannot find a partner. In addition, we cannot distinguish between those in the group being 
single for the first or the second reason because this is usually not asked.  
Furthermore, social milieus are often defined as (very) homogenous lifestyle groups. Due to 
similar values and economic and social positions, a higher level of communication between 
individuals of a specific social milieu is expected. These social milieus are often criticised by 
electoral researchers because they lack the unifying function which was so significant to the 
establishment of traditional milieus and their impact on voting behaviour. Thereby, an 
important link between such milieus and a certain party preference is missing. In particular, 
since it is not always obvious whether an item has the same meaning for the individuals 
sharing a lifestyle or not, it cannot be assumed that a higher level of communication exists 
only due to a similarity of characteristics. Recalling that in the traditional milieus of Lepsius 
such unifying functions were fulfilled by, for example, trade unions or church associations, I 
would argue that there must be a link between a lifestyle group and organisational 
membership17 in order to define a social milieu.  
 
                                                 
17  In this work organisations also include associations, clubs, societies, charities etc. For a detailed 
discussion on the different organisational types see Sahner 1993:23ff. 
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In this way we can at least assume that the interests of the individuals in a lifestyle group is 
going in the same direction (cf. Weßels 2000:131). As emphasised by Immerfall (1997:141ff.) 
voluntary organisations facilitate the development of the citizen’s consciousness, self-
organisation and solidarity. Furthermore, voluntary organisations provide ‘free spaces’ for the 
development of civil skills and more assertive group identities (cf. van Deth 1998:135).  
According to von Alemann (1996) it might be correct that a process of individualisation as 
also stated by many sociologists took place, but this has not resulted in the disappearance of 
the organised society. On the contrary, the impact of the third sector has increased - sports 
organisations grow, trade unions still exist and the traditional welfare organisations have not 
failed in competing with the growing number of commercial nursing services. Epple 
(1995:40), too, argues that present analyses on decision-making processes reflect the 
indisputable tendency towards individualisation and anonymisation. However, these analyses 
ignore the existence of traditional relationships or the impact of new social relationships like 
informal connections at work and in leisure. Thus, not only the impact of organisations which 
traditionally have an impact on individual voting behaviour should be analysed. Other 
organisations which do, at first glance, not seem to be of particular importance to the political 
decision making process, should also be included in the analysis. In „Voting“ (1954) Berelson, 
Lazarsfeld and McPhee, for example, analysed the impact of organisations on the voting 
decision of the citizens in Elimra, New York, with regard to the 1948 presidential election. 
They found out that 
 „(…) organizations as such do little in the way of potential political activity, yet membership does have 
an effect simply by bringing together people of like social position and interests“ (1954:53).  
Thus, they argued, “organisational membership brings out latent political predispositions“ 
(Berelson/Lazarsfeld/McPhee 1954:53).  
When stating the decline of the impact of old group memberships on voting behaviour it must 
be considered that new relationships between organisations and voting behaviour might have 
arisen. These new relationships might not have the lifelong impact old group memberships 
have and they will probably also not include such large homogenous groups as trade unions 
and church associations. But they may still be significant for the voting decision of the 
individual. Even Max Weber stated that choral societies in Germany have a considerable 
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effect in at first glance unlikely areas, for example, in political ones (cf. Sahner 1993:47; se 
also Otte 1998:187 and van Deth 2001:214).  
Furthermore, in contrast to Lepsius’, I assume that social milieus today do not have to be 
regionally restricted (cf. Chapter 2.1.1). As pointed out by Böltken (1992:169), there is a 
general tendency towards trans-local orientations and group specific lifestyles; groups are no 
longer regionally fixed in advance. In today’s society most regional organisations are also part 
of national and partly also transnational organisations. And even if organisations only exist at 
the national level the development of modern technology facilitates, for example, with the 
help of the Internet, the establishment of specific group interests and group awareness between 
the individuals even though no direct personal interaction might take place in everyday life 
(cf. Beck 1997, Oedegaard 1994 and 2000). Several German parties have, for example, 
established virtual organisations in the Internet which they want to have the same legal status 
as a Landesverband (party organisation at the Länder level). These virtual party organisations 
offer chat-rooms and email exchanges between party members who due to job mobility both 
within Germany and abroad or only limited leisure time cannot engage in traditional party 
organisations. The SPD established such a virtual party organisation already in 1995 
(SPD:2002), the FDP founded one in June 2002 (FDP:2002) and the PDS followed with the 
establishment of a 17. Landesverband end August 2001 (Partei des Demokratischen 
Sozialismus:2001). As party memberships decrease the parties hope that in particular new and 
young members may be addressed through an Internet based party membership. To which 
extent this kind of organisational membership will actually become a significant alternative to 
traditional organisations remains to be seen. In particular this will depend on the future legal 
status these on-line organisations will have. 
The above presented arguments can be summarised in the following way:  
I assume that both old and new social milieus exist in the German population. The old 
milieus are featured by traditional lifestyles and are still formed on the basis of social 
structural cleavages, like class, religion and region. To a certain extent, these cleavages 
are still reflected by organisations that are closely linked with specific political parties. In 
order to detect potential new milieus, new lifestyles also have to be considered. These 
lifestyles incorporate different aspects of the individual’s way of living and its values. 
They might indicate the existence of other cleavages than the ones expressed by 
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traditional lifestyles and milieus. The membership structure of lifestyle groups and their 
connection to specific political parties is important for the establishment of new social 
milieus.  
As emphasised by Kriesi (1998:181) 
“The decline of traditional cleavages does not necessarily signify the end of structuration of politics by 
social divisions. The crux is to identify theoretically and empirically the relevant social divisions in a 
world in flux and to study their political formation.” 
In the empirical analysis in Chapter 7 lifestyle groups will therefore be used to describe 
statistically more or less homogeneous groups defined by important life areas, leisure 
activities and aesthetic preferences.  
Thus, a lifestyle group will be defined as a  
group of people expressing similar values, leisure activities and aesthetic preferences in 
everyday life. 
By applying the lifestyle approach the assumption is that not only traditional cleavages 
become visible, but also – as pointed out by Kriesi – theoretically and empirically relevant 
social division and to study their political formation. A cleavage is in this thesis thus 
understood as a  
characteristic or issue which is represented by one particular lifestyle group which is 
also connected to organisational membership and organisational interest 
representation.  
These cleavages may be either latent or manifest (cf. Figure 2.3). Whereas latent cleavages 
may be understood as social divisions – either on the basis of social structure or issue position 
- which may have the “quality” and importance of becoming real societal cleavages, but have 
not yet reached the surface, manifest cleavage implies that a particular social division already 
exists and has been institutionalised by organisations and parties. 
And finally, 
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a social milieu will be defined if an association exists between a lifestyle group, 
cleavage(s), organisational membership, organisational interest representation and party 
preference.  
An discussion of the distinction and relationship between the concepts will take place in the 
following chapter.  
2.4 A theoretical framework for analysing cleavages, lifestyles and social milieus in 
modern electoral research  
Figure 2.3 (based on Figures 2.1 and 2.2) will be used to clarify the distinction between a 
lifestyle group and a social milieu as defined above. Figure 2.3 may be interpreted as 
follows: the individual lifestyle is a product of personal and socio-economic features, the 
experiences which have had an impact on the individual's values and socialisation process. 
In everyday life, the individuals choose to socialise with people with whom they basically 
share similar characteristics18, a process of communalisation takes place. Different groups 
exist side by side and no major conflict of interests arises. These groups can also be found 
on a trans-regional level where members of a group, through Wahlverwandtschaft 
(affinity), can equally identify with, for example, a political candidate or a party presented 
in the media. A process of virtual communalisation triggered by the media might take 
place.19  
As shown on the right side of Figure 2.3, it might be assumed that people sharing similar 
lifestyles establish social groups. The reason may be non-political and be based on the 
preference for the same leisure activities like playing golf or going to the theatre. A 
process of communalisation may thus take place based on solidarity and sympathy. 
Although latent cleavages may already exist, this phase is characterised by group solidarity 
between the members sharing a similar lifestyle. There is no conflict with other social 
groups with different lifestyles. Nevertheless, the situation may turn into one of conflict. A 
group, comparing itself with other groups, may feel discriminated or see its values and 
interests undermined; at this time the social group will form itself, establish an own 
                                                 
18 Recall the argument from Lazarsfeld et.al presented in Chapter 2.1.1 
19 Such a process of virtual communalisation might also take place through other modern technologies like 
for example the Internet. 
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organisation or join an existing one - the cleavages may become manifest and a process of 
aggregation takes place (recall Figure 2.1). Such a development may be seen in the new 
social movements in the area of ecology, environmental protection, women’s groups and 
citizen’s initiatives in West Germany and their attachment to die Grünen (cf. von Alemann 
1992:101; Weßels 1997:213f.). A cleavage that becomes manifest through the 
establishment of an interest organisation is required for the establishment of a milieu with 
a long-lasting loyalty to a certain party. Whether this is a party established by the interest 
organisation itself - the British Labour Party, for example, was initiated by trade unions - 
or whether the interest organisation finds an already existing party willing to represent 
their interest is of no importance for the impact of the milieu on voting behaviour.20 
                                                 
20 However, this is significant to the development of the party system since the establishment of a new party 
would change the number of parties competing for votes. 
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Figure 2.3 The dynamics between cleavages, lifestyles, organisations and political 
elites in the establishment of social milieus  
 
The existence of lifestyle groups on 
the trans-regional level through a 
common identity based on 
Wahlverwandtschaft 
The formation of an individual's lifestyle 
Vergemeinschaftung   
through the interaction between  
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group solidarity (latent cleavages) 
Vergesellschaftung  
manifestation of cleavages - 
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organisational infrastructure 
representing the interests of a particular  
social group 
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that particular group  
The materialistic point (social structure) 
The ideal point (culture) 
Values 
The establishment of social milieus with 
stable party preferences 
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In this context it may be interesting to note that Weber also argued that a process of 
aggregation could take place before a process of communalisation takes place. An example 
he uses is a school class which in the beginning is established on a functional basis; the 
pupils do not know each other. However, these pupils will gradually develop a feeling of 
solidarity; according to Weber a process of communalisation will take place. Thus, it is 
irrelevant which process comes first. This might be important in order to understand that 
individuals who - for different reasons - have joined an organisation might be more likely 
to develop similar attitudes than individuals who are not members of the same 
organisation. 
In consequence, lifestyles may be considered as rationally motivated individual preferences 
facilitated by the individualisation process. Nevertheless, as argued in this section, lifestyle 
groups can also be developing social milieus where a process of communalisation takes place 
between individuals sharing similar social characteristics, cleavage perceptions, lifestyles and 
organisational membership structures. A reason why the lifestyle approach may seem so 
insignificant to electoral research may be that the lifestyle groups are simply not (yet) 
politicised or electoral researchers have not yet found those cleavages which uncover social 
conflicts between modern lifestyle groups.    
In the next chapter the cleavages and social milieus established at the time of the German 
Empire and the Weimar Republic will be presented. It will also be explained how they 
developed in East and West Germany after the Second World War. 
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3. TRADITIONAL CLEAVAGES AND SOCIAL MILIEUS 
3.1 Cleavages and social milieus in the German Empire and the Weimar Republic 
In their classic book Party Systems and Voter Alignments Lipset and Rokkan (1967) 
demonstrate how the political alliances were formed that led to the development of stable 
systems of political organisation in western countries (cf. Lipset/Rokkan 1967:35). They argue 
that the distinction between western party systems clearly reflect the differences of the 
national histories of conflict and compromise across different cleavage lines. Lipset and 
Rokkan (1967:47, Rokkan 1970:101ff.) define four decisive dimensions of cleavage in 
Western polities in relation to certain historical epochs: the conflict between centre and 
periphery to the Reformation and Counter-Reformation in the 16th-17th centuries. Issues 
dominating in this epoch were national versus supranational religion and national language 
versus Latin. The conflict between State and Church is arranged to the national revolution; the 
phase in which the nation states were formed and consolidated from 1789 and after. In this 
epoch the conflict of secular versus religious control of mass education dominated. The third 
cleavage, the one between land and industry corresponds with the Industrial Revolution in the 
19th century and was characterised by the issues concerning tariff levels for agricultural 
products and control versus freedom for industrial enterprise. Finally, Lipset and Rokkan add 
a fourth dimension of cleavage, the one between capital and worker, corresponding to the 
Russian Revolution of 1917. The integration into national polity versus commitment to an 
international revolutionary movement was the dominating issue in this epoch.21 Thus, in the 
1920’s a freezing of the major party alternatives had taken place in the wake of the extension 
of the suffrage and the mobilisation of major sections of the new potential supporters and led 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967:50) to the argument that, with a few significant exceptions, the party 
systems of the 1960s reflect the cleavage structure of the 1920s. 
 
 
                                                 
21 However, the Russian Revolution did not produce new cleavages but simply accentuated long-established 
lines of division within the working-class elite (Lipset/Rokkan 1967:48). 
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Figure 3.1 The cleavage model of Lipset and Rokkan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Roth 1998:27, English translation) 
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Socialists and who in the Weimar Republic were represented by the Communists (see also 
Sperber 1997:3). 
All four political social milieus were sharply separated from each other by moral barriers. 
Until the end of the Weimar Republic the German party system was characterised by a close 
relationship between the political parties and their respective social milieus. The main 
characteristics of the social milieus and their development up to the end of the Weimar 
Republic will be given in the following section (cf. Lepsius 1993: 32ff.). As emphasised in 
Figure 2.1, there is a close relationship between cleavages, social milieus and parties and these 
will be presented in further details in the Chapters 3.1.2 to 3.1.4.  
3.1.1 Social moral milieus and the development of the party system  
The Conservative milieu: the Conservative milieu developed due to the conflict between the 
feudal ruling strata whose members had the status of civil servant at the time of absolutism 
and the rising bourgeoisie. Furthermore, this conflict was complicated by the personal union 
between public servants and lords (of manors). With the Prussian agricultural constitution this 
conflict experienced a specific regionalisation and economisation in the East. Thus, the 
Conservative milieu had two variants, the feudal-agrarian one and the governmental-bourgeois 
one. Protestantism united them. The barrier of common moral concepts and religious 
prejudices protected this subculture against the Protestant petty bourgeois milieu and the 
Catholic milieu. 
In the German Empire the Conservative Party had a solid, regionally concentrated support 
basis. From 1871 to 1887 the party increased in proportion to growing number of voters. It 
increased, however, in its traditional basis and not through votes of other electoral groups. The 
Conservatives managed to keep their electorate, but their growth stagnated. They remained the 
representatives of a Protestant, agrarian, regionally closed social milieu with traditional 
paternalistic ideals (Lepsius 1993:32ff.). With the beginning of the Weimar Republic, the 
Conservatives, now calling themselves the German National People’s Party (DNVP), still 
depended on their 1912 pre-war milieus. In addition, the party significantly gained in the 
critical election of 1924 protest voters of the urban population which previously voted for the 
Liberals. However, in the 1928 election the Conservatives’ election result dropped to the same 
level they had before World War I.  
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The Protestant-bourgeois milieu: in the course of time the socio-economic homogeneity which 
existed when the milieu was established, decreased and existential fear arose with growing 
industrialisation. Due to assimilation processes with both the Conservative and the Socialist 
milieu the bourgeois social milieu narrowed to a middle class with a specific petty-bourgeois 
social moral; the original democratic aims of the milieu were again and again ritualised and 
dogmatised in new intellectual versions. The self-confidence of this milieu was founded on a 
moral-cultural distance to the labour movement and the conviction to be conducive to the 
state’s benefit (Lepsius 1993:48).  
Although German liberalism is featured by changing party formations, a line may be found 
throughout the time period from the German Empire to the Weimar Republic. In 1871 the 
Liberals had 1.5 million voters and the peak was reached in 1897 with 2.7 million voters.22 
However, since then the Liberals failed to win new parts of the population over. They focused 
on the social groups they had roused before the establishment of the Empire. German 
liberalism managed the transition from the Empire to the Weimar Republic, but since 1924 
rapidly declined because it lost its political, integrating power. It could not integrate the 
German bourgeoisie into the industrial society. Major parts of the liberal party converted into 
either protest parties like the Reform Party, the Antisemites and the National Socialists or 
parties representing the interests of specific professional groups (Lespisus 1993:34).  
The Catholic milieu: this milieu was established on the conflict between church and state and 
its main aim was maintain inner autonomy. This led to isolation and to dogmatisation of an 
internal moral which social moral concepts came from a time, where no external threats gave 
reason for a religious conclusion. The inner heterogeneity of strata specific interest prevented 
the articulation of these social conflicts between the strata. Finally a denominational moral 
barrier against Protestants and dissidents surrounded the whole and the social milieu fought 
for an autonomous monopoly on the socialisation processes (cf. Lepsius 1993:47).  
Zentrum entered the German Empire both well organised and with a high turnout in the 
Catholic areas. Furthermore, the strength of the Zentrum grew rapidly with the pressure of the 
struggle between the Church and the State (Kulturkampf) and reached its full strength in 1874 
with 1,4 million votes which it also kept with the growing recruitment till 1887. Thereafter, 
                                                 
22  As in the case of the Conservative, also this due to the increasing proportion of voters since 1871. 
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the Zentrum continued to gain absolute votes, but the number lagged behind the actual 
population development. Till the end of the German Empire the Zentrum thus lost recruiting 
power. With the transition into the Weimar Republic, Zentrum gained votes again, in 
particular due to the introduction of female suffrage. Nevertheless, already from 1920 this 
development slowly reversed. The social and political order of the Zentrum voters was based 
on denomination, pre-political and pre-industrial value orientations which were indifferent to 
social and political events. This also facilitated the strong resistance of this milieu against the 
national socialists (Lepsius 1993:34ff.).  
The Socialist milieu: Finally the fourth large social milieu integrated those parts of the 
population which dropped out of the other social milieus with the process of industrialisation. 
The Socialist milieu was rather homogenous and became the strongest fighter for political 
equality. However, restricted to specific class interests, the social democrats involved in 
several fights about political and social equality where no complete agreement could be 
reached on the priority of neither the one nor the other (Lepsius 1993:48 ff.).  
The Socialist party was hardly organised at the beginning of the German Empire. In 1875 the 
social liberal and radical democratic sects united and formed the Social Democratic party23. 
Under the pressure of the socialist law (Sozialistengesetzes)24 a broad network of pre-party 
organisations were developed and up till 1890 the party gained a fifth of the votes (1.4 
million). This increase continued until 1912 and the party mobilised workers, certain parts of 
the agricultural workers and decayed craftsman and integrated these groups into a specific 
sub-culture. With the transition to the Weimar Republic the party grew significantly, however, 
already in 1920 the Socialist (including the Communist) only had their relative share of 1912. 
According to Lepsius the development of Socialism in Germany got stuck to the organised 
social milieu developed at the turn of the 19th century. The population part mobilised until then 
was a reliable base of recruitment, but no expansions were successful except for in the 
                                                 
23 In 1875 the General German Workers’ Association (Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein – ADAV) 
which was founded in 1863 by Ferdinand v. Lasalle and the Social Democratic Workers Party 
(Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei – SDAP) founded in 1869 by Karl Liebknecht and August Bebel 
merged and became the German Socialist Workers’ Party (Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands). In 
1890 the party name was changed to the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). In 1917 the Idependent 
Social Democratic Party (USPD) and the Spartakusbund split from the SPD. The USPD joined the SPD 
again in 1922 whereas the Spartakusbund constituted the German Communist Party (KPD) in 1919 (Iral 
1997:1 in the section on SPD).  
24  Otto von Bismarck tried to win the workers and thereby abolish the workers’ party by introducing 
extensive social insurances during the 1880s (cf. Görtemaker 1994:293ff.)  
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extraordinary situation in 1919. Socialism was the only new community with a political–social 
ethos in the era of the Empire and it was in direct confrontation with industrialisation. 
Nevertheless, the recruitment was finished within the time of the Empire (Lepsius 1993:35). 
The share of votes for the parties in the German Empire and the Weimar Republic are shown 
in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 The development of the German party system 1871-1928 
Year Turn- 
Out 
Conservatives Liberals Centre Socialists Other 
 In % % abs. % Abs % abs. % abs. % abs. 
1871 51 23 9 40 15 19 7 3 1 15 6 
1874 60 14 7 39 20 28 14 7 4 12 6 
1877 60 18 10 38 20 25 13 9 5 10 5 
1878 63 27 15 33 19 23 13 8 4 9 5 
1881 56 24 12 37 19 23 12 6 3 9 5 
1884 60 22 12 37 21 23 13 10 5 8 5 
1887 77 25 19 36 27 20 15 10 8 9 6 
1890 71 19 13 34 25 19 13 20 14 8 6 
1893 72 19 15 27 20 19 15 23 18 12 9 
1898 68 16 12 24 18 19 15 27 21 14 12 
1903 76 14 13 23 22 20 19 32 30 12 11 
1907 84 14 15 25 28 19 22 29 33 13 14 
1912 85 12 15 26 31 16 20 35 43 11 13 
 
 DNVP DVP and DDP Centre and BVP SPD and KPD Other incl. 
NSDAP 
1919 83 10 31 23 70 20 60 45 139 2 5 
1920 79 15 42 22 62 18 51 42 117 3 9 
1924 77 20 57 15 43 17 49 33 97 14 42 
1924 79 21 62 16 40 17 53 35 106 11 33 
1928 76 14 44 14 42 15 47 40 124 17 51 
*The numbers refer to the share of votes in percentages at the elections as well as the absolute number of votes in 100 000. 
(Source: Lepsius 1993:33, English translation) 
As can be seen from Table 3.1 the party system in the Weimar Republic was increasingly 
fragmented. According to Jeffery (1999:98 ff.) 
“(..) the tendency to party political sectionalization evident in the extreme form at the bourgeois centre 
but also in the manual worker and Catholic population, had serious implications for party interaction, 
coalition formation and governmental stability throughout the Weimar years. It indicated a narrowness 
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of perspectives which led parties to be unwilling to subordinate sectional interests or to compromise 
sectionally based ideologies in pursuit of any wider, shared conception of national interests.“ 
In particular in the bourgeois centre the splinter parties represented a “sectionalization gone 
mad” (Jeffery 1999:98). Parties sought to represent small social groups like the Saxon 
Farmers’ Party and the League of Farmers and Vineyard Owners in the German South-West. 
Thus,the Weimar years lacked the clearly identifiable cleavage structures on which the Lipset-
Rokkan thesis of long-term continuities in the social foundations of party politics is based. 
Jeffery (1999:98) argues  
“There was no one middle class as such in the Weimar years, but rather a series of different middle 
classes which lacked any sense of collective identity and interest (beyond, at best, a shared anti-
Leftism).” 
The summary of the different social milieus and the development of the party system in the 
German Empire and the Weimar Republic clearly show how different the social milieus were 
with respect to stability. As emphasised in Falter and Bömermann’s study (1989) of the rise of 
the National-Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP), before 1933 the party strongholds of 
the Zentrum and the Bavarian People’s Party (BVP)25 most strongly resisted the extreme right 
wing nationalists. The Catholic strongholds had a below-average support for the NSDAP and 
until July 1932 the number of votes for the Zentrum even increased. Schmitt concludes these 
results to confirm 
”(…) welche stabilisierende Wirkung ein durch Amtskirche, Partei und Verbände integrierendes 
konfessionelles Milieu selbst unter extremen Bedingungen noch entfalten konnte" (Schmitt 1989:165).26 
The extreme left wing strongholds could be distinguished from the other parties, as well, due 
to their stability and even growth in support for the Communist Party (KPD). However, at the 
same time their support of the NSDAP highly increased. This phenomenon is traced back to 
the different powers of the milieus. The Zentrum and the BVP were 2 1/2 times stronger in 
their strongholds than the KPD was in his (Falter/Bömermann 1989:110). The party 
stronghold exchange between the DNVP and the NSDAP was the clearest sign of a change of 
political representation within a milieu. A similar exchange between the Liberals and the 
NSDAP was only partly confirmed.  
                                                 
25 The BVP, was a Catholic Party, too, which split off the Zentrum in 1925 and which represented the 
Catholics in the state of Bavaria.  
26  English translation: ”(…) which stabilising effect a confessional milieu integrated through Church, party 
and organisations could unfold even under extreme conditions" (Schmitt 1989:165). 
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The social milieus were all closely connected with regional loyalties and sometimes also 
had their own regional party representation. The impact of the regional cleavage on the 
party system in the German Empire and the Weimar Republic is presented in further detail 
in the following chapter. 
3.1.2 The centre-periphery cleavage and the development of regional milieus 
According to Urwin27 (1982:165) there has always been a disjunction between ‘political’ 
Germany and the territory occupied by German speaking-peoples. A German state did not 
exist until 1870 although German societies have been on the European map for centuries. 
Due to the changing political boundaries of German territory, German politics showed 
marked regional differences and not even the establishment of a single German state in 
1870 could deny the existence of important regional differences that had grown over 
centuries: An east-west gradient reflected economic differences in terms of urbanisation, 
agricultural settlement and industrialisation and was crossed by the religious north-south 
axis (Urwin 1982:181).  
These regional loyalties which had developed over centuries manifested themselves not 
only in a cleavage between Prussia and the remaining Germany, Prussia itself was a 
collection of disparate territorial units with different histories, identities and behavioural 
patterns. This regional particularism which existed before Germany was unified in 1870 
still existed in the twentieth century. Regional loyalty remained high and Berlin never 
obtained the dominating central power some other west European capitals developed 
(Urwin 1982:181).  
In the German Empire the SPD was mainly a party of the industrial and urban areas. It was 
not able to establish itself in areas dominated by Catholics who, except in ethnic regions 
like West Prussia, Posen and Alsace-Lorraine, voted for the Zentrum. Given the regional 
distribution of Catholics the electoral base of support for the party could thus be found in 
the western Rhineland, the south (especially Bavaria) and Upper Silesia (Urwin 1982:189). 
The Conservatives had their base of support in the Prussian aristocracy in the eastern 
provinces. The National Liberals were essentially Protestant and had first gathered force in 
                                                 
27 Only the most significant developments of the centre-periphery cleavage and regional developments in 
Germany will be stated. For a more extensive presentation see Urwin 1982:165-249.  
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the borders of Germany, like Baden and Schleswig-Holstein. The liberals were stronger in 
western Germany; in the northwest their support was based in urban areas and in the south 
in rural and agricultural areas. However, the progressive element of liberalism was 
Prussian and the many mergers and splinters reflected regional as well as programmatic 
differences. An example is the South German People’s Party in Württemberg which kept 
its independence till 1910 (Urwin 1982:190ff). 
The most noticeable regionalist parties were those of the ethnic minorities like the Polish 
population in the eastern provinces and the population of Alsace and Lorraine. Urwin 
considers the Guelph (in German die Welfen) movement of Hanover as a regionalist party. 
The Guelph movement denied Hanover’s annexation by Prussia which the deposed 
monarch had accepted in 1866 (Urwin 1982:191). 
In the Weimar Republic a particular variant of proportional representation was introduced 
which encouraged parties to contest in every electoral district. Thus, electoral results of 
this period offer a better opportunity to study the parties’ regional support (Urwin 
1982:192). The newly founded liberal parties, German Democratic Party (DDP) and 
German People’s Party (DVP) had no major political power in the Weimar Republic, only 
in Baden and Württemberg the DDP had significant, regional support. The DVP inherited 
some of the National Liberal strongholds in north-western Germany and in urban areas. 
The votes for the Zentrum and the BVP highly correlated with the distribution of 
Catholics.28 Only in some of the industrialised areas of the Rhineland the Zentrum party 
had problems being supported by Catholic voters and in Bavaria the BVP did not obtain all 
Catholic votes due to competing regional and rural groups like the Bavarian Peasants’ 
league which was strongly supported in Lower and Upper Bavaria. The successor of the 
Conservative Party, the DNVP, was mainly supported east of the river Elbe. Apart from 
strongholds in Hessen and support in the Protestant Middle Franconia, the DNVP had no 
regional base of support west of the Elbe.  
Politically significant parties survived in Hanover (die Welfen) and Bavaria (Bavarian 
Peasants’ league) which were both founded in the times of the German Empire. In 
Württemberg the already mentioned (Protestant) Württemberg Farmers’ and Winegrowers’ 
                                                 
28 The Zentrum and the BVP did not compete for Catholic votes except in the Palatinate (Urwin 1982:193). 
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became a strong regional force (cf. Urwin 1982:193). Together with other rural parties 
which were also survivors of the old Bund der Landwirte and the DNVP these parties 
represented a more or less permanent agrarian disaffection with the regime. The permanent 
agrarian crisis during the 1920s and the fact that no agrarian party existed helped the 
NSDAP to gain support. Urwin emphasised (1982:196):  
“The NSDAP was the first national party able to exploit the anti-urban, anti-capitalist sentiments of the 
German countryside: the 1930 breakthrough came primarily in western Protestant areas of peasant 
smallholdings.”  
The SPD and the KPD – the latter had split off the SPD - were the dominant parties in 
Berlin. Both parties highly correlated with industrialisation and therefore competed for 
support of the same social base. Whereas the SPD was a party that was evenly supported 
nationwide, the KPD’s heartland was the industrialised regions of the Rhineland and the 
Saxonies. Except for the KPD support in the Rhineland neither the SPD nor the KPD 
received noteworthy support in the Catholic regions (cf. Urwin 1982:196).  
3.1.3 The religious cleavage and the Catholic milieu 
Two events were of special importance for the revival of the religious cleavage in Germany in 
the 19th century. Firstly, this was the territorial resettlement of the Great Secularisation and 
the Wiener Congress - the religious homogeneity that had existed until 1814 was no longer 
given. Large, closed, Catholic areas were connected with Protestant-dominated German states 
that were in a majority, especially in Prussia. Secondly, due to the establishment of the 
German Empire which excluded Austria, this process was intensified. In most regions, except 
in Bavaria and Saxony, the German Catholics lived under the rule of Protestant dynasties. In 
additional to being a minority of one third, they also felt like second-class citizens (Schmitt 
1989:158). 
The fact that all conflicts could be connected with the religious cleavage was essential for the 
Catholic milieu in Germany. There were several decisive factors for the Catholic population: 
the opposition between the Catholic hierarchy and the State, between the Catholic minority 
and Protestant majority, between cultural periphery and the central state, between the 
bourgeois society and the State as well as the social contrast between the ordinary people 
(Catholics) on the one hand and the state class and employers (Protestants) on the other hand. 
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The abolition of the Kulturkampfgesetzgebung made it possible to integrate the Catholics into 
the nation state in the decades before the 20th century. However, the religious conflict still 
maintained its impact on Catholics as a Catholic social milieu with a strong political 
representation by the Zentrum party had been established in the meantime.  
On the local level the formation of associations and the local presence of the church integrated 
Catholic milieus across all strata. The universal character of the church and the national 
constitution of the associations provided, at the same time, a counterbalance to this 
parochialism and made the integration of milieus from different social structures feasible. 
Thereby not only the existing base of support was secured. The Catholic milieu was also 
established in the rising industrial societies:  
"Es erlaubte einerseits die Aufrechterhaltung hergebrachter Bindungen, traditionaler Weltbilder und 
unstädtischer Lebensweisen. Es bot äußere Ordnung und innere Sinngebung von einer außerhalb der 
Arbeitsphäre liegenden Lebenswelt her, und damit auch Schutz gegen die atomisierenden Folgen 
industrieller Arbeitsprozesse. Anderseits offerierte auch das katholische Milieu Instrumente, die es den 
Betroffenen erlaubte, die aus der Arbeitswelt resultierenden Problemlagen, innerhalb des katholischen 
Bevölkerungselements zu bewältigen (Arbeitervereine, christliche Gewerkschaften usw.)" (Schmitt 
1989:161). 
This explains the immense immunity of the Catholic milieu to the only milieu which was 
established after the foundation of the Empire, the Social Democratic milieu. 
In contrast, the Protestant milieu was characterised by the absence of the unifying function of 
the church. The church as an institution could not integrate opposing social groups on the local 
and the national level. None of the three Protestant milieus, the Conservative, Liberal and 
Social Democratic one, could base its mobilization on religious solidarity or the institutional 
support of the church. Every milieu had to build up its own specific integration mechanisms. 
Only the Social Democratic milieu managed to consolidate its organisational infrastructure to 
an extent comparable to that of the Catholic milieu. The religious milieu, therefore, had an 
advantage. It had already mobilised its members when the industrial revolution and the class 
conflict related to it began. 
3.1.4 The cleavage between workers and employers and the worker’s milieu 
In the 19th century Germany was characterised by a significant increase in payroll workers. 
In particular agricultural workers and small peasants had moved to the cities hoping for 
better living conditions (Winkler 1995:401, cf. Görtemaker 1994:175-206). 
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Simultaneously, an increasing number of workers were employed due to technical changes 
and a division of labour in expanding companies. The workers in the cities developed a 
different tradition than the workers in the countryside and in the small cities. In the latter 
areas the workers were still attached to the middle class through background, family, 
marriage, profession and membership in organisations an associations that included all 
strata. Thereby social contradictions were less obvious than in the cities. This even resulted 
in a certain distance to the Socialist movement established in the cities (cf. Winkler 
1995:402). In the big cities, modern industrial iron and metal companies including a large 
number of qualified workers were founded. Due to the working conditions in these 
companies these workers were most strongly exposed to the industrial socialisation and the 
tensions between employers and workers. 
According to Lepsius (1993:45) the central social event in the 1860s and 1870s was the 
establishment of a social cultural workers’ milieu. Due to the far-reaching social change a 
sub-culture including both agricultural and manual attitudes was developed; this sub-
culture simultaneously had to address the underprivileged situation of its members and 
demand political-cultural emancipation. This pre-socialist sub-culture was the basis of the 
political workers’ movement which integrated about 50% of the workers (Lepsius 
1993:45). Although the number of members and voters dramatically increased during the 
Empire, the sub-cultural orientation of the workers’ movement did not shake the party 
system. The socialist milieu of workers and manual workers was embedded in the already 
politically organised social-cultural milieu. Since the milieu was represented by the SPD, 
the party system was hardly influenced by the impact of industrialisation. It led to a 
“negative integration” of the working class as Roth puts it (cf. Lepsius 1993:46f.). The 
working force was structured within itself and not integrated in the society as a whole – 
party, trade unions, education-, welfare-, sports- and social associations integrated the 
proletariat in a political sub-culture which facilitated the definition of a common situation.  
This coalition between the workers and the socialist parties which had developed during 
the time of the Empire was also maintained during the Weimar Republic by actualising 
political issues relevant for the working class. Winkler (1995:404) emphasised: 
“Die zum großen Teil durch die Position der Eltern vorbestimmte soziale Lage der Arbeiter, die 
Prozesse der primären politischen Sozialisation, die wahrgenommenen überlieferten Erfahrungen der 
relevanten Bezugsgruppen in der Gesellschaft sowie die eigenen stratifikationsbedingten Erfahrungen 
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banden einen beträchtlichen Teil der Arbeiterschaft an diejenige politische Elite, die sich der Interessen 
insbesondere der gewerblichen Arbeiterschaft angenommen hatte.” 
As discussed in Chapter 3.1.2 the regional differences of socialist support varied 
significantly and the support highly correlated with the number of workers in a region. The 
manual workers thus formed, at least in urban, industrial centres, an identifiable and 
distinguishable social milieu in the Weimar years and they formed the social basis of a 
stable, left wing vote (Jeffery 1999:105).  
According to Urwin (1982:205ff.) the party systems and the institutional structures of both 
the Empire and the Weimar times were supported by keeping alive cultural and economic 
differences and their regional basis. The system of the Empire ignored all problems 
whereas the Weimar Republic’s system permitted everybody to name them. 
Urwin offers a summary of the salient conflict dimensions of both in the Empire and in the 
Weimar Republic. Furthermore he places the parties according to a more ‘centrist’ or more 
‘regional’ position. The summaries are presented in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 and also clearly 
demonstrate how varying party alliances became possible.  
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Table 3.2 Conflict dimensions and parties in the German Empire 
Cleavage 
SPD Zentrum Minorities Agrarian Parties 
Regional 
Parties 
Progress 
Party 
National 
Liberals 
German 
Reich 
Party 
Conser-
vatives 
Culture          
Ethnic-
Linguistic  (R) R   (C) C C C 
Religion  R R  (R) (C) C C (R) 
Economic          
Rural-urban (C)   R (R) C C C R 
Rural class  (R)  R (R)    C 
Urban class R     (R) C C C 
Social 
welfare C C    C R R R 
Political/ 
Territorial          
East vs. 
west    R  (R) R C C C C 
Prussia vs. 
rest (R) R R R R R C C C 
Traditional 
values R (C) R R R R R R C 
Centrali-
sation (C) R R  R C C C (R) 
(Source: Urwin 1982:206) 
Table 3.3 Conflict dimensions and political parties in the Weimar Republic 
Cleavage 
KPD SPD Zentrum BVP 
Agrarian/ 
Regional 
Parties 
DDP DVP DNVP 
Culture         
Religion  C R R  C C C 
Economic         
Rural-urban C C  (R) R C C R 
Rural class  (R)  (R) R   C 
Urban class R R    (R) R R 
Social 
welfare C C C   C R R 
Political/ 
territorial         
East vs. 
West     R R R   C 
Centrali-
sation (C) C R R R C C (R) 
Regime 
support R C C (R)  C RC R 
(Source: Urwin 1982:207, C = centralist; R = regionalist. Brackets indicate a subsidiary and more dubious 
ranking).  
3.2 Changes in the traditional Cleavages and social Milieus after 1945 
After 1945 three events took place which changed the situation compared to that in the 
German Empire and the Weimar Republic. Firstly, the Catholics lost their minority position 
due to the division of Germany. Secondly, the traditional anti-central and anti-Prussian 
tendencies vanished with its dissolution. Thirdly, a religious mix of the population took place 
due to evacuations, mobility of refugees etc. 
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3.2.1 Developments in West Germany: Continuity and discontinuity 
The parties represented in the first election in 1949 were a mixture of old and new ones. The 
SPD continued in the tradition of the Weimar Republic by representing the manual working 
class. The KPD continued to represent the far left and the German Rights Party (DRP) the far 
right whereas the bourgeois centre was still as disintegrated as during the Weimar times. 
However, in addition to the continuities of the party system of the Weimar Republic, the 
CDU/CSU and the FDP emerged as new, nationwide parties at the 1949 election 
“The foundation of the FDP was an attempt to bring together different strands of the hitherto divided 
German liberal tradition, while the CDU/CSU represented an altogether new type of party. Although 
descended closely from the inter-war Centre Party (and Bavarian BVP), the CDU/CSU styled itself as a 
democratic Volkspartei, a catch-all ‘party of the whole people”(Jeffery 1999:102).  
This prevented a re-establishment of Christian trade unions and its own religious party. Instead 
of forming a purely Catholic party, a union party was established which also included 
Protestant factions. At the same time the Catholic network lost its functions as these were 
taken over by the Länder or municipalities. However, a relatively closed Catholic milieu 
existed in the 1950s. The Social Democrats and the Liberals had also maintained their 
traditions of 1933, strongly focusing on their respective milieus.  
The transformations which began in West Germany in the 1950s and which continue until 
today can be seen as a process during which the parties became independent and loosened 
their ties to their respective milieus. The foundation of the old party system was shattered with 
the CDU/CSU as a political party that represented more than one milieu. The religious 
cleavage still existed but only between religious and secular movements and not - as in former 
times - as a cleavage between Catholics and Protestants. In addition, the CDU/CSU committed 
itself to the West German ‘social market economy’ and a western orientated foreign policy. 
The party thus managed to integrate broad sections of the non-left electorate into the party. It 
was able to build up a widespread support basis (cf. Jeffery 1999:102). 
This development made it impossible for the SPD not to react to the political changes. It had 
to leave its traditional milieu as well if it wanted to get more than a 30% basic rate of support. 
In its Godesberger Programm of 1959 the SPD defined itself as a left-of-centre people’s party. 
The party gave up its Marxist base and increasingly accepted the principle of a socially 
responsible market economy as opposed to their previous adherence to socialist 
interventionism and large-scale nationalisation (cf. Jeffery 1999:103).   
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These transformations of the parties' led to important changes on the part of the milieus. Both 
were reciprocally reinforcing processes - the erosion of milieus and the transformation of 
parties which had detached themselves from their original milieus by becoming people's 
parties. This implies that parties can allow social transformations to take place or that they can 
adjust to social changes. It is a process of interaction and has an important impact on the 
stability of the social milieus. The individual may leave his traditional milieu more easily, 
without having to expect punishments from his social environment; the parties' loosening of 
ties actually more or less asks for an active individual political orientation and identification 
which is not just based on tradition.  
The dual role of the Union parties as a party of the Catholic milieu on the one hand and as a 
representative of movements on the right side of the SPD on the other hand, guaranteed the 
loyalty of Catholics who remained in their milieu. At the same time a great number of 
Catholics were given the opportunity to loosen or give up their connection with the church 
without having to give up their original party political orientation. According to Mair (1993) it 
is thus necessary to consider the movements within the traditional parties when proclaiming 
that an electoral change has taken place in the advanced industrialised society. As can be seen 
from Table 3.4 the CDU/CSU and the SPD are still the major parties in Germany although the 
party system has become more fragmentary with the Greens taking office in the Bundestag in 
1983 and the PDS at the general election in 1990 after the reunification with the former GDR.  
Table 3.4 Bundestag election results 1949-1998 
Party 1949 1953 1957 1961 1965 1969 1972 1976 1980 1983 1987 1990 1994 1998 
CDU/ 
CSU 
31.0 45.2 50.2 45.4 47.6 46.1 44.9 48.6 44.5 48.8 44.3 43.8 41.5 35.1 
SPD 29.2 28.8 31.8 36.2 39.3 42.7 45.8 42.6 42.9 38.2 37.0 33.5 36.4 40.9 
FDP 11.9 9.5 7.7 12.8 9.5 5.8 8.4 7.9 10.6 7.0 9.1 11.0 6.9 6.2 
Die 
Grünen 
- - - - - - - - 1.5 5.6 8.3 3.8 7.3 6.7 
PDS - - - - - - - - - - - 2.4 4.4 5.1 
Others 27.8 16.5 10.3 5.7 3.6 5.5 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.5 1.4 4.2 3.5 5.9 
(Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 1999 and 2000) 
Since the national cleavage (centre versus periphery) which had been decisive in the Weimar 
Republic as well as the agricultural-industrial cleavage (urban versus rural) had lost its 
importance29, the West German party system was dominated by the two cleavages work 
versus capital and religious versus secularism in the 1950s and 1960s. These were crosscutting 
                                                 
29 Among other things, this was due to post-war mobility and the development of the welfare state. 
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and formed a party system with three dominant parties, the CDU/CSU, the SPD and the FDP. 
In addition, the Zentrum which still existed in the beginning of the 1950s represented the 
Catholic employees (Alemann 1992: 95). 
Figure 3.1 Cleavages in the West German party system in the 1950s and 1960s 
(Source: Alemann 1992:95, English translation) 
With regard to the relationship between religion and voting behaviour, some comments are 
necessary. Firstly, it is the general assumption that voting behaviour and the decreased impact 
on religion and church attendance in society is directly proportional to one another. However, 
Schmitt (1989:171) states that religion is the main influencing factor for voting behaviour:  
"(...) die Konfession hat im Laufe der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik ihre Bedeutung für das 
Wahlverhalten nicht nur nicht verloren, sondern ist - angesichts der rückläufigen Einflusses anderer 
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Merkmale wie etwa Schichtzugehörigkeit - zur wichtigsten sozialstrukturellen Einflußgröße des 
Wahlverhaltens geworden."30 
Secondly, the contrast between the drastic changes of the milieu and the parties and a 
persistent voting behaviour can be explained by the long-term transformation process: the 
secularisation effect on voting behaviour will, if actually taking place, first become apparent in 
the next generation’s voting behaviour (cf. also Pappi 1992:204).  
The changing impact of the class cleavage and the religious cleavage on voting behaviour 
since World War II is shown in Table 3.5.  
Table 3.5 The socio-economic and religious cleavage in West Germany between 1949 
and 1994 
 1949 1953 1961 1965 1969 1972 1976 1980 1983 1987 1990 1994 
CDU/CSU voters among…. (in % of the average share of votes in the population) 
All respondents 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Workers 80 66 78 73 68 68 87 87 88 84 85 89 
Employees/ 
Civil servants 102 120 107 100 98 103 98 100 106 105 98 100 
Self-employed 105 102 109 135 140 142 137 144 131 140 141 141 
Farmers 159 144 115 160 194 213 191 200 175 174 166 197 
Protestants 80 78 72 75 66 74 78 74 81 81 85 92 
Catholics 134 127 131 131 138 134 133 136 129 128 124 124 
SPD voters among…. (in % of the average share of votes in the population) 
All respondents 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Workers 146 165 141 145 133 130 123 120 127 136 129 128 
Employees/ 
Civil servants 80 84 76 88 100 94 95 96 93 93 102 105 
Self-employed 54 52 46 31 50 67 51 59 59 52 50 54 
Farmers 17 16 62 33 10 20 19 31 32 31 31 31 
Protestants 111 123 132 126 129 117 121 116 124 117 114 118 
Catholics 94 74 76 67 69 80 74 78 71 83 83 87 
(Source: Bürklin/Klein 1998:81, English translation) 
To facilitate the analysis of party identification of the different social groups over time the 
share of votes have been compared to the electoral results in the population (Bürklin/Klein 
1998:79f.). Although no dramatic changes in the party affiliation of the social groups can 
be found there is a light tendency towards convergence in voting behaviour of the social 
groups over time. In 1949, for example, the share of Catholics voting for the CDU/CSU – 
was compared with the population – 134%. In 1994 this number was still significantly 
high, but had dropped to 124%. Simultaneously, the share of Protestants voting for the 
CDU/CSU increased from 80% to 92% in the same time period. As is shown in Table 3.5. 
                                                 
30  English translation: ”(…) denomination has not only not lost its significance on voting behaviour 
throughout the history of the Federal Republic, but has become the most important social structural 
influential factor on voting behaviour in view of the decreasing impact of other characteristics like 
strata.” 
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as well the share of workers voting for the SPD dropped from 146% in 1949 to 128% in 
1994. Parallel hereto the share of workers voting for the CDU/CSU increased from 80% to 
89%. With regard to the voting behaviour of employees and civil servants – the so-called 
“new middle class” – no particular party affiliation to either people’s party is evident since 
the late 1960s. Thus, although the traditional cleavages obviously still have an impact on 
voting in the 1990s, the people’s parties are increasingly concentrating on the social group 
of employees and civil servants without strong party affiliations. With the growing impact 
of the service sector (cf. Chapter 4.1.3) and growing size of this group they become 
increasingly important for the people’s parties to win the election.     
As presented in this chapter the German party system shows significant differences 
between the Weimar and Bonner party system. Germany thus belongs to the few 
exceptions of the Lipset and Rokkan model. Nevertheless, the cleavage theory still 
contributes to understand the establishment of and changes in the German party system. 
3.2.2 Developments in the GDR: 40 years of dictatorship 
The GDR was, on the other hand, run by a dictatorship for over 40 years. Other parties existed 
but they were under the power of the SED and in the end it really did not matter whom the 
citizens voted for. Social transformations were controlled, for example, the full development 
of the service sector was renounced to maintain the size of the working class (cf. Chapter 
4.1.3). A secularisation process took place in the GDR, although to a much larger extent than 
in West Germany. The number of Protestants in the population decreased from 80.4% in 1950 
to about 30% in 1989. In the 1950s the number of Catholics was 11%, in 1989 it had declined 
to 6.1% (Statistisches Bundesamt 1992:193). In the GDR religion was influenced by 
governmental policies, too, but in contrast to West Germany a strict separation between 
Church and State existed. In the 1950s, for example, the right to teach religion at school was 
withdrawn from the Church. Nevertheless, the Church kept involved in cultural and social 
matters. Since the mid 1980s opposing individuals, criticising the Communist regime, 
gathered in the Protestant church. As pointed out in Chapter 1, religion itself, though, as a 
measure of the existence of traditional values and changing value orientation can hardly be 
used with regard to the GDR. 
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In the GDR’s first free election for over 40 years, the Volkskammerwahl in March 1990, 
the SPD was expected to win significantly. It was assumed that the electoral patterns of pre 
World War II would revive (Schmitt 1997:425). In the Weimar Republic the geographical 
territory of the GDR mainly maintained Socialist and Communist voters. In the 1928 
elections to the Reichstag, the SPD obtained 36% of the votes compared to 27% in the 
region which later became the Federal Republic of Germany (cf. Schmitt 1994:186). 
Together with the KPD the left-wing parties even received 49% of the votes compared to 
35% in the Federal Republic. Even at the election in 1933 SPD and KPD maintained this 
stronghold in the east and received 38,1% of the votes compared to 25,8% in the territory 
of the later Federal Republic. Furthermore, in the elections in the Soviet zone in 1946 the 
voting pattern of pre war times continued, too. Nevertheless, this continuation finished in 
the following 40 years of dictatorship. At the Volkskammer election in 1990 the SPD and 
PDS were only weakly represented in the traditional industrial areas of the workers’ 
movement (Schmitt 1997:426f.) whereas the Conservative block Allianz für Deutschland 
(CDU, DSU and Demokratischer Aufbruch) received their highest support in these areas. 
Only two minor lines of continuation can be found between the 1990 and the 1946 
election. The Liberals were supported above average in parts of their former strongholds 
and the CDU received a significantly high support in the only closed Catholic area in the 
former GDR which was Eichsfeld in Thuringia.  
Based on analyses of the social structure and voting behaviour at the 1990 Volkskammer 
election, Schmitt (1997:433) argues that the traditional social structural cleavages still 
existed. However, the decades of dictatorship had also changed the relationship between 
social structure and party system. With respect to religion he found a close relationship 
between both Catholic and Protestant religious voters and the CDU. Thus, the religious 
cleavage in the east is to a larger extent one between the religious and the secular 
population than in the west. In the west still significantly more Catholics than Protestants 
vote for the Union parties. At the 1998 election, for example, the voting behaviour of 
Catholics in the east and the west hardly differed (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 1998:26f.). 
In the west 47% of the Catholics voted for the Union parties and in the east 46%. Among 
the Protestants, however, a different voting behaviour existed. In the west the SPD 
received 48% of the Protestant votes, the CDU obtained only 32%. However, in the east 
the CDU received 37% of the votes among Protestants compared 35% for the SPD. 
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According to Schmitt there thus exists a religious social moral milieu in the sense of 
Lepsius in the east (Schmitt 1997:430).  
With regard to the class cleavage Schmitt sees a disruption after 1990 both with 1) the 
historical patterns of the territory of the GDR and with 2) to the development in West 
Germany. The majority of workers in the GDR voted for the CDU in 1990. Both the SPD 
and PDS which traditionally represent the workers lacked a basis in their electorate. 
Furthermore, Schmitt argues that the class cleavage in the GDR was not as much 
embedded into milieus as in the west due to the fact that the workers in the GDR did not 
clearly dissociate themselves from other working people. Decades of repression and a 
lacking articulation of interests prevented the development of large social groups sharing a 
feeling of togetherness. The only group in the social hierarchy which according to Schmitt 
may be defined as a milieu is the leading strata in the SED and other leaders who received 
their positions due to their political career within the SED (cf. Schmitt 1997:430). The 
main outcome of the 1990 election was also confirmed at the 1994 general election, 
although the CDU lost some votes among workers in the east and won a few among the 
self-employed. In addition, the SPD increased their support in the new middle strata of 
employees and civil servants. The support among workers and self-employed stagnated 
which according to Schmitt (1997:440) indicates a development into an employees’ party. 
The outcome of the 1998 general election seems to confirm this trend towards a 
convergence of voting patterns in the east and west. 39% of the workers in the east voted 
for the SPD at the 1998 election whereas the CDU only received 27% of the votes in this 
group (cf. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 1998:22ff). Arzheimer/Falter (1998:43) argue, 
however, that this convergence in voting pattern among East German workers at the 1998 
election was a result of increased readiness to change party support rather than an 
increasing similarity to West German voting patterns and that this may change again at the 
next election. 
I have now presented the two dominant cleavages in Germany, work versus capital and 
religion versus secularism. They both managed to develop into stable milieus and to keep 
stable during World War II. As emphasised in this chapter the changes in milieus after 
World War II are closely linked to the social transformations that have taken place over the 
past decades. As argued by Pappi (1992:182) there is a change in election return at the 
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aggregate level when the social composition of the electorate changes. Thus, it is important 
to know the main trends of demographic, economic and social change. Before discussing 
the rise of new cleavages and possible new social milieus on the basis of lifestyle studies in 
Chapter 5, I will therefore present some of the most important social transformations of the 
post war Germanys which are assumed to have contributed to the weakening of the 
traditional cleavages and social milieus and facilitated the rise of new ones.  
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4. SOCIAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN WEST GERMANY AND THE 
GDR 
The development which has led to the transformation of milieus in West Germany – that of 
decreasing the traditional milieus in the past decades - can be seen as a change in the 
relationship between subject and situation (cf. Schulze 1992b). The situation affects the 
individual by limits, suggestion and release whereas the subject determines the individual’s 
actions via influence, symbolization and choice.  
Limits: Everyone acts in a room of restricted possibilities, given limits of money, mobility, 
communication, social networks, supply of consumer goods, chances to reach certain positions 
in the job market etc. Suggestion: The exposure to a situation has an impact on the individual 
who thereby obtains additional knowledge. New situations are overcome with the help of the 
cognitive knowledge of past situations. Release: The (new) situation is manifested. Only a part 
of the objective reality reaches the subject where the important thing how the reality is 
perceived by the individual and what he/she does with it.  
In contrast to the above three modes of situation, are the following three modes of action: 
Influence: An action that changes the situation like environmental influence, the construction 
of objects, the influence of other individuals etc. Symbolization: Signs to express attachment 
to, for example, a social group by special clothes, way of talking etc. Choice: Refers to which 
alternative an individual chooses in a given situation, for example, when choosing among 
consumer goods, planning a vacation or deciding whether to study or not. 
According to Schulze the social transformations which have taken place in the post war 
decades have shifted the impact of the modes described above. Whereas individuals actions 
were previously determined by limits, influence and extraneous symbolic they are today 
determined by self-determined symbolization, suggestion, release and choice. This also 
implies that social circles are today selectively chosen by the individuals and not imposed by, 
for example, the family.  
The relationship between subject and situation has in particular been marked by the decrease 
in situational limits over the past decades which again has resulted in an increased impact of 
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"suggestion" and "release". Examples of declines in situational limits are: increased supply of 
consumer goods, more income and leisure time, technological improvements in the home, 
increased mobility, less control from neighbours, relatives and religious associations, extended 
communication through the telephone and increase in information.  
These transformations of society imply that the cognitive orientation of the individuals helps 
to establish different social milieus and not just the translation from the primary environment. 
Important factors for an individual’s choice of social relations can be personal style, 
educational level, age etc.  
Nevertheless, with regard to the increased individual freedom two important aspects need to 
be considered. Firstly, limits may vanish at a national level but can still exist among 
individuals. The chance to get a higher education when living in a small community is, for 
instance, based on an individual's willingness to leave its familiar surroundings. Besides, the 
importance of education can have a different status in different social groups. The chance to 
increase one’s income depends on the economic structure in the region as well as on the 
individual’s education. Thus, it is important to consider that individuals use opportunities 
differently and that different regions offer different opportunities (cf. Bertram 1992,1993; 
Schweigel 1993).  
Secondly, even if a decrease in situational limits at the individual level takes place this may 
not necessarily lead to milieu transformations. I will try to clarify this argument by using a 
simple example: an individual leaves his rural Catholic community in order to study in a 
university town. He decreases the situational limits by moving, acquiring a higher level of 
education and leaving his social network. He is then confronted with other values and social 
groups and can more freely choose his actions. He may still maintain the values of his social 
milieu; he does not stop being a Catholic or being anti-abortion and regards marriage as the 
correct way of living. Furthermore, the loss of the social milieu from his hometown may be 
substituted by joining a milieu representing the same values in the new town.  
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that important social transformations have taken place in the 
past few decades and that these have caused erosions in the traditional social milieus. The 
major socio-economic changes, changes in the social structure and value changes in the two 
Germanys will be presented in the following sections. 
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4.1 Socio-Economic Changes 
Since 1945 the two German states have been marked by very different socio-economic 
developments. In this chapter, I will summarise the most important changes and differences in 
the fields of economy, education and production.  
4.1.1 Economic growth 
In West Germany income and fortune per capita increased five times between 1950 and 1980. 
Based on the prices of 1983, the income per capita exploded from 4000 DM in 1950 to about 
21.000 DM in 1983 (Geißler 1992a:38). All working groups benefited from this increase. 
However, due to the deceleration in wage levels at the beginning of the 1980s, the income of 
all groups increased only to a limited extent. Only the self-employed, except farmers, could 
considerably increase their income. The expansion of the welfare state also increased the 
standard of living of the economically weak strata (Geißler 1992a: 40).  
In the GDR an economic growth also took place, but not to the same extent as in West 
Germany. In the 1960s and 1970s the differences in income between the two German states 
considerably increased. In the 1960s the real average income in the GDR was 30% below the 
West German one, in the 1970s 40% and in the beginning of the 1980s it increased to 55 %. In 
the following years the gap decreased as a result of the weak increase in West Germany and a 
relative improvement of the purchasing power of the Ost-mark (Geißler 1992a:42)  
In 1988 the disposable income of all private households in the GDR was 53% lower than in 
West Germany. The income of the working class was 43% lower than in West Germany. It 
should be considered, however, that there was a higher number of double income households 
in East Germany and that the gap in individual incomes was therefore even larger (Geißler 
1992a:42). Figure 4.1 shows the different developments in net average income in West 
Germany and the GDR.  
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Figure 4.1 Net average income of employed households 1960-1982: Difference between 
West Germany and the GDR 
(Source: DIW 1985:280 in Geißler 1996:48, English translation) 
Since 1990 this difference between the two Germanys has declined. Wages in the former GDR 
have been partly adjusted to the West German level. In particular, pensioners, officials and 
employees in the service sector have benefited from the reunification (Geißler 1992b:25).31 In 
1996 wages in the new Länder varied - depending on which branch - between 68% and 90% 
and more of the level in the old Länder. The gap in household income declined, too. Whereas 
in 1991 the eastern Germans had only 45% of the West German household income, it 
increased to 74% in 1994 (Geißler 1996:54). 
                                                 
31 This does not necessarily imply a growth in purchasing power since all prices were adjusted to the West 
German level at the same time.  
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The acquisition of material goods increased in both Germanys over the decades as shown in 
Table 4.1. This can be seen as a result of a growth in purchasing power and of technological 
developments. In West Germany the supply of consumer goods continuously increased and 
often led to lower prices. However, in the GDR most luxury consumer goods were basically 
non-available for the common East German citizen. This explains the gap between the 
possession of material consumer goods in East German and West German households at the 
time of the reunification. I will not discuss this in further detail, but would like to emphasise 
that according to Inglehart East Germans were likely to have a backlog of demand for 
materialist satisfaction at the time of the reunification. However, as can be taken from Table 
4.1 too, the differences have shrunk since 1990. This is probably a result of the East Germans 
access to the western German supply market and the expansion in the supply of goods in the 
former GDR.32 
Table 4.1 Consumer goods in East and West German households 1962-1993 (in %) 
   West     East   
 1962 1973 1983 1988 1993 1960 1970 1983 1988 1993 
Car  27 55 65 68 74 3 16 42 52 66 
Washing-machine1 34 75 83 86 88 6 541 871 66 91 
Freezer 3 28 65 70 80 0 91 293 43 73 
Dish washer 0 7 24 29 38     3 
Telephone2 14 51 88 93 97  6 12 16 49 
Television 37 89 94 95 95 1 70 91 96 96 
Colour television 0 15 73 87 95 0 0 383 52 92 
Stereo   0 0 38 42 75     62 
(Source: Different sources cf. Geißler 1996:51, English translation) 
1 West – Automatic washing-machine. East 1970 and 1983 other washing-machines, too. 
2 DDR - Number of main extensions in apartments pro 100 household. 
3 1985 
4.1.2 Spread of education 
Since the education debate in West Germany in the 1960s, the number of pupils and students 
seeking higher education has significantly increased. The continuous growth of the industrial 
and the service sector in the 1950s and 1960s caused an increased demand for people with 
higher educational qualifications. General admission to higher education was considered 
fundamental for the continuation of economic growth. In the 1970s and 1980s this 
                                                 
32 In the immediate period after the fall of the Wall, the trade and merchandise branch experienced a boom, 
which fell dramatically after a few years. This was a result of both the satisfaction of backlog demand 
and of the recession causing increased unemployment and an inflation rate of about 4% (Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, October 21st 1993:17). 
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development continued although the economic sector warned of a surplus of qualified people. 
However, the spread of education had developed its own dynamic force, independent of direct 
political and economic impulses (Geißler1992a:215).  
The Hauptschule (extended elementary school), in the 1950s called the Volksschule 
(elementary school) was attended by 79% of the total number of pupils in 1952 whereas in 
1993 the number had dropped to less than 1/3 (cf. Geißler 1996:253). During the same time, 
the number of high school pupils increased from 6% in 1960 to 26% in 1993. The growing 
number of university students was almost equally strong – more than every third student per 
age group started a university (24%) or polytechnic university (14%) career.  
The results of increased equal opportunities for education in all strata can be summarised as 
follows: the formation of secondary schools (Realschule and Gymnasium) and other ways to 
matriculate as well as the opening of the universities, increased the chances of education for 
all children in all strata. However, a reduction in the differences between the strata could only 
be noticed at the medium level of education, whereas the differences at the high school and 
university level have become even larger. Whereas it is correct that nowadays more workers' 
children attend high schools and universities compared with two decades earlier, their number 
is still relatively low when compared to the number of children from the upper strata (cf. 
Geißler 1996:260ff).  
Equal opportunities in education were a principle goal in the GDR. In particular children with 
a working class background were encouraged to break the bourgeois monopoly of education. 
For this reason, die Einheitsschule (comprehensive school) was established, the education of 
teachers from the lower strata began and the family's influence regarding the children’s 
socialisation was limited in favour of the state’s influence (Geißler1992a:227).  
Since 1958 equal opportunities in education have been retracted. Between 1960 and 1989 the 
number of children from the intelligence strata increased from 19% to 78%. Children from 
other strata were forced out of the universities (cf. Geißler 1996:264f.).   
In the course of the reunification state control of the admission to the final year at high school 
and university was abolished in the new Länder. According to Geißler (1996:271ff.) the 
educational spread that was blocked in the GDR for two decades disappeared and 
developments in the east and west became more similar. In 1993 32% of the pupils in the 
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seventh grade – both in East and West Germany - attended high school which seems to 
confirm that the old and new Länder have become more alike. At university level the number 
of first year students grew continuously from 14% in 1989 to 24% in 1994, although the 
number was still lower than in the west were it was 29.4% in 1994. The newly established 
universities for applied science became highly popular in the new Länder. In 1994 42% of 
first year students chose this option compared to 35% in the old Länder. 
Apart from differences in the political and educational system, the following characteristics 
were evident in both societies: the resistance of the upper strata to the children’s social decline 
was stronger than the striving of the lower strata for social advancement (cf. Geißler 
1996:269).  
4.1.3 The shift from the primary sector to the service sector 
The long-term changes in economy and society can be explained by the shifts within the three 
economic sectors: the primary sector of production (e.g. agriculture, fishing and forestry); the 
secondary sector of manufacturing (e.g. industry, trade, mining and building); and the tertiary 
sector of service (e.g. commerce, transport, administration, education and research). Over the 
last century the West German society changed from an agrarian society into an industrial and 
finally into a service society.  
Until into the 1970s West Germany was still an industrial society (cf. Table 4.2). Most of the 
workforce was employed in the production of goods (48%). The strength of the secondary 
sector increased at the expense of the primary sector which fell from 25% in the 1950s to 13% 
in the 1960s. However, the growth rate of the tertiary sector was even stronger and between 
1950 and 1989 the West German service sector increased from 33% to 55% 
(Geißler1992a:118) and to 58% in 1993 (Geißler 1996:137).  
In the 1950s and 1960s typical features of the industrial society developed in both German 
states. The secondary and tertiary sector expanded at the expense of the primary one, in West 
Germany this development was more pronounced than in the GDR. Thereafter, both societies 
developed differently. West Germany was characterised by an increased shift towards the 
tertiary sector and a decline of the other two. In 1993 the West German primary sector was 
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only 3.3% and the secondary sector 39% whereas the service sector had increased, as already 
mentioned above, to 58% (cf. Geißler 1996:137). 
Table 4.2 Development of the production sectors from 1950-1993 (in %) 
Production    West      East   
Sectors 1950 1960 1970 1980 1989 1993 1950 1960 1970 1980 1989 1993 
Primary  25 13 9 5 3.7 3.3 31 17 13 11 11 4.2 
Secondary 43 48 48 45 41 39 42 49 51 52 50 38 
Service 33 39 43 49 55 58 27 34 36 38 40 58 
(Source: based on Geißler 1996:137) 
In the GDR, on the other hand, all three sectors stagnated. Its socio-economic structure in the 
1990s was almost similar to the one of West Germany in 1965. The tertiary sector did not 
develop continuously. Obvious deficits existed in the credit and insurance sector, in the legal 
system and in the consumer service as well as in the field of juridical and economic 
counselling. Another characteristic of the service sector – in those areas where it did exist - 
was the personnel surplus in areas such as public administration and universities 
(Geißler1992a:117). In 1989 the secondary sector was still dominant in East Germany (50%) 
whereas the primary sector was 11% and still quite large when compared to West Germany 
(3.7%) although the primary sector had decreased significantly in East Germany since the 
1950s (31%), too. The service sector in East Germany had only grown from 36% to 40% from 
the 1970s to 1989 compared to 12% in West Germany within the same time (from 43% to 
55%). Since the reunification the production sector of the new Länder has significantly 
changes and is now more or less similar to the one of the old Länder. The service sector 
increased from 40% in 1989 to 58% in 1993, the secondary sector decreased from 50% to 
38% and the primary sector decreased from 11% to 4.2% in the same period of time.  
However, the number of working women was 82% in the GDR. This corresponds to the 
picture of advanced industrialised societies such as Sweden and the USA. It is a result of 
governmental efforts since the 1970s to compensate the loss in working power (Hradil 
1992b:9). 
4.2 Changes in the social structure 
The aforementioned socio-economic developments changed the West German social structure 
which in the 1960s was dominated by a large working class (45%) and a small middle class 
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(20%) as shown in Figure 4.2. Increased chances of social advancement and the changes in the 
production sector caused fundamental shifts in the West German social structure between the 
1960s and 1980s. The old middle class dropped to 7% and the working class was reduced to 
33% (18% skilled workers and 15% unskilled and trained workers). The social structure in the 
1980s was clearly influenced by the continuous growth in the service sector and 28% of the 
West German population belonged to the new middle class (Figure 4.3). 
Figure 4.2 Social strata in the West German population in the 1960s 
(Source: Dahrendorf 1965 in Geißler1992a:5, English translation) 
Social mobility to the upper strata can be seen from two perspectives. With the transformation 
to a service society and increase in professions with demands for higher qualifications, the 
lower strata of manual workers reduced and the middle and upper strata in the tertiary sector 
grew at the same time. The decreasing strata were mainly farmers and unskilled workers. 
Since the 1970s skilled workers and parts of the non-managerial service sector have belonged 
to the decreasing strata as well. In addition, the admission of immigrant workers in the 1960s 
and 1970s, taking over the rather unpopular jobs of the lower strata, facilitated the West 
Germans' further chances for upward mobility.  
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Seen from another point of view, the change in strata was made easier by the increased 
dominance of the "relatively open, educated strata" over "the relatively closed strata of 
proprietors". The old middle class of farmers and other self-employed who possessed capital, 
property etc. was rather difficult to join from the outside. With regard to the educational strata 
the new middle class was easier to join by obtaining higher degrees and these were easier to 
obtain than capital and property. Due to the expansion of the middle strata into the service 
sector, the social structure opened at the expense of the old middle class.  
Figure 4.3 Social strata in the West German population in the 1980s 
(Source: Geißler 1992a:76, English translation) 
Although it is difficult to say anything about social mobility in the GDR during the past few 
decades because of the lack of data, some tendencies may be found. The increase of general 
education was similar to the one in West Germany. It can be interpreted as an upward 
movement and has resulted in social advancement for a large number of the population. As 
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mentioned before, the service sector developed far less quickly than the one of West Germany. 
Nevertheless, the structural changes forced large parts of the population to leave the declining 
agrarian sector and move to industrial positions. However, the stagnating development of the 
tertiary sector prevented a structural-based transition into the tertiary sector. Furthermore, the 
strong decrease of "the relatively closed property strata" of independent farmers, manual 
workers and merchants, removed mobility barriers.  
This high vertical mobility in the revolutionary phase of transformation was marked by a 
decline in social mobility in the following decades. In the 1980s a phase of solidification was 
reached and children from the lower strata were denied access to higher education more often 
than in West Germany (Geißler1992a: 211). 
As shown in Chapter 4.1.3 the production sector significantly changed in the former GDR 
after the reunification. With the growth of the service sector and the crises in – among others -
industry and agriculture – changes in the economic and professional structure took place. 
Mobility was further increased because people who had important positions in the old GDR 
system were replaced (Geißler 1996:245ff.). According to Geißler these changes led to 
different possibilities for social mobility: 50-60% of the former leading strata lost their 
positions which facilitated social advancement for qualified people from the upper middle 
strata although they competed with West Germans. Graduates from universities of applied 
sciences who are employed in the service sector will probably maintain their status; workers 
and employees in industry and agriculture are, on the other hand, exposed to social decline. In 
particular the semi-skilled and unskilled are affected by the labour market’s crisis and will 
hardly be able to socially advance. 
The social changes also had an impact on the individual's way of living and plans for the 
future. Since the 1960s the number of marriages in West Germany decreased. In addition the 
average age of people marrying has risen. The divorce rate increased to 30% and other ways 
of living became increasingly popular at the expense of the traditional normal nuclear family, 
which was characteristic of the industrial society. At the end of the 1980s 16% of the 
population lived in single-person households, 4% as co-inhabitants and about 5% in single-
parent families. The number of children born outside marriage increased from 5.5% in the 
1970s to 10.2% in 1989. To put this matter in a nutshell: this is called the pluralisation of ways 
of living (Hradil 1992b:6).  
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In addition, the life cycles of individuals have changed. The standardised continuation from 
childhood, youth, adolescence and old age, has changed. Life phases like post-adolescence, 
i.e. the time between youth and adulthood, have been extended due to among others longer 
education.  
Some peculiarities were evident in East Germany at the time of the reunification. More people 
married and married younger. As a result children were also born earlier and the birth rate was 
higher than in West Germany (1.67 per woman compared to 1.42 in West Germany). At the 
same time the divorce rate was higher compared to the West (45%). The number of children 
born outside marriage was 35% and the percentage of single-parent families was 17%. It is 
necessary to emphasise that the social network in the GDR had encouraged procreation since 
the 1970s because of the decrease in population, which had resulted in a large number of old 
people and the necessity for increased reproduction. During its existence the GDR was a 
country of emigration which was only reduced by closing the borders. The percentage of 
foreigners was minimal compared to West Germany (1.2% versus 8.2%) and the GDR was 
thus marked by a rather homogenous population (Hradil 1992b:6).  
Since the reunification changes in the social structure have taken place and still do. Also in the 
former GDR the marrying age as well as the age of first-child mothers increases. At the same 
time, the birth rate has dramatically fallen. This can be explained by the adjustment of the 
social welfare network in the new Länder to the one in the old Länder. East German mothers 
were guaranteed jobs, apartments and places in kindergartens and day-care nurseries for their 
children. Whether these arrangements were just another way for the Communist regime to 
control the socialisation process of the children will not be discussed since their existence is 
the only relevant point here. In the last few years, in particular women in the new Länder have 
lost their jobs or see them threatened. The growing insecurity regarding the economic situation 
and the labour market makes it difficult for individuals to plan a family and the future.  
This presentation shows that not only decreases in situational limits can take place as Schulze 
argues and as stated at the beginning of this chapter. The rise of new and the revival of old 
limits such as cuts in the financial support of students or cuts in state-supported kindergartens 
can take place. In this respect the political elites can control social transformations and 
influence changes in the social structure. An increase in situational limits may also take place 
due to economic developments. Increased unemployment, also among academics indicates 
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that, for example, education may no longer be considered as a secure ticket for upward-
mobility (cf. Chapter 4.3.2.1).  
Beck's (1986:205) thesis, pointing out that the decline of control by the primary social 
environment has been substituted by the control from public institutions, thus seems 
confirmed. Increasingly, the individual's freedom to choose and to plan his life is influenced 
by the bureaucracy, which influences the access to education, job markets etc. Therefore the 
individual needs to plan his action, which again results in a process of individualisation. 
Everything from passing an exam to leading a successful marriage and having a family are 
perceived as personal success or failure. The individual has been freed from traditional social 
control and is now a part of the "risk society", where different patterns of individual action to 
master a situation and reach certain goals are seen in the rise of (new) lifestyles.  
In the course of the reunification the East Germans were exposed to this western subjective 
modernisation (cf. Chapter 2.1.3). They probably experience the changes more strongly since 
they do not result of a long transformation process as was the case in the West. This makes the 
contrast to the former "secure", government-controlled society even more evident. The ability 
of the East Germans to integrate into the western "risk society" will be important for 
Germany's future. How individuals or groups perceive their new situational limits will also be 
of special importance for the establishment of new and old lifestyle groups and social milieus 
in the former GDR. In all probability not everyone will perceive the fall of Communism and 
the introduction of the social market economy as positive.  
4.3 Changes in value orientations 
In Chapter 2.2 I presented two theories of value change: Inglehart’s theory of post-
materialism and changes in different values important to social integration. In this chapter, 
I will present empirical results of value change based on these theories. 
Although it is difficult to make any comparison with the former GDR, empirical results 
regarding value change will be presented if available. Besides the lack of data in the former 
GDR value change developed differently due to the existing social order. For example, already 
since the 1950s the GDR regime opposed religion. Measuring the decline in the traditional 
value of acceptance due to the decrease in the importance of religion – as is done for West 
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Germany - makes no sense. However, a GDR-specific decline in the value of acceptance 
nevertheless exists and will be presented in Chapter 4.3.2.5.  
4.3.1 Is there a change from materialist to post-materialist value orientation? 
Inglehart (1977:27ff.) applied a four item values index to measure changes in value 
orientations in six European countries in the early 1970s (cf. Chapter 2.2.1 for details on 
Inglehart’s theory). The question asked was (Inglehart 1977:28): 
“If you had to choose among the following things, which are the two that seem most 
desirable to you?” 
- Maintaining order in the nation. 
- Giving the people more to say in important political decisions. 
- Fighting rising prices. 
- Protecting freedom of speech. 
The respondent was asked to name first priority and the second priority value. Based on 
the answer pattern, individuals were classified as materialists, post-materialists or mixed 
types. Materialists considered the first and third value as important, the post-materialist 
chose the second and fourth values, whereas the mixed value types chose, as indicated by 
the name, both materialist and post-materialist values.  
This question has been repeated in most Eurobarometer surveys since the 1970s and thus 
facilitates a comparison of the development from materialism to post-materialism in West 
Germany from 1970 until 1999. The results are presented in Figure 4.4.  
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Figure 4.4 The development of materialists, post-materialists and mixed types in 
West Germany 1970-1999 
 
(Source: The numbers are based on the Eurobarometer surveys from the European Commission. The 
numbers from 1970-1997 are taken from Klein/Pötschke 2000:214 who took the numbers from 1970 until 
1993 from Abramson/Inglehart 1995:12f. Klein/Pötschke calculated the numbers for 1994 and 1997 
according to the standard weight variable “Weight Result From Target” also used by Abramson/Inglehart. 
Only respondents who had ranked both first and second priority were included in the analysis. The 1999 
numbers were kindly provided by Dr. Markus Klein). 
As can be seen from Figure 4.4 a value change from materialism to post-materialism as 
predicted by Inglehart has not taken place in the West German society during the past 
decades. Although until the end 1980s, the number of materialists fell and number of post-
materialists steadily grew a shift took place at the time of reunification. Since then the 
number of materialists compared to the post-materialists have continued to grow. The 
number of mixed types value orientations is at the highest during the whole time period 
analysed. It has even, more or less, continuously increased since the 1970s.33   
Although Inglehart’s theory is not really applicable to analyse value change in the former 
GDR, the development of materialism and post-materialism from the time of reunification 
                                                 
33 By using a non-linear autoregression model assuming an inflation rate of zero percent, Klein/Pötschke 
(2000:212f.) predict the number of materialists, post-materialists and mixed types in the West German 
population 1970-97. Whereas they find a decrease in the number of materialists and an increase in the 
number of mixed types, they find no increase or decrease in the number of post-materialists.  
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until 1999 will be shown in Figure 4.5. During the whole time period analysed, the number 
of mixed types is the highest as is also the case in the west. Whereas the materialists and 
post-materialists nearly equalled in 1990 - the number of materialists is slightly higher than 
the number of post-materialists - this gap has significantly increased since 1991.  
Looking at the four questions used in the Inglehart-Index, this result is not surprising. The 
questions used to measure post-materialist value orientations, “giving the people more to 
say in important political decision” and “protecting freedom of speech” were more 
important to the eastern German population immediately after the end of more than forty 
years of dictatorship than during the following years. Thus, it could even have expected 
that post-materialistic values would rank much higher in 1990 than they actually did. 
However, a backlog of demand in materialistic satisfaction could have been expected, too 
and an increase in materialistic values with growing economic problems like rising 
unemployment and the cut back of eastern German industry. Nevertheless, the meaning of 
the questions used to measure post-materialists values obviously have, or at least had, a 
different meaning in the former GDR immediately after reunification than what it 
according to Inglehart’s theory is supposed to measure.   
I summarised some criticism of Inglehart’s theory in Chapter 2.2.1 and therefore need not 
to repeat them. However, at least for Germany there is no clear indication that a value 
change towards pure post-materialistic values is taking place.  
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Figure 4.5 The development of materialists, post-materialists and mixed types in 
eastern Germany 1990-1999 
(Source: The numbers are based on the Eurobarometer surveys from the European Commission 1990-1999 
(Eurobarometer number 34.0, 35.0, 36, 37.0, 38.0, 39.0, 40, 42, 47.1 and 52.1) and were kindly provided by 
Dr. Meinhard Moschner. The numbers have been weighted according to the standard weight variable 
“Weight Result From Target”. Only respondents who had ranked both first and second priority were 
included in the analysis. For some years, surveys including the index were carried out both in the spring and 
autumn. This has been indicated by year and 1 for spring (i.e. 1991-1) and year and 2 for autumn (i.e. 1991-
2)). 
4.3.2 Changes in values of social integration  
Meulemann analyses value change in the West German society during the past decades based 
on four values important to social integration in society: equality, achievement, co-
determination and acceptance (cf. Chapter 2.2.2). Based on different sets of variables, 
Meulemann measures the development of these four values. The results are summarised in the 
following sections.  
4.3.2.1 Equality: Stable valuation of equality in the west, no research in the east 
Although the analysis of equality is based on different variables and different time series, 
Meulemann argues that the results show that the value of equality remained constant in West 
Germany over the past decades (cf. Meulemann 1996:87). For example, asking whether an 
individual believes that the chances and possibilities to achieve something are fairly or 
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unfairly distributed in West Germany, 49% thought that the chances were equal in 1967, 53% 
in 1976 and 50% in 1977 (Meulemann 1996:79).  
With respect to the evaluation of equality in the fields of economy, administration and 
education, the evaluation of equality in the first two remained stable during the past two 
decades: In 1964 42% of the population thought that the economic conditions in West 
Germany with respect to what people own and earn were fair, in 1969 this number was 47%, 
in 1970 46%, in 1973 44%, in 1975 43% and in 1979 50% (cf. Meulemann 1996:81f.). 
Concerning equality in the field of administration, for example, if confronted with the police 
due to a minor violation, 72% of the respondents thought they would be treated fairly in 1959, 
in both 1977 and 1980 the percentage was 69%.  
However, the assessment of realization of educational opportunity has decreased over the past 
decades. In 1958 and 1963 70% thought that everyone has the possibility to get educated 
according to his/her talents and abilities. In 1979, 1984 and 1986 only 50% thought so. 
Meulemann explains this development with the simultaneous increase in number of people 
taking education that increased competition and reduced opportunities within the educational 
system (cf. Chapter 4.1.2). While assessment of actual equality within the given social order 
was maintained, assessment of equality in the education system got worse due to simultaneous 
expansion of the system (Meulemann 1992:533). 
In the GDR equality was a basic value of the social order that was - or was at least expected to 
be - fulfilled with the establishment of a socialist state, although it is widely known that 
significant inequalities existed in the former GDR. However, since the socialist state was 
assumed to offer equal opportunities, the question of equality and its assessment within the 
population was not questioned; neither by the state nor by social research which lacks of 
empirical data altogether (cf. Meulemann 1996:188-190).  
4.3.2.2 Achievement: Decreased importance in the west, but not in the east 
Achievement is the result of an individual’s own effort and thus a tool for self-realization. 
According to Meulemann one’s whole life can be considered an achievement, but in particular 
professional work is regarded as such. Between 1956 and 1968 the percentage of people 
considering life a duty was 60%, between 1972 and in 1980 this number was 50% and 
between 1982 and 1990 the number had decreased slightly to 44% (cf. Meulemann 1996:88f.). 
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As life can be perceived as easy or difficult work, too, can be seen as an end in itself or a tool 
for joie de vivre. In the course of time, work has lost its value in favour of leisure time. 
Between 1952 and 1963 between 11% and 14% of the population agreed that life would be 
more enjoyable without work. Between 1972 and 1990 this number rose to 20%.  
In addition, in West Germany the motives to work changed over the decades. This can be 
measured with two sets of variables regarding motives to work: “job satisfaction” and 
“accomplishment of a task” versus “necessary evil” and “chance to earn money”. The first sets 
of motives increased to 60% in 1962; thereafter it decreased continuously to 39% in 1987 and 
increased again to 48% in 1990. Thus, the evaluation of achievement changed in West 
Germany; the value of work depreciated in favour of leisure time. In 1982, 67% agreed to the 
statement: "You do not live to work, you work in order to live" (Noelle-Neumann 1990:310).34  
According to Meulemann, this does not imply that individuals no longer fulfil their duty, but 
that what they do is decreasingly perceived as such. Instead of considering work a duty, work 
is increasingly characterised by responsibility and participation. The ways of perceiving work 
might have changed over the decades as Meulemann states, but the presentation of different 
lifestyle groups presented in Chapter 5 will show that distinct attitudes towards work can still 
be found. Some people consider work a duty or a way to earn money and thereby increase 
their standard of living whereas in other groups work in itself is still a value. 
In March 1990 similar questions were asked in the former GDR (cf. Noelle-Neumann 
1990). 67% of the respondents regarded life as a duty, whereas only 17% wanted to enjoy 
their life. When asked which hours were generally considered the best, "the hours working 
or the hours not working", 69% answered that they liked both equally. An additional 10% 
preferred the working hours. This means that - in total - 79% of the eastern Germans had a 
positive attitude towards working.  
These differences in the evaluation of achievement at the time of reunification can be 
explained by the fact that in the former GDR work was far more important to social 
integration than in the west. As Meulemann puts it ‘the GDR was a working society’; it had a 
high employment rate for both men and women, independent of family status; social policies 
                                                 
34 Research conducted by the Allensbacher Institut für Demoskopie with comments by Noelle-Neumann in 
Forbes. 
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were institutionalised at the working place; the allocation of company apartments took place 
as well as the organisation of holidays. Thus, work was the core of Vergesellschaftung in the 
GDR (cf. Meulemann 1996:191). This idealization of work and low wages and salaries were 
closely connected; the less individual achievement was rewarded by increased payment the 
more achievement had to be encouraged by moral appeals (Meulemann 1998:124f.). 
Company surveys show that throughout the decades from 1967 until 1990 employees in the 
GDR complained about lacking rewards for personal achievement (Meulemann 1996:194). 
In all the four areas Meulemann (1996:190-210) uses in order to measure the development of 
achievement from 1967 until 1990 - work achievement, motivation for working, the 
importance of work and work as an aim in life, no value change took place in the GDR. As 
pointed out above this differs from the development in the west during the same time period. 
Whereas the west changed from a ‘working society’ to ‘an achievement and leisure society’ 
during the past decades, where self-realization is also practised in other areas than work, the 
east remained a working society (Meulemann 1996:211). 
4.3.2.3 Co-determination: Increased evaluation in the west, diversity in the east 
Meulemann analyses changes in co-determination in the political area and in the area of 
upbringing in family and school. I will first present some results regarding changes in political 
participation. In 1952 27% of the population claimed to have an interest in politics. Between 
1960 and 1969 this number increased to 41% and fluctuated between 40% and 50% until 1989 
(Meulemann 1996:95ff.). In 1990 political interest even rose to 55%, but fell below 50% again 
in 1992. This indicates that the increase was probably a short-term mobilization due to the 
reunification. Political discussions with friends, neighbours and relatives increased from an 
average of 1.17 in 1953 to 2.24 in 1990 (cf. Meulemann 1996:77). In the field of political 
efficacy changes took place during the past decades, too. In 1959, for example, only 25% 
disagreed with the statement: "People like me do not have an influence on what the 
government does." In 1968 the number of people who disagreed with this statement had risen 
to 35% and remained stable at approximately 40% until 1991 (Meulemann 1996:103).  
The move to egalitarianism in society is measured by questions regarding the upbringing of 
children: obedience and meekness, orderliness and diligence, or self-reliance and free will. In 
1951 25% and 41% of the population approved of the first two sets of variables, whereas 
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independence and free will were approved by 28% (EMNID nr. 3/4 1992:103). A continuous 
decrease in the appreciation of obedience and meekness has taken place during the past few 
decades and in 1991 only 9% agreed with these values. At the same time the approval of self-
reliance and free will increased to 63% whereas orderliness and diligence were considered 
valuable qualities by 36% of the respondents.  
In the former GDR the same questions were answered similarly in 1991. 61% agreed to the 
variables of free will and self-reliance. Obedience and meekness received only the approval of 
5% altogether 4% lower than in West Germany. This is not surprising regarding the fact that 
the population in the new Länder had been living according to these principles for over 40 
years. The largest differences between the two German states could be found in the valuation 
of orderliness and diligence, where the number of approval was 10% higher among the eastern 
Germans (EMNID nr. 3/4 1992:103).  
In other areas of egalitarianism as well as in the area of political participation data is too 
scanty to be meaningful with regard to the development in the GDR. According to 
Meulemann, however, there is a slight decrease - or at best a constant development - in 
political participation in the GDR from the late 1960s until the late 1980s (cf. Meulemann 
1996:221) and an increase in egalitarianism between generations and genders (cf. Meulemann 
1996:227). 
4.3.2.4 Acceptance: Devaluation in the west, forced secularisation in the east 
With the increased evaluation of co-determination, Meulemann expects a decrease in the value 
of acceptance that he measures by religiousness and morality (cf. Meulemann 1996:125ff.). 
The number of people who do not attend church increased significantly during the past 
decades. Between 1953 and 1963 the number was rather constant between 13% and 19%, but 
increased to 40% between 1963 and 1976 (Meulemann 1996: 77 and 126). In 1982 the 
percentage of people never attending church was 50% and remains at this level until the end 
1980s. Even among Catholics the regular church attendance decreased from 60% in 1953 to 
36% in 1979.   
A more direct decrease of the value acceptance becomes obvious in the field of morality, for 
example, with the question whether divorces should be made as easy as possible, as difficult 
as possible or if they should be indissoluble. In 1953 13% wanted divorces to be as easy as 
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possible, in 1976 this had increased to 31% (Meulemann 1985:406). In 1980 the number had 
decreased to 26%, but is not directly comparable to the other percentages since infidelity 
instead of guilt was introduced as grounds for divorce in 1977 (Meulemann 1992:535). 
Meulemann gives the following reason for the decrease of acceptance as a value in West 
Germany over the last decades; the meaning of life can no longer be found in traditions – 
which is the same as religion - but has to be made in everyday life (Meulemann 1996:133). As 
professional achievement has lost its position as being meaningful, people search for the 
meaning in life in co-determination - either in family or political life. The identification with 
one’s family implies living and working for the children. Meulemann argues that the growing 
impact of an independent upbringing of one’s children refers to an increased importance of 
family as a source of meaning of life.35 With regard to politics as a source of meaning of life, 
Meulemann emphasises that this not necessarily imply a real increase in political influence. It 
is rather a new way of viewing politics where political interest and involvement today is 
regarded as a chance for personal self-realization. 
This value change can be understood as a second kind of secularisation which followed the 
secularisation of the 19th century and which is characterised by an enlargement of its social 
base. Whereas the first secularisation transferred the religious motives to working life, the 
second secularisation has been marked by the simultaneous depreciation of religious and 
professional motives in West Germany. Meulemann concludes is that what religion has ceased 
to offer is not being sought after in professional life but in leisure time, where leisure time 
includes both political involvement and devotion towards children (Meulemann 1985:403). 
Meulemann points out that many of the value changes had already started to take place in 
society when the student protest movements reached their peak in 1968. The movements can 
thus be seen as a release of value changes since a large part of the population might have 
agreed with them. 
As emphasised in Chapter 3.2.2, the GDR government already opposed religion from the early 
1950s and different policies were carried out in order to alienate the population from the 
Church. As the following numbers show, the government was quite successful; the territorial 
                                                 
35 I would like to point out that this growing devotion towards children does not necessarily mean an 
increased evaluation of the child itself, but might just as well be a result of the parents need for self-
realization that can be fulfilled by successfully bringing up a child. 
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area of the former GDR was mainly Protestant and in 1946 81.6% of the GDR population 
were Protestants, in 1964 this number was 59.4%, in 1984 30.0% and 1989 the number had 
sunk below 30 %. Simultaneously, the number of people without religious affiliation increased 
from 5.9% in 1946 to 69.3% in 1990 (Meulemann 1996:230). Religious practices like 
weddings, christenings and confirmations decreased dramatically after the SED offensive in 
the mid-1950s. In particular, confirmation lost in competition with the Jugendweihe36 which 
was introduced by the SED in 1954, promising the youth educational and professional 
advantages.  
According to Meulemann two secularisation processes took place in the former GDR. The 
first one was the most significant and was initiated by the SED from the 1950s until the 1960s. 
The second one took place between 1965 and 1975 and can be understood as a consequence of 
modernisation, like the secularisation process in the West. Nevertheless, as the most important 
secularisation process in the GDR was the first one that was initiated by the state, the 
secularisation processes in the two Germanys cannot be compared. Thus, the secularisation 
process in the GDR cannot be seen in the light of value change. If judging the decrease of the 
value acceptance in the GDR another indicator seems more suitable the “solidarity with the 
GDR” and changing attitudes with regard to this indicator over the past decades. Before 
presenting this in further detail in the following Chapter 4.3.2.5, I will give a short summary of 
the development of the four values in the East and West after the reunification.  
As emphasised at the beginning of this chapter, only some of Meulemann’s time series have 
been presented here in order to give an idea of what kind of indicators he uses to analyse value 
change in the West German society. Analyses based on data after 1990 indicate that these 
developments continued in the west with a few exceptions even after the reunification 
(Meulemann 1996:396ff.). With respect to developments in the former GDR, the figures after 
reunification are rather contradictive: On the one hand the secularisation process continues, on 
the other hand other measurements in the area of - among others - political interest, confidence 
in democracy and support of socialism fluctuate significantly since the reunification. Although 
this might be a consequence of methodological problems, Meulemann argues that the much 
higher fluctuation in the east might indicate a discontinuity of values in the east (cf. 
Meulemann 1996:410-413).  
                                                 
36 This was a ceremony in which 14-year-olds were given adult social status. 
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The four values of social integration that Meulemann uses in order to analyse value change in 
reunified Germany originated in West Germany and were transferred to the former GDR with 
the reunification. Thus, it must be taken into consideration that neither the values nor the 
indicators used to measure these values might be valid for the new Länder. Nevertheless, for 
the growing close of the two Germanys the differences and similarities of values and value 
change presented are of course still highly relevant.   
4.3.2.5 The devaluation of acceptance in the GDR  
According to Gensicke (1993), "solidarity with the GDR" might be used as a measure of the 
changes of the value acceptance in the GDR. Gensicke argues that the mentality of the 
younger East German generation was so much westernised during the 1980s that it could 
hardly be distinguished from the West German youth.37 The largest difference was found in 
the fact that they lived under conditions which made self-development in the ideel and 
material sense impossible.    
In the three groups, students, apprentices and young workers, GDR solidarity was almost 
equally evaluated in the 1970s, but they developed differently in the 1980s.38 At the beginning 
of the 1970s the percentage that felt unreserved solidarity towards the GDR was about 40% in 
all groups. The acceptance decreased in all groups but the most and the earliest among young 
workers and apprentices. The young worker’s solidarity fell rapidly and was only approx. 5% 
in the late 1980s. The solidarity of the apprentices fell, too, however not as dramatically, to 
20% in the late 1980s. Gensicke traces this back to the fact that these groups were to a larger 
extent confronted with the economic reality of East German policies. In comparison the 
students were raised according to the ideology and the discipline of the system. Besides, they 
mostly came from the intelligentsia and were to be the future elite. In the mid 1980s the 
solidarity with the GDR was - with 70% - at its highest among students. The support had 
fallen to about 35% in 1989, but the students were still the group with the highest level of 
solidarity with the GDR (Gensicke 1993:174). Another difference was the impact of the 
                                                 
37 The changes in the variable "GDR solidarity" are only presented for the younger generations as similar 
time series studies on the mentalities within the East German population were not possible under the 
SED-regime (cf. Gensicke 1993:172).  
38 The acceptance of "solidarity with the GDR" does not necessarily mean identification with Marxism (cf. 
Gensicke 1993:173). It can be founded on the social success, like the equality between men and women. 
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western media. The consumption was much higher among the working population. They were 
thus more strongly influenced and confronted by western values.  
In the GDR value orientations were only of a positive nature if they were connected to social 
aims; family, love, work, sport or meeting friends had no individual value in itself. Individual 
values were seldom mentioned and if, only negative values like egotism, heartlessness, 
ruthlessness etc. Between 1979 and 1989 the claim for individual values increased. The 
acceptance of duty decreased from 4.13 to 4.09, self-criticism rose from 4.1 to 4.19, socialism 
fell from 3.59 to 3.25, achievement decreased from 3.62 to 3.14 and joie de vivre grew from 
3.57 to 3.66 (Gensicke 1993:176).39  
Value changes in the GDR are also related to age like in the West and values of self-
development decrease with increased age. In all of the following areas, self-development, 
living standard, joie de vivre and individualism, the younger generations have higher scores 
than the older ones. Similarly the values of duty and acceptance increase with age. Discipline, 
for example, received the value 4.3 in the age group 18-25 whereas the age group 56-65 
valued it with 4.8. The same result occurred when asked about achievement. Regarding the 
variable that measures the importance of the value of "contribution to society", the score is 3.6 
in the younger generation and 4.4 in the older ones.40   
Finally, I would like to comment on similarities and differences between the younger eastern 
and western Germans after the reunification. In both Germanys, family, friends and 
professional success have priority. Equally important are independence, self-realization and 
joie de vivre. However, some differences exist. In the new Länder, family, work, income and 
fashion are more important.41 In addition, the eastern youth is less biased against pressure to 
do well than the western youth. In the old Länder, friends and leisure time are more highly 
valued. Since the reunification, the value of work has considerably increased in the former 
GDR. This can be understood in connection with the labour market’s development. 
Additionally, the wish ’to make it’ grew strongly. Job security and higher income are more 
highly valued in the new Länder; responsibility, appreciation, acknowledgement and 
usefulness are also extremely important.  
                                                 
39 Average value measured on a scale with maximum value 5. 
40 Average value measured on a scale with maximum value 5. 
41 The stronger valuation of the last two could be another sign of backlog demand (cf. Chapter 4.1.1). 
Social Transformation in West Germany and the GDR 
 
86
Regarding interest in politics the eastern German youth has stabilized on the same level as the 
western youth. Until the Volkskammer election the interest in politics was the highest (79%). 
This dropped continuously to 27% in 1991. With the election in March 1990, the political 
decision had been made and political questions became less important than economic issues.42 
One development among all generations in the former GDR, which is not surprising regarding 
their high expectations of the reunification, is the decrease in satisfaction since 1990 
(Gensicke 1993:189). Especially among young people dissatisfaction with political 
developments grew; firstly, it was basically the middle age group that benefited immediately 
from reunification, in particular, well-educated, skilled workers and employees with 
professional experience. Members of the younger age group could hardly get professional 
training and were also the first to be made redundant or put on part-time work. They also had 
little or no income at their disposal. Secondly, as Gensicke argues, the development of 
decreased political orientation, political division and radicalisation in the new Länder must be 
understood in the light of "stolen perspectives for a better future". The frustration is 
understandable, especially in those regions where economic improvement is not in sight.  
These data prove that a process of individualisation and value change took place in the GDR, 
too (cf. also Gensicke 1992:679, Klages/Gensicke 1993:56-59). However, the political regime 
stopped the development towards a subjective modernisation (cf. Chapter 2.1.3). Ironically, it 
was at the same time, as shown above, this group of young people, who although not causing 
die Wende43, at least in the end, contributed to the fall of the ruling system. This they did 
through their enormous increase in complaints about the absence of promised improvements 
in living standards, freedoms and democracy (Ritschel 1992:300).  
Recalling Meulemann's argument (Chapter 4.3.2.3), that the students protest movements were 
a release of value changes approved by broad parts of the West German population, a parallel 
might be drawn to the fall of the GDR regime. The developments that led to the final collapse 
of the Communist regime were not just a result of political opposition although with the 
changing Soviet policy since the mid-1980s a strong opposition towards the GDR system was 
facilitated. However, as shown above, changes in attitudes and value orientations of large parts 
of the East German population had especially taken place in the last decade. In this way, the 
                                                 
42 Please remember that these numbers mainly refer to results among young people age 18-24. 
43 This expression is used in Germany when referring to the peaceful revolution in the GDR. 
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opposition movement in the GDR might be seen as release of desired social changes. They 
could count on the population’s support although their primary goals for wanting social and 
governmental change might have been of a different nature (e.g. democracy, human rights 
versus higher standard of living and travel permit).  
4.3.2.6 The decreased acceptance of "voting as a value" 
A final indicator for the decrease in the value of duty and acceptance that is important for 
understanding changes in election behaviour, is the decline in the number of individuals who 
consider "voting to be a duty of the citizen". An analysis of Falter/Schumann (1993:44), 
proved that among those citizens who agreed to the above statement, the percentage of non-
voters was under 10% whereas among those who did not agree, the number was about 50%.44 
Usually protest and non-voting is measured according to disaffection with politics, parties and 
the system (Politik-, Parteien- und System- Verdrossenheit), lack of political interest and 
absence of party affiliation. These results show, however, that although no time series data on 
the development of "the norm of voting" exist, it seems plausible that a decrease in the 
acceptance of this value has contributed to the growth in non-voters.45 When compared with 
Meulemann's data on the growth in political interest and participation, "voting as a duty" 
might also have been replaced by an active political orientation expressed by the increased 
evaluation of co-determination (see Chapter 4.3.2.3). Thus, if anticipating that a decrease in 
the number of people considering "voting as a duty" has taken place, this not necessarily 
relates to a decrease in political interest or an increase in the number of non-voters.  
4.3.2.7 Organisational membership and social integration  
Finally, voluntary organisations are important to social integration; they serve as a link 
between state and society (Immerfall 1997:141). Whereas values are important to the 
cohesion of society because lasting social relationships need a minimum of shared values, 
memberships in voluntary organisations offer citizens to establish and to practise 
                                                 
44 This analysis includes both the new and the old Länder. In the former GDR voting was compulsory. Its 
abolition might explain the drastic decrease in vote turnout between the Volkskammerwahl in March 1990 
and Bundestagswahl in December 1990. The number of non-voters increased from 9.2% to 24.5% 
between these two elections. Another explanation is the fact that free elections were nothing new 
anymore, as four elections had taken place in ten months. 
45 10 or 20 years earlier citizens who were not interested in politics or were dissatisfied would still vote 
because they would regard it as their duty. Today, this group is to a larger extent inclined not to vote.  
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consciousness, self-organisation and solidarity. An extensive network of organisations is 
thus important to a liberal democracy (Immerfall 1997:142; Sahner 1993:98). Table 4.3 
summarises the development of organisational membership in the west from 1984 until 
1998 and in the east from 1993 until 1998. 
Table 4.3 Membership in organisations 1984-1998 
West Germany East Germany  
1984 1988 1993 1998 1993 1998 
Membership (%) in:       
Trade union 16 16 17 12 25 13 
Political party 5 5 5 4 3 3 
Citizen’s initiative 2 2 2 1 0 1 
Church association 7 10 7 9 5 3 
Musical-/choral society 7 8 6 7 1 2 
Sports club 28 29 28 28 10 12 
Other organisations 19 24 19 22 14 14 
No membership 44 42 44 42 53 62 
(Source: Wohlfahrtssurvey 1984, 1988, 1993, 1998 in Statistisches Bundesamt (ed.) 2000:535, English translation) 
As can be seen the pattern of organisational membership remained – in most areas – the same 
in the west over the past 15 years. Only membership in trade union decreased significantly 
from 16% in 1984 to 12% in 1998. This development is closely related to the changes in the 
labour market presented in Chapter 4.1.3 and 4.2. Trade union membership decreased in the 
east, too, from 25% in 1993 to 13% in 1998. This development is similar to the one that took 
place in the west, although the reasons for this development are probably more diverse than in 
the west (Statistisches Bundesamt 2000:535). 
The development indicates an increasing similarity in the pattern of organisational 
membership in the east and the west with respect to memberships in trade union, parties and 
citizen’s initiatives. However, there are still significant differences with respect to the other 
organisations. In particular, the number of memberships in the east is considerably lower than 
in the west. Furthermore, the number of people without membership is 20% higher in the east 
than in the west (42% in the West versus 62% in the East in 1998). Memberships in voluntary 
organisations are often considered a social capital, important to democracy and democratic 
stability (cf. Putnam 1995). This low level of memberships in the former GDR with even an 
increase in the number of non-members over the past years should thus be closely observed 
(cf. Schöb 1999:8ff.). 
The purpose of this extensive presentation of the social transformations was to clearly show 
how – changes in social structure and values - have influenced the cleavage structure of the 
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German electorate and thus also the voting potential of the West German people's parties, the 
CDU/CSU and the SPD during recent decades. Furthermore, the aim was to emphasise how 
differently and to some extent how similarly, the two Germanys have developed during forty 
years of division. This is important to bear in mind and decisive for understanding the 
existence of lifestyle groups in the new and old Länder that will be presented in the following 
chapter.  
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5. LIFESTYLE GROUPS IN GERMANY  
In this chapter results from German lifestyle studies in the field of sociology and political 
science will be presented and discussed. Firstly, an overview of some of the studies will be 
given. Secondly, two lifestyle analyses – one conducted in the west and one conducted in 
the east – will be presented in further detail and discussed with regard to cleavages and 
voting behaviour. As already several times emphasised in this thesis, the terms lifestyle 
groups and social milieus are often used interchangeably. In the surveys presented 
regarding the milieu concept, I have marked the term, i.e. “milieu”, in order to indicate that 
it is of a different nature than a social milieu as applied in this thesis.   
5.1 An overview of different lifestyle surveys in Germany 
Since the 1980s several lifestyle analyses have been conducted in West Germany (cf. Chapter 
2.1.2). The aims of the analyses are of a different character and so are their methodological 
approaches and sampling procedures. Lüdtke (1989), for example, analysed lifestyle groups 
based on 98 respondents. The majority of the sample lived in middle and upper Hesse and 
some came from other cities in West Germany. Lüdtke was the first German author who tried 
to put empirical lifestyle research on a theoretical basis (Hartmann 1999:108). According to 
Lüdtke, lifestyles are established when participants form their life consciously. This happens 
in interaction with the environment surrounding the individual. Furthermore, Lüdtke 
distinguishes clearly between attitudes, preferences and values (mentality), actions and 
behaviour (performance) and social structural characteristics (structural context). He 
emphasises, however, that these three areas dynamically interact. In his survey Lüdtke used 
six fields of performance. Firstly, factor analysis was used for data reduction; thereafter he 
used the factor values in order to obtain 12 lifestyle groups by means of cluster analysis. 
Discriminant analysis was then used to analyse the social characteristics of the lifestyle 
groups.  
Schulze’s analysis (1992a) is based on a random sample of 1014 respondents in the city of 
Nuremberg in 1985. On the basis of items like activities, cultural preferences and habits he 
used factor analysis to construct three patterns of aesthetic preferences in everyday life which 
have developed in West Germany in the post World War II era; the trivial scheme, the 
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excitement scheme and the highly civilized scheme. Finally, Schulze arranged age and 
education with these patterns of aesthetic preferences in everyday life in order to construct five 
“social milieus”; the entertainment “milieu”, the self-realization “milieu”, the harmony 
“milieu”, the integration “milieu” and the high-class “milieu”. 
Giegler’s (1994) survey is based on a geographically limited sample, too, analysing lifestyle 
groups in the city of Hamburg in 1990. The sample was rather small, including only 168 
respondents who were questioned about leisure activities, nutrition, personal hygiene, the 
consumption of beverages, use of media and aims in life. On the basis of these items seven 
lifestyle groups were established by means of cluster analysis.  
Since 1979 the Sinus-Institute in Heidelberg has carried out a so-called Lebenswelt-
Forschung. It aimed to find large groups in the German society that possess similar attitudes to 
life and ways of living in order to facilitate the finding of market segments more precisely then 
this could be done with socio-demographic characteristics (cf. Georg 1998:108). Until 1981 
the “milieus” were defined using a qualitative method and from then on statistical methods 
were applied as well. On the basis of qualitative material 112 items were developed which 
were considered characteristic for defining an individual’s affiliation to a “milieu”. Thereafter 
250 individuals whose “milieu” affiliation was already identified answered to these items in a 
standardized survey. By means of factor analysis the structure of the items was found and by 
applying discriminant analysis a satisfactory solution of the group affiliations on the basis of 
68 items could be found. After testing these 68 items on a representative sample of 1000 
respondents, the number of items could be reduced to 40. Since an individual’s affiliation to a 
“milieu” could be estimated on the basis of these items, they were called “milieu indicators”. 
In a final step the indicator was again tested on the basis of 5000 respondents (cf. Hartmann 
1999:73). Originally, eight “milieus” were defined by Sinus in 1992 and from 1991 a ninth 
“milieu” - “the milieu of the new employee” – was included. Furthermore, in 1996 three of the 
“milieus” were exchanged (cf. Hartmann 1999:78).  
In 1984 Sinus carried out an analysis for the SPD in order to find the party’s basis of support 
using the “milieu indicator”. The sample of this survey included 5000 respondents. It was 
quite large and included both social structural characteristics like occupation, gender and age 
as well as attitudes and interests. The conclusion was that the “advancement orientated milieu” 
and “technocratic-liberal milieu” would play a key role in receiving the majority of votes at 
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the 1987 election (SPD 1984:5). On the basis of a survey conducted in 1991 a continuity of 
the relationship between “milieus” and parties was confirmed (cf. Flaig/Meyer/Ueltzhöffer 
1994:143).  
In 1990 the Sinus-Institute started to cooperate with the eastern German Concrete-Institute 
located in the eastern part of Berlin (cf. Ueltzhöffer/Flaig 1993:69) in order to analyse lifestyle 
groups in the former GDR and to compare similarities and differences between the east and 
the west. In 1991 a survey was carried out on behalf of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. The 
sample included 1979 respondents in the new Länder and 2027 respondents in the old Länder 
(cf. Becker/Becker/Ruhland 1992:7). The result of the survey carried out in the east will be 
presented in further detail in Chapter 5.2.2.  
Following the analysis on behalf of the SPD, Gluchowski at the CDU-orientated Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung carried out a survey in 1986. Nine lifestyle groups were defined using 
factor and cluster analysis on a basis of items like aims in life, value orientations, attitudes 
towards different areas such as work, family and leisure as well as religiosity and political 
attitudes. The survey was based on a representative sample of 3000, carried out in the autumn 
of 1986 (cf. Gluchowski 1987:20f.) A detailed presentation of the lifestyle groups will be 
presented in Chapter 5.2.1. 
Spellerberg (1996, 1997) relates life satisfaction, aims in life and lifestyle in her survey. She 
considers the lifestyle concept as useful in defining large social groups which are not only 
based on economic factors but also on similar behaviour and attitudes. According to 
Spellerberg, lifestyle is a symbolic visible way of expressing social position, social 
experiences and individual orientations. She thus analyses lifestyles from the social structural 
perspective (cf. Spellerberg 1997:25). Her survey was carried out in conjunction with the 1993 
Wohlfahrtssurvey. Only respondents between the age of 18 and 61 answered the additional 
lifestyle questionnaire. The survey was based on a representative sample and included 1564 
respondents in the west and 776 in the east. 119 variables in the areas leisure activity, media 
use, television preferences, musical taste, reading habits, style of fashion and furnishing as 
well as aims in life were reduced to 35 dimensions by means of factor analysis. Thereafter, a 
cluster analysis was carried out and nine lifestyle groups were found in the east and west 
respectively (Spellerberg 1997:26). Finally, she analysed the relationship between the lifestyle 
groups and job position and education as well as quality of life. 
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Otte (1997) conducted a secondary analysis of Spellerberg’s data in order to analyse to which 
extent lifestyle groups can predict voting behaviour. By means of factor analysis Otte reduced 
the variables to 25 factors and by applying cluster analysis he found 6 lifestyle groups in West 
Germany which to a significant extent match with the findings of Schulze. With respect to 
voting behaviour, Otte discovered that the traditional social structural variables class and 
religion were more important in explaining the preference for the CDU/CSU versus SPD than 
the lifestyle approach. However, the lifestyle approach was more powerful in explaining a 
preference for the Greens or non-voting (Otte 1997:339). A similar analysis was carried out by 
Zerger (2000) using the Sinus milieu concept to analyse the impact of milieus on voting 
behaviour at the 1990 federal election. His conclusion is that a relationship between milieu 
and voting behaviour is difficult to prove and that the few significant results are hard to 
interpret (Zerger 2001:225). However, in this context it should be kept in mind that the 1990 
election was the first one in reunified Germany and thus took place under special 
circumstances (cf. page 1).        
Vester et.al (1993, 1997, 2001) carried out an extensive research project analysing the social 
structural change of “social milieus” and the rise of “new social milieus” in West Germany 
1988-1992. The analysis was based on representative samples, expert interviews, narrative 
interviews, content analysis and the in depth analysis of the rise of “new social milieus” in 
three West German regions. The research design is complex and so is the interpretation of the 
results. However, I will try to summarize some of the main steps and findings. In the 
representative survey - carried out in 1991 – questions about gender equality, social equality, 
multiculturalism, readiness to become politically involved and political dissatisfaction were 
asked (cf. Vester 1997:113). The analysis included 44 statements and by means of cluster and 
factor analysis Vester et. al. found seven political styles which could easily be distinguished. 
Thereafter, they analysed the relationship between social position and political-ideological 
Lager (political camp), “milieus” and social cohesion. The analysis of “milieus” was based on 
the 1991 Sinus indicators - the “milieus” are thus the same as those used by Sinus. Four 
Lagers each comprising about 25% of the population were found. These were: the Lagers of 
individualisation, of modernisation, of a conservative order and the declassed Lager. Although 
neither the political ideological Lagers nor the political party Lagers corresponded with the 
nine “social milieus”, Vester argued that both still concentrate on very specific milieu zones 
(Vester 1997:115). Furthermore, Vester et.al. discussed the existence of cleavages in the West 
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Germany society in four areas; social structure, mentalities, unequal social positions and 
political and ideological cleavages (Vester et.al. 1993:36-50).  In conclusion Vester argued 
that the political immobility in 1997 was not the consequence of depoliticised and egocentric 
mentalities in the population; the societal changes that have taken place due to 
individualisation have not yet been translated to the political agenda which was still blocking 
the development and perspectives and the change to the younger generations (Vester 
1997:121). With the 1998 parliamentary election this situation changed. The new Chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder obviously had received the message – using Tony Blair and “new Labour” 
as a model - that the voting potential was located in “the new middle”. However, as 
emphasized by Vester the “new middle” Chancellor Schröder is addressing consists of only 
5% of the population and has hardly nothing in common with the sociologically defined “new 
middle” that comprises more than 25% of the population (cf. Die Zeit Nr. 49 1999:7). 
A comparison of some of the different lifestyle groups and “social milieus” found in the 
surveys presented above is given in Appendix 1. As can be seen, there are some similarities in 
the number and labelling of lifestyle groups and “social milieus” found by different 
researchers. In order to give the reader indications which kind of variables might hide behind 
the sometimes quite “adventurous” labels used in the presentation of lifestyle groups, two 
lifestyle analyses – one conducted in the east and one conducted in the west - will be presented 
in detail in the next chapter. Although some expressions used in the labels are rather difficult 
to translate into English, I have done so. The original German labels can be taken from the 
overview in Appendix 1.  
5.2 Lifestyle groups, cleavages and party preference 
As presented above only a few lifestyle surveys in the west have been carried out in the 
field of election research. In the east, no surveys on voting behaviour exist yet. 
Nevertheless, two surveys will be presented in further detail in this chapter; they were 
selected on the basis of the following criteria: 1) For the west one of the surveys including 
election behaviour should be used; one of the most well-known German lifestyle analyses 
in election research conducted by Peter Gluchowski in 1987, was chosen and 2) The 
lifestyle analysis presented for the eastern German population should be as close in time to 
Gluchowski’s survey as possible. One of the first extensive lifestyle analyses of the eastern 
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German population was carried out by Becker, Becker and Ruhland in 199146 and will thus 
be presented in further detail. Although this survey does not include voting behaviour, a 
classification of possible political preferences will be given (cf. Oedegaard 1994). 
5.2.1 Lifestyle groups in the west – a presentation of Gluchowski’s survey 
Gluchowski arranges the lifestyle groups in five different political generations. The first group 
consists of people who grew up during the time of National Socialism. The second consists of 
those who spent their youth during World War II and the first post-war era. The third group is 
the generation of the Adenauer era47 and the fourth group presents the generation of students 
involved in the protest movements. The last group consists of those who grew up during the 
social and alternative movements that began in 1972. In the following the main characteristics 
of the different lifestyle groups have been summarised (for an extensive presentation see 
Gluchowski 1987:21-30)  
In the older political generations, including the era Adenauer, four lifestyle groups exist that 
are marked by a preference for traditional values: 
The upper conservative (11%): The average age of this lifestyle group is 52 years – although 
the level of people under age 45 is quite high, too - and is above-average represented by men. 
Special features of this group are a high level of education, a good professional standing and 
the highest average income of all groups. The largest part of the self-employed can be found in 
this group and it has an above-average proportion of executive employees. The value 
orientations of this group are traditional-conservative: professional success, a high standard of 
living and an intact family life with children are important. They are open-minded towards 
self-development although distant to gender equality. The members of this group have a 
strong personality, are used to responsibility and have basically reached their goals. Family is 
important and is characterised by a traditional division of work. Children are taught to respect 
the parents’ authority. Leisure activities are limited due to lack of time. However, time is spent 
with the family or used for cultural activities and involvement in important societal interests. 
The members of this lifestyle group are against exaggerated consumption and fashion. It is 
                                                 
46 This survey includes an analysis of western German lifestyle groups as well as a comparison of the 
groups found in the east and west. However, since party choice is not included in the analysis of 
Becker/Becker/Ruhland, Gluchowski’s study seems more useful to present the case of West Germany.  
47 Adenauer was leader of the CDU and the first Chancellor in West Germany after World War II. 
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important to be well dressed, but clothing should be unobtrusive. Technical development is 
considered important to maintain future prosperity. Church and religion are very important to 
the members of this group, too, and they take actively place in church life. Finally, this group 
is very interested in politics and are usually very well informed. On the left-right scale the 
members of this group have a position to the right of the middle. Law and order have to be 
respected, but it is also a duty of the citizens to get involved in politics beyond the act of 
voting. The party identification of this group is the CDU/CSU.  
The duty-orientated employee (11%): Features of this lifestyle group are a relatively low level 
of education, a big share of workers and unskilled workers with strong ties to trade unions. 
The average age of the members of this group is 50 years and often the members are already 
pensioners. They often live in smaller communities. A harmonic family life is of importance 
and so is the acquisition of durable goods. Life goals are characterised by a conservative-petty 
bourgeois attitude with a strong orientation towards family life. Personal value orientations are 
dominated by traditional values of duty and acceptance as well as a high importance of social 
equality. Work is basically a means to earn money; regular working hours and a secure job are 
of major importance. Work is primarily considered a duty and does not have to be interesting 
or according to one’s inclination. A traditional division of work dominates the household and 
family life is very important; leisure time is usually spent with the family. The members of this 
group don’t put much emphasis on consumption and fashion. They want to be neatly dressed 
without showing up. Furthermore, this group is rather non-religious. Politics are only 
important when matters of the welfare state are discussed. In general, representatives of this 
group expect that the state comes up to their expectations. Law and order are obeyed. The only 
political activity of this group is regularly voting because they assumed to have no greater 
political influence. Members of this group tend to favour the SPD. 
The integrated elderly person (11%): Older women and widows - average age 64 - dominate 
this category. They live in smaller communities and show a low level of education. Harmonic 
family life is important, as are thrift, love of one’s native country and national consciousness. 
The members of this lifestyle group are conservative in every respect: household work is 
traditionally divided; more sense of duty is demanded of other people and developments 
towards the leisure society are seen as negative. A neat appearance is of big importance, 
however fashion is not favoured. Of all groups this has the strongest relationship with religion 
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and the church and members of this group often complain about the disappearance of religious 
values in today’s society. Political interest is low, but they are very satisfied with the present 
political system. The confidence in the state is very high. As they think to have little political 
influence their political activity is limited to regular voting which they regard as a citizen’s 
duty. The party identification of this group is the CDU/CSU. 
The isolated elderly person (4%): This group has an average age of 68, is mostly female (73%) 
and half of the group are widows. Furthermore, they have a below-average level of education 
and the lowest income of all lifestyle groups. A number above average of this group’s 
members come from the working class and live in very small communities. The group is 
characterised by loneliness and the aim in life is individual security and health. The group is 
conservative orientated and of all groups this one is the most distant towards self-development 
and hedonistic value orientations. Work has become irrelevant to the majority of this group, 
family has lost its meaning as well and leisure needs hardly exist. Consumption is reduced to 
what is daily needed and new clothes are rather unimportant. The members of this group have 
no relationship to modern technique but feel threatened by it. Furthermore, religion is very 
important to the members of this group. Faith provides comfort and the participation in church 
life is an occasion to have social contacts otherwise missing. The members of this group 
identify most strongly with the CDU, but this lifestyle group has the second highest number of 
members with no party identification, too. An inclination towards non-voting might thus exist 
since members of this lifestyle group are dissatisfied with the political system, have little 
confidence in the state and above 70% are not interested in politics.  
 
Due to the social transformations in the post-war era, lifestyle groups with no definite or 
uniform party preferences came into existence. 38% of the population belongs to this group 
and can be separated into two major sub-groups: 
The open-minded and adaptable normal citizen (25%): Men are above average represented in 
this lifestyle group. The average age is 50 years, but the group as such comprises the 
generation between 46 and 60 years whose children have already left the house. With respect 
to education, work and income this group is similar to the average population. Half of the 
members of this group have experienced social advancement when compared to their parents 
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and most of them live in smaller cities. Goals are social advancement, success in work, a high 
standard of living and a fulfilling family life as well as self-realization. The members of this 
group have traditional-conservative values like order, achievement, sense of duty and 
discipline. However, they also use this basis in order to develop values like personal freedom 
and self-development. A traditional division of work and up-bringing of children is this 
lifestyle group’s standard. Leisure activities are widely spread and include family, practical 
work and craftsmanship as well as activities in organisations and clubs. Consumption and 
fashion is very important to the members of this group. They want to be well dressed and wear 
qualitative clothes that also serve as a status symbol. Technical development is considered 
very important for future prosperity. Furthermore, the members of this group are rather 
religious and participate in church life. Finally, politics is quite important to this group. They 
are very satisfied with the political system and have a big confidence in the state. However, 
they are only moderately interested in politics and are only conditionally willing to get 
involved in political participation. The members of this group have a stronger identification 
with the CDU than with the SPD. However, the largest number (38%) of this group has no 
party identification. 
The inconspicuous, rather passive employee (13%): Younger people with an education below 
average in lower working positions – as their parents - with low income dominate this 
category. The majority of them live in big cities. Passivity results due to the fact that life goals 
can hardly be defined. A strong emphasis of leisure time is contrasted by the lack of 
orientation in other areas of life. Consumption and fashion dominate; the newest fashion is 
more important than the clothes’ quality. Work is only a means to earn money and among the 
areas family, job and leisure time, the latter dominates. However, leisure activities are rather 
inconspicuous and leisure time is often spent watching television. Political interest is very low 
and the prevailing opinion is that the state basically acts correctly. Voting is irregular and 
respect for law and order is relatively low. This lifestyle group has an equal inclination 
towards the SPD and the CDU. However, 50% of the members of this group have no party 
identification. 
The major difference between the last two groups is that “the open-minded, adaptable, normal 
citizen” has a higher social status and stronger ties to the church. Thus, this group has a 
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stronger inclination to the Union parties than the SPD whereas “the inconspicuous, rather 
passive employee” identifies himself equally strongly with both people's parties.  
At the beginning of the 1970s three new lifestyle groups emerged in the younger generations. 
25% of the western Germans fit into one of these lifestyle groups. All groups lack a long-term 
party affiliation. With an increased preference for the value of self-development, the distance 
to the traditional people's parties grows and the identification with the Greens increases.  
The advancement-orientated younger person (10%): The average age of the members of this 
group is 33 years, the majority is married or has a partner and not seldom they have children, 
too. They work as employees in positions that require an average level of education. 1/5 is still 
studying. The main life goal is an organised meaningful life that allows enjoyment, too. 
Success in one’s professional life, social respect and acquisition of property are prerequisites 
for reaching this goal. Value orientations consist of a mixture of duty and acceptance and self-
development. Family life is characterised by equality; a lot of women work, household work 
and the upbringing of children are shared and children are brought up to be independent. A 
neat appearance is important and fashion is a status symbol. Technical developments are 
considered relatively important. Furthermore, this group is basically not religious, sees politics 
not essential, is satisfied with the political system and has confidence in the state. Political 
participation - beyond voting – is rather seldom. This group has the weakest party 
identification of all groups - 58% have no party identification at all - and there is a slightly 
stronger inclination towards the SPD than towards the CDU/CSU. 
The post-materialistic, left-alternative younger person (5%): The majority of the members of 
this group live in larger cities and university towns. Most of them still study, either at school, 
in vocational training or at university. About one third works, mainly in the public sector 
where they achieve a relatively high income. Of all lifestyle groups this one has the highest 
level of education. The average age of the members of this group is 28 years. The value 
orientation of this group is dominated by values like self-development, equality and freedom 
of speech. They are distant to traditional-conservative values as well as values that are related 
to societal standing. The members of this group have a strong personality, they often try to 
convince other people of their opinion, they like to accept responsibility and can be very 
determined to reach their goal, in particular with regard to subjects or issues they consider 
important for society. One’s profession is seen as a means for self-realization and self-
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development and income is less important. Private relationships are based on partnership and 
equality. Leisure time is important and is often used for political activities or other societal 
involvement. The members of this group are hardly interested in consumption and fashion. 
They disapprove of technical developments as they consider them dangerous for mankind. 
Finally, the members of this group are almost anti-religious. Their aversion against the 
churches is big. However, politics is very important and political interest is high and is often 
expressed as criticism of the system. In comparison to the rest of the population, 
dissatisfaction with the political system and distrust in the state are very large. Ideologically 
members of this group lean towards the left. This group is reserved about the people's parties 
and strongly identifies with the Greens. 
The left liberal integrated post-materialist (10%): This group differs from the preceding group 
because its members are older and have advanced positions in life cycles. Their education is 
finished and the level of education is high. They are married or live with a partner and have 
more often children than the members of the previous group. Many of them work in higher 
positions of the public sector. This group, too, is above average represented in large cities. 
Their value orientation is dominated by self-development and in particular values of social 
equality are important. Furthermore, the members of this group are characterised by a strong 
personality, they make their way in life, are highly convincing and like to assume 
responsibility. Self-development at work is considered important; contents of work should be 
interesting and according to one’s qualification. The members of this group prefer to work 
independently. They are less interested in making a career, competition at work or be 
financially successful. Partnership and family life is based on equality and freedom. In their 
leisure time this group involves in intellectual, cultural and social activities. Among the fields 
family, work and leisure time, work is of special importance, in fact the separation between 
working hours and leisure time has vanished. Consumption and fashion are not important, 
except that clothing should be solid. In comparison with the younger post-materialist members 
of this group are not set against technical developments and they show no particular anti-
religious attitude. The political interest of this group is high. They are satisfied with the 
political system and are marked by a left liberal, not a left-extreme position. They are critical 
of the state, but supportive. They believe that a further democratisation of society and politics 
is necessary and they are prepared to get personally involved in politics. Politically influenced 
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in the 1960s and 1970s, this group inclines more often to the SPD, but they can also identify 
themselves with the Greens. 
Figure 5.1 Lifestyle groups in the western German population in 1987 
(Source: Gluchowski 1991:235, English translation) 
The above presentation of western German lifestyle groups shows that the traditional features 
of social structure still are important in distinguishing between the groups; differences in 
educational level, profession and income made a classification of lifestyle groups into strata 
possible and different value preferences were found by differentiating between political 
generations. 
Figure 5.1 shows the different groups arranged on a vertical axis based on strata and a 
horizontal axis based on value preferences. The lifestyle groups that may present the 
continuation of the traditional milieus presented in Chapter 3 are "the upper conservative", 
"the duty-orientated employee", "the integrated elderly person” and “the isolated elderly 
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person". These groups are dominated by the desire for duty and acceptance (also characterised 
as materialistic) and hardly any differences in the intensity of the traditional value preferences 
are seen. The distinguishing characteristics between "the upper conservative" and the "duty-
orientated employee" are basically expressed on the vertical strata dimension. This is also the 
case with the two other traditional lifestyle groups.  
An opposite relationship exists in the three younger political generations. Differences in strata 
placement between the groups is of little importance to party preference, but the value 
orientations are of considerable impact. All three groups are in the upper part of the strata 
dimension and all are primarily orientated toward self-development. "The post-materialistic, 
left-alternative person" is the group with the strongest intensity toward self-development, 
which explains why its members incline towards the Greens, followed by "the left-liberal 
integrated post-materialist". "The ascension-orientated younger person" is the group with the 
least intensity.  
"The open-minded and adaptable citizen" and "the rather passive employee" are the two 
lifestyle groups with the most non-uniform party preferences. The placement of the first group 
in the upper strata and at the same time its desire for traditional values might explain this 
group's inclination towards the Union parties. The second group's inclination towards both 
people's parties can be understood by seeing how the group crosses both the value and the 
strata dimensions. This presents the dilemma of the traditional people's parties quite clearly. 
Both the CDU/CSU and the SPD still recruit voters from the traditional milieus on the left side 
of the figure, but these include today only 37% of the electorate. Whereas the FDP does not 
have any clear voters potential in any of the lifestyle groups and is dependent on the political 
climate to recruit voters on the marginal areas of the SPD or CDU/CSU (cf. Gluchowski 
1987:32). 
5.2.2 Lifestyle groups in the east – a presentation of the findings by Becker, Becker 
and Ruhland 
In the eastern German population nine lifestyle groups were categorised, too. Although some 
have similar characteristics to those found in the old Länder, these lifestyle groups clearly 
reflect the special social and political conditions of the GDR and cannot be considered copies 
of those found in the west. The division of the population based on class/strata, i.e. lower, 
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middle and upper class, in the old Länder cannot be transferred to the former GDR. This 
especially applies for income and profession because the GDR policy was to level out income 
and basically ignore professional status. The lifestyle group of "the upper conservative" can 
therefore not be found in the former GDR. A development of such a lifestyle was not 
permitted under the Communist regime. "The bourgeois-humanistic" lifestyle which emerged 
in East Germany is only partly comparable with the western, conservative upper-class 
lifestyle.  
The percentage of the distribution of the eastern German population is shown in Figure 5.2 
and I will summarise the most important characteristics of every lifestyle group below (for an 
extensive presentation see BeckerBecker/Ruhland 1992:105-113).  
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Figure 5.2 Lifestyle groups in the eastern German population 1991 
(Source: Ueltzhöffer/Flaig 1993:72, English translation) 
The bourgeois-humanistic person (10%): The members of this lifestyle group have higher 
education and often a PhD. They work as qualified and executive employees, civil servants 
and self-employed in the field of administration, education and information. The income of 
this group’s members is at a middle and higher level. One third is retired. Furthermore, the 
members of this group are characterised by Christian value orientations and protestant virtues 
like duty performance, discipline and social engagement. The preservation and the 
continuation of human traditions that includes respect of human dignity, tolerance and 
solidarity are important to this group. The members of this group have an esteem for arts and 
culture, too. Finally, they want to live a harmonic life with their family and social 
environment. They are distant towards materialistic goods that they consider substitutes for 
real values worth living for. With respect to consumption they prefer durable quality products.    
The rationalist technocratic person (6%): The members of this group have an educational level 
which is above average and are qualified and executive employees, civil servants and self-
employed. The income is at a middle and higher level. In the past, many representatives of this 
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group belonged to the privileged class, with access to consumer goods and services not 
available to the common East German citizens. This lifestyle group is marked by optimism 
about the future as well as trust in reason and scientific rationality. Their goal is an efficient 
life planning, therefore nothing is left to coincidence. Furthermore, the members of this group 
are characterised by elitism and they want materialistic and societal estimation which they 
consider well-deserved in relation to what they have achieved. Finally, these people are 
characterised by perfectionism, pragmatism and conformism. Success is considered to be a 
duty. The members of this group are thus willing to adjust, if necessary. They enjoy too busy 
themselves with technology at work and in their leisure time. With respect to consumption 
they are quality orientated and prefer an expensive style.  
The petty bourgeois materialistic person (23%): This group consists of skilled workers and 
employees at the lower and middle level working in public administration, banks or in the area 
of education and health, possessing an income at the middle level. Their aim is to secure and 
improve living standards, have no material worries and be proud of what they have achieved 
in life. Family is important and they want to live a comfortable life without conflicts. The 
members of this group want to make the best out of things, they are optimistic and consider 
life satisfaction a main principle of life. Members of this group want order and do not allow 
themselves to stand out and thus adjust to the existing conventions. Status demonstration is 
important in order to express an attachment to the upper middle strata.  
The traditional farmer and worker (27%): The largest of the eastern German lifestyle groups - 
the traditional farmer and worker - has no equivalent in the west. This means that more than 
25% of the population in the new Länder lives under conditions which have not existed in the 
west since the first post-war years (Becker/Becker/Ruhland 1992:99). The members of this 
lifestyle group belong to the older generation, half of the members are unemployed, retired or 
are in early retirement. They possess a low educational level and those still working work as 
traditional manual workers, farmers or as employees at the lower and middle level. A secure 
job is considered the basis for maintaining both a satisfying standard of living and social 
security when retired as well as a basis for a life in organised communities with family, 
colleagues and the village community. Furthermore, the members of this group are 
characterised by austerity, simplicity and rationality. The have no exaggerated demands and 
do not live beyond their means. With respect to consumption the members of this group prefer 
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solid products and are attached to nature. In addition, they consider it a virtue to honestly say 
one’s opinion and to behave naturally. Finally, life in the former GDR is often idealized, in 
particular, due to its simplicity, clarity and “social equality”.   
The worker without traditions (8%): This group is characterised by low education and its 
members are workers often employed in problematic industries like chemistry or in the service 
sector working for, in particular, the state run post- or train company. There is a high 
proportion of unemployed and short time workers in this group, thus income is low. The 
members of this group want to live an organised life without problems. They value 
materialistic security, to be able to afford more and to live a pleasant life. The members of this 
group mainly ignore the future – they wait for what comes. With respect to consumption many 
wishes remain unfulfilled due to a lack in finances. In order to cope with this they pretend not 
to need much.   
The hedonistic worker (5%): The members of this group often have a middle level education. 
They are mainly skilled workers, but also low-level employees and civil servants are 
represented in this group. Income is at the lower and middle level; in particular the women in 
this group have a low income. The members of this group want to live a pleasant and 
comfortable life with a higher standard of living and to be able to afford all they want. All 
opportunities that may give them an advantage are used. They want to belong to the western 
world of consumption and leisure. The possession of materialistic goods is important to the 
members of this group and they focus on enjoying today’s life and to follow the fashion 
trends. Finally, an exaggerated level of self-confidence may be found among the members of 
this group; according to the state ideology they were the “ruling class” and were thus 
supported by the state. 
The status and career orientated person (9%): The members of this group have a high level of 
education. They are skilled workers, trade workers, qualified employees or self-employed. In 
the past they often belonged to the leadership in the SED and in administration – they had 
“good relations” and had access to privileges. The income is at the higher level. The life goal 
and the decisive value orientations of the members of this group are professional and social 
advancement. In the past, social status could be expressed through power and privileges and 
today the members of this group try to earn as much as possible to be able to show their status. 
Among the members of this group significant problems to adjust exist as well as a certain 
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insecurity as old values no longer exist. Western norms and standards of consumptions are 
used as orientation and the model example is the successful West German manager. Status 
symbols are important; members of this group cherish a fascination for high-tech and a belief 
in progress. 
The sub-cultural youth (5%): The members of this lifestyle group are workers, temporary 
workers or performing employees. However, many are still in education or in vocational 
training, on short-term work etc. Income is low. They focus on withdrawing themselves from 
the conventional regulations, norms and constraints of society. They want to have fun and 
enjoyment in life as well as change and spontaneity. Communication is important and so is the 
social network of like-minded people. Furthermore, the members of this group want to 
distance themselves from the decent normal citizens. Finally, the members of this group are 
characterised by an aversion against planning the future as well as a disdain of materialistic 
goods. There is a generous handling of money among them and they put their own individual 
taste pointedly on show. 
The left-intellectual alternative person (7%): The members of this group have a high level of 
education and often have a university degree or a degree in applied sciences. They work in the 
field of education, research, electronic data processing and arts. Their level of income is high. 
Self-realization and self-development is important to the members of this group. Furthermore, 
they want to be useful to society and they are characterised by an ecological way of thinking. 
With regard to consumption this group is simple, close to nature and they to not value 
materialistic needs. There is also a readiness – among the members of this group - to become 
politically, socially or artistically engaged – in order to realize own ideals. 
5.2.3 The reflection of cleavages and party preference in eastern and western 
German lifestyle groups 
Summarising the discussion in the two previous chapters, four cleavages may be found in the 
West German lifestyle groups. These are the cleavage between religion and secularism, work 
and capital, left and right and materialism and post-materialism. The following lifestyle 
groups: "the upper conservative", "the integrated elderly person" and "the isolated elderly 
person" may be arranged according to the cleavages religion, capital, right and materialism. 
These lifestyle groups have a party preference for the CDU/CSU “The duty-orientated 
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employee" can be arranged according to the cleavages secularism, work, left and materialism 
and has a party preference for the SPD. The last lifestyle group that may clearly be arranged 
according to one or more of the above cleavages is "the post-materialistic, left-alternative, 
younger person". This lifestyle group is characterised by secularism, left and post-materialism 
and has an inclination towards the Greens.  
Whether the value cleavage between the values duty/acceptance and self-development and/or 
materialistic and post-materialistic value orientations will actually remain depends on whether 
the generation thesis or the life-cycle thesis is confirmed (cf. Chapter 2.2.1). Looking at Figure 
5.1 the first thesis would imply that the traditional values on the left side of the figure will 
disappear when individuals still representing these die and that the values and lifestyle groups 
on the right side of Figure 5.1 will take over completely.  
The second thesis implies, that over the years, at least some individuals will move from the 
lifestyle groups presented on the right side of the figure to the left. This would imply that value 
changes can take place due to an individual's move from one life phase to another which 
means that the western German society does not necessarily move in the direction of post-
materialism (cf. Chapter 4.3.1). On the contrary, values may show a retrograde movement 
towards traditional values. For instance, middle-aged people tend to give economic prosperity 
a higher priority than younger and older citizens. This can be explained by the fact that they 
are the age group dependent on a functioning and prosperous economy (cf. Dittrich 1991:176). 
The presentation of eastern German lifestyle groups in Chapter 5.2.2 seems to reveal two 
(latent) cleavages, one between the deprived and the satisfied (i.e. between losers and winners 
of the reunification) and one between communism and opposition (i.e. between the supporters 
of the old SED regime and those opposing it). Both cleavages can be connected to the 
transformation process that has - and to some extent even ten years after the reunification still 
does take place. Furthermore, they reflect the chances of the different lifestyle groups to adjust 
to the new living conditions. “The traditional farmer and worker“ and “the sub-cultural youth” 
may, for example, be assigned to the cleavages communism and deprived. The "bourgeois-
humanistic" lifestyle group may, for example, be arranged according to the cleavages deprived 
and opposition, deprived and communism, but also to the cleavages satisfied and opposition, 
depending on how the group has coped with the transformation process. The "status and career 
orientated person" and "the rationalist-technocratic person" may be arranged on several 
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cleavages, as well. Here, too, the development is dependent on how the members of these 
lifestyle groups manage the integration process into the new society. On the one hand, those 
satisfied might take an oppositional image in order to increase opportunities in making a 
career. They have never really opposed communism, however. On the other hand, those not 
adjusting to the new political system might be assigned to the cleavages communism and 
deprived.  
As pointed out in Chapter 5.2, the discussion of party preference of the lifestyle groups in the 
east has to take place at the purely hypothetical level as party preference is not included in the 
analysis presented by Becker, Becker and Ruhland. If meaningful suggestions of party 
preferences of East German lifestyle groups may be indicated, this is presented below (cf. 
Oedegaard 1994).  
The "traditional farmer and worker" may have a preference for the PDS. As shown above, 
members of this group belong to the older generation and have lived in the communist system 
for a long time. This impact on individual mentalities should not be underestimated. In 
addition, they feel threatened by the new situation as their jobs are cut and abolished due to 
inefficiency and a decrease in subsidies. 27% percent of the eastern German population belong 
to this lifestyle that has no equivalent in the old Länder and no pure, political representation in 
any of the "western" parties.48 The PDS may thus represent both the deprived and supporters 
of communism in this lifestyle group.  
On the other hand, the SPD might win those members of this lifestyle group who are basically 
satisfied with the development and who want a political representation of their group interests. 
This could result in the reinforcement of the cleavage "work versus capital" in reunified 
Germany since the eastern German workers to a larger extent present the traditional working 
class than the workers in the west.49 The cleavage "work versus capital" may also revive in the 
east with the take-over of the western German policy of social market economy. As 
emphasised in Chapter 3.2.2 a slight tendency in this direction was indicated at the 1998 
federal election. 
                                                 
48 In this context "western" also means those eastern parties whose organisation and politics were 
influenced by West German sister parties, such as the FDP, the SPD and the CDU. 
49 Recall the different developments in the industrial and the service sector in the two Germanys presented 
in Chapter 4.1.3.  
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"The left-intellectual alternative person" and "the bourgeois-humanistic person " might have 
their political representation in Bündnis 90/die Grünen. No post-materialistic lifestyle group 
existed in the GDR that can be compared to the west. Although the eastern "left-intellectual 
alternative person" and the western "post-materialistic, left-alternative younger person" and 
the "left liberal integrated post-materialist" all represent modern values and the demand for 
social changes, their primary goals were of a different nature. This is not surprising regarding 
the different situation in the east and the west, which led to the focus on different issues, e.g. 
democracy and human rights versus ecology and social equality. Due to the Christian value 
orientation of "the bourgeois-humanistic" lifestyle the members of this group may also incline 
to the CDU. The “status and career orientated person” may have a preference for the PDS as 
they often belonged to the leadership in the past. With regard to all three groups the following 
should be kept in mind; they are all characterised by a high level of education – often 
university degree. According to analyses there is an above average support for the PDS among 
the highly educated. This can be traced back to the special situation of higher education in the 
former GDR; an intensive ideological indoctrination took place which was based on a socialist 
value orientation (cf. Bürklin/Klein 1998:172; Chapter 4.1.2 in this thesis).      
The second largest lifestyle group in the former GDR is "the petty bourgeois-materialistic 
person". Their wish for materialist satisfaction and importance of family as well as the desire 
to express a belonging to the upper middle class might imply a preference for the CDU or the 
FDP. The question is how this has been influenced by the ongoing economic recession and to 
which extent this lifestyle group has remained optimistic or turned against the government. 
Looking at the East German lifestyle groups presented above the religious cleavage is missing 
almost completely; only the “bourgeois-humanistic person” possesses - according to the 
analysis of Becker et.al. - some Christian value orientations (cf. Becker et.al 1992:105). This 
can be traced back to the governmental opposition against religion presented in Chapter 3.2.2. 
Besides, the East German population is almost purely Protestant and, as also stressed in 
Chapter 3.1.3, it was the Catholic milieu which represented the religious cleavage in the 
German Empire and Weimar Republic. 
In addition to the cleavages between the deprived and satisfied and the supporters of 
communism and the supporters of opposition, an old cleavage seems to revive in reunified 
Germany, the cleavage between the centre and periphery (cf. Chapter 3.1.2). Although Berlin 
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became the German capital again in 1991 and the parliament started to move from Bonn to 
Berlin in 1999 there are still tensions between the old and new Länder. As emphasised by 
Bertram (1992:126): 
“Gerade angesichts der deutschen Wiedervereinigung ist es noch sinnvoller als vor der deutschen 
Wiedervereinigung, sich mit der Frage auseinanderzusetzen, ob Konflikt- und Spannungslinien im 
sozialen und politischen System nicht nur oder zunehmend weniger entlang sozialer Schichtungsgrenzen 
verlaufen und möglicherweise sehr viel stärker entlang bestimmter regionaler Differenzierungen.” 
Whether this will actually result in a regional cleavage represented by the PDS in the former 
GDR, comparable with the way the CSU represents Bavaria, remains to be seen.  
Reunified Germany thus seems to be characterised by a complexity of cleavages – both latent 
and manifest – which have different strengths and also cross-cut. These are the cleavages 
centre - periphery, religion - secularism, work - capital, left - right, materialism - post-
materialism, communism – opposition and deprived – satisfied. 
In addition to the above mentioned cleavages others have been discussed in research 
literature which are also reflected in the lifestyle groups presented. Vester et. al (1993:36), 
for example, argue that there is a post-modern or post-industrial cleavage which 
distinguishes the younger generation who have profited from the educational reforms and 
occupational modernisation from the rest of the population. Furthermore, they see a rise of 
new social inequalities which are based on group affiliation; in particular women, older 
people, foreigners, groups with little occupational qualification and people from 
disadvantaged regions are affected by this development. Another example is Kriesi 
(1998:181-182) who argues that there is an evidence for the existence of a social division 
between two segments of the new middle class. These have both different value 
orientations and make different political choices: the social and cultural service 
professionals develop ‘left-libertarian’ values whereas the managers through their 
identification with the opposite camp reinforce their social and cultural distinctiveness as 
well (cf. Kriesi 1998: 171-172).  
In this chapter I have – on the basis of previous lifestyle studies – discussed how lifestyle 
groups, cleavages and voting behaviour may be related. No discussion on the existence of 
social milieus was possible due to the limited information with regard to organisational 
membership, interest representation and party preference. This will thus be discussed on 
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the basis of my own analysis which will be presented in Chapter 7. Before this, though, the 
hypotheses, variables and strategy of data analysis will be presented in the following 
chapter. 
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6. HYPOTHESES, DATA AND STRATEGY OF DATA ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents the hypotheses which will be tested in the empirical section, as well 
as the data and variables which will be used in the empirical analyses. Finally, an overview 
of the strategy of data analysis will be given in Chapter 6.3.  
6.1 Hypotheses 
Before elaborating the hypotheses, I will sum up the major findings so far in the thesis. The 
starting point was the presentation of the traditional social milieus which developed during the 
German Empire and the Weimar Republic. These social milieus were based on the traditional 
social structural cleavage dimensions and the members were characterised by similar 
lifestyles, values systems, social positions etc. Furthermore, the milieus were strengthened by 
their entanglement with organisations which the individuals belonged to during their whole 
lifetime. These organisations presented both leisure activities - like sports and choir - as well 
as job interests and ethnic and religious interests etc. At the national level these groups had 
established alliances with political parties which represented the interests of the respective 
groups. It was this interwoven system which according to Lepsius got too rigid over time, and 
by the end of the Weimar Republic resulted in a break-up of these tight relationships between 
social groups and parties; due to social transformations the social milieus had changed. 
However, the parties had not changed and were focusing too strongly on their original support 
basis. Nevertheless, two social milieus – the Catholic and the workers’ milieu survived World 
War II and were still significant in the West German post-war era. 
The major social transformations in both Germanys, with respect to socio-economic changes, 
changes in the social structure and value changes, were presented and discussed in Chapter 4. 
There is now doubt that the western German population - and to some extent also the eastern – 
changed significantly in the post-war decades. Which impact these developments have had on 
the German population could be seen in the lifestyle groups presented in Chapter 5. The 
lifestyle groups and “social milieus” found in today’s surveys reflect the increased 
differentiation of the German population which can be traced back to these social 
transformations. As argued by Hradil (1997:507), the “social milieus” of the post industrial 
society are – when compared to the social moral milieus in previous decades - both less 
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obvious with respect to their social structural distinctions and with respect to their individual 
affiliations. Above all, however, the “milieus” differ because nowadays individuals may - 
through their own actions - quite easily change “milieus”. These changes are also reflected in 
the changing composition of the western German population during the past decades as was 
presented in chapter 5.2.1; some “milieus” have disappeared, some have increased, some 
decreased and some new ones have been found. As emphasised by Scheuch and Scheuch 
(forthcoming), however, this shows that it is not correct to characterise these groups as social 
milieus because real social milieus cannot have such a high level of instability.  
For this reason my argument – throughout the thesis – has been that it is necessary to 
distinguish between lifestyle groups and social milieus. Looking at Figure 2.3 in Chapter 
2.3.2, both lifestyle groups and social milieus may exist in society. However, they differ with 
respect to strength and stability. Whereas the social milieus are characterised by manifest 
cleavages, organisational membership and political representation, lifestyle groups are based 
on group solidarity and affinity.  
Thus, the assumption is that:  
There is a core of social milieus in the German population. Some of them are traditional 
and others are new; they may change in size over the years. Nevertheless their main 
characteristics remain the same and they offer a certain stability in the volatile 
electorate. In addition, there are several lifestyle groups. They are far more short lived 
than the social milieus and reflect the trends of a certain epoch or decade. By conducting 
lifestyle analyses on a continuous basis it may be possible to trace the changes and even 
disappearance of existing social milieus and lifestyle groups and the rise of new ones.  
Modern societies are in continuous rotations and changes seem to go faster and faster. In 
today’s reunified Germany changes take place as well; the former GDR is catching up with the 
modernisation process, the service sector is continuously growing in the west and both 
Germanys are influenced by the EU integration process and by the globalisation of the world 
economy. All these developments influence large parts of the population and may bring new 
cleavage dimensions and social milieus in the German – and of course - other societies into 
existence. 
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Of all surveys on lifestyles and “social milieus” presented in Chapter 5 the one by Vester et.al. 
is the one which is closest to the approach applied in this thesis. They too analyse the 
existence of cleavages in the modern society, “social milieus”, lifestyles, organisational 
membership and party preference. However, one important distinction exists in the fact that, I 
only define a social milieu as such if there is a significant relationship in a lifestyle group with 
respect to cleavages, organisations and party preference and if this relationship is consistent 
i.e. the members of a modern, post-materialistic orientated lifestyle group should, for example, 
not have a preference for the CDU/CSU (cf. Oedegaard 2000). Thus, the definition of a social 
milieu is 
a social milieu exists if there is a relationship between a lifestyle group, cleavage(s), 
organisational membership(s), interest representation and party preference.  
As emphasised several times so far in the thesis, the assumption is that both old and new 
social milieus exist in the German population; old milieus are featured by traditional 
lifestyles and are still formed on the basis of social structural cleavages, like class, religion 
and region which to a certain extent are reflected by organisations that are closely linked 
with specific political parties. In order to detect potential new milieus, new lifestyles also 
have to be considered that reflect the modernisation process which has taken place in the 
German population during the past decades. These lifestyles incorporate different aspects 
of the individual’s way of living and his or her aims in life. They might indicate the 
existence of other cleavages than the ones expressed by traditional lifestyles and milieus. 
The membership structure of lifestyle groups, their interest representation and their 
connection to specific political parties is important for the establishment of new social 
milieus which influence the party system. Furthermore, it is expected that different milieus 
exist in the old and new Länder as the social developments in the east and west since 
World War II have been of different natures.  
Based on the above presented definition the following single hypotheses can be 
formulated: 
H1: It is assumed that a religious milieu still exists in the west which is characterised by 
individuals with a traditional and religious orientated lifestyle, who have a religious 
affiliation and are member of religious organisations, see the churches as an interest 
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representation and have a party preference for the CDU/CSU who they also consider to 
represent their interest. This milieu is not assumed to exist in the east. 
H2: It is assumed that a worker’s milieu still exists in the west which is characterised by 
individuals with a work orientated lifestyle, who are blue-collar workers, trade union 
members, see their interests represented by the trade union and have a party preference 
for the SPD which they also consider to represent their interest. This milieu is not 
expected to exist in the east. 
H3: It is assumed that a Green milieu exists in the west which is characterised by an 
education-orientated lifestyle, where the individuals possess post-materialistic value 
orientations, are members in student organisation(s) and/or alternative political 
organisations, see their interests represented by environmental organisation(s) and have 
a party preference for Bündnis 90/die Grünen which they also consider to represent 
their interest. This milieu is not assumed to exist in the east. 
H4: It is assumed that a regional milieu exists in the east characterised by left-
orientation, membership in political organisation(s) and/or student organisation(s), 
interest representation by and party preference for the PDS. 
The aim of the analysis is to explore whether the above presented milieus – which are 
assumed to exist based on previous analyses presented earlier in this thesis – also exist 
under the definition of a social milieu as applied in this thesis. Furthermore, it is the aim of 
the analysis to explore whether other social milieus may be found. 
Based on the presentations in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 the assumption is that both traditional 
social milieus still exist in the old Länder, i.e. the religious and the workers’ milieu, and 
that there will also be signs of new milieus with features typical for the modernised 
society, for example, a post-materialistic, Green milieu. In the new Länder the traditional 
social milieus will no longer exist in the population, social milieus which are typical for 
the advanced industrialised society will not exist either, but a milieu will exist covering 
specific eastern German features. Finally, the increased tendency towards non-voting 
raises the question to which extent this is coincidental or whether it is a systematic 
development taking place in particular parts of the population, in particular among the so-
called losers of the modernisation process. If the latter is the case, the question is whether 
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this is also reflected by the existence of an “unpolitical milieu” characterised, for example, 
by low social status, dissatisfaction, feeling of deprivation, apathy and the like, as was 
indicated in the presentation of lifestyle analyses in Chapter 5. A fifth hypothesis might 
thus be formulated 
H5: It is assumed that unpolitical milieus exist both in the east and west which are 
characterised by a low social status, passivity both with respect to lifestyle, 
memberships and political interest and whose members do not have any interest 
representation and tend not to vote. 
With regard to the cleavages, several latent and manifest cleavages are expected to exist in 
reunified Germany as was discussed in Chapter 5.2.3. Only a few have been included 
above, and should be considered to be minimum requirements for the formation of a social 
milieu. Further discussion on the cleavages will take place in Chapter 6.2.2. 
6.2 Presentation of data and variables  
The ALLBUS survey (Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften) 1998 
will be used in the empirical analysis.50 The reasons are several. First of all, the survey 
contains a module on lifestyles and an extensive list of questions concerning organisational 
memberships of the respondent - both former and present - and party preference. All these 
variables are important for the analysis of social milieus according to the definition applied 
in this thesis. Secondly, the survey was conducted both in the new and old Länder which 
facilitates a comparison. Thirdly, the survey was conducted in 1998 and it might thus be 
assumed that the Germans have had some time to adjust to the consequences of the 
reunification. The 1998 ALLBUS module neither includes questions regarding party 
preference nor questions about perceived conflicts51 in Germany. Nevertheless, I will use 
different issues to measure possible cleavage dimensions in German society and vote 
intention as a measurement for party preference. Thus, although ALLBUS 1998 has some 
                                                 
50 The data used in this analysis is based on the ALLBUS survey from 1998 (ZA study number 3000). The 
author is responsible for the analysis and the interpretation of the data presented in this thesis. 
51 In 1980, 1982 and 1990 questions were asked about perceived social conflicts in the West German 
society. Some of these refer to traditional cleavages like, for example, between left and right orientated 
people and between workers and employers. Others refer to social conflicts which are not (yet) manifest 
cleavages like conflicts between rich and poor and immigrants and Germans. 
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shortcomings it is – at least for the time being – the only available data set suitable for the 
research question of this thesis. 
Several surveys have compared the lifestyles of the eastern and western population and 
some of the results of these studies were presented in Chapter 5 (i.e. Becker et.al. 1992 
Spellerberg 1996). In particular, concerning party preference and interest representation, it 
can be reasonably assumed that some time was necessary for the eastern Germans to get an 
overview of the party system and party choices in a democratic country and to figure out 
which institution might actually represent their own interests. Thus, even though it might 
be premature to expect long-lasting party ties in the east, tendencies might possibly 
become visible eight years after reunification.  
6.2.1 Lifestyle groups 
As can be seen from Figures 2.2 and 2.3 and discussed in Chapter 2.3 a lifestyle group is in 
this thesis defined as a  
group of people expressing similar values, leisure activities and aesthetic preferences in 
everyday life 
where the expressed lifestyle is a product of both the economic situation and individual 
socialisation and values. Like Spellerberg, I expect that the lifestyle is closely associated with 
social structure and that – based on the dominant lifestyle characteristics of a group - 
assumptions about the dominant social structural characteristics of the members can be made. 
Social structural characteristics will not be included directly in the empirical analysis of the 
lifestyle groups. However, the association between a lifestyle group and the social structural 
characteristics will be explored at a later stage to expand the knowledge of the lifestyle group 
and to analyse to what extent social structural cleavages between the lifestyle groups exist.  
Both in Chapter 2.1.2 and Chapter 5 several lifestyle surveys were presented and discussed 
and, in general, lifestyle is understood as the individual organisation of everyday life. 
Empirically this is often measured by leisure activities both in the domestic and non-
domestic areas. In addition to the specific leisure activities, several studies include 
aesthetic characteristics in, for example, music, food, furniture etc. (cf. Bourdieu 1982; 
Schulze 1992a; Spellerberg 1996). Furthermore, several surveys include questions about 
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individual values, life goals etc. Thus, there are many sets of variables which can be used 
as an indicator for lifestyle.52 Nevertheless, a distinction might be drawn between the 
aesthetic dimension covering music, literature etc. and the ethical dimension including life 
goals, values of the individuals and the like (cf. Koch et.al. 1999:22).  
In ALLBUS 1998 the lifestyle module includes questions about leisure activities, life areas 
important to the respondent and aesthetic preferences in the area of music, television and 
newspapers. Items in these areas will be used in the analysis of this thesis and are 
presented in detail in Table 6.1.53  
As emphasised throughout, this thesis focuses on the political impact of social milieus in 
reunified Germany. I have tried to prove theoretically that the concepts of lifestyle and 
milieu are related and that both traditional and new social milieus may be reflected in the 
lifestyle groups. With the increasing variety and supply of culture, the individual lifestyle 
expresses a social and cultural affiliation (cf. Koch et.al. 1999:21) and accordingly one 
might assume that individuals would prefer to socialise with other individuals with the 
same cultural and social lifestyle. Since the variables presented in Table 6.1 give a more 
differentiated picture of attitudes and behaviour of individuals in today’s Germany, new 
patterns of affiliations may be easier to uncover than when analysing, for example, solely 
the traditional social structural variables such as age, education, denomination, occupation 
and the like.  
                                                 
52 Cf. Chapter 2.1.2 
53 Leisure activities included in the ALLBUS survey have been selected on the basis of their empirical 
significance in other surveys. Important categories are the place of the leisure activity (whether domestic 
or non-domestic), orientation towards family and relatives, political and social engagement and the 
aesthetic schemes excitement, - trivial- and high culture (Koch et.al 1999:22 ff.).  
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Table 6.1 Lifestyle variables in the area of leisure activities and at the ethical and 
aesthetic dimensions    
Leisure activities54  
Read books; read magazines; listen to LP’s, CD’s, cassettes; watch video; occupy oneself with the computer; 
use internet and on-line services; educate oneself privately; do nothing, be lazy; walk, wander; yoga, 
meditation, relaxation through self-hypnosis, body experience; go eating or drinking; visit friends, neighbours 
acquaintances; visit family, relatives; party games with family; trips or short journeys; participation in politics; 
honorary activities; church attendance, attend religious meetings; artistic and musical activities; do-it-yourself, 
repairs in the house/car, gardening; do active sports; visit sport events; go to the cinema, visit pop–or jazz 
concerts, go dancing; go to the opera, classical concerts, theatre, exhibition 
Important life areas55  
Own family and children; occupation and work; leisure and recreation; friends and acquaintances; relatives; 
religion and church; politics and public life; neighbourhood 
Aesthetic characteristics   
Music taste56 
Folk music; German pop music; 
pop- and rock music; classical 
music; jazz 
Television taste57 
Television- and quiz shows; sports; 
feature movies; news; political 
magazines; arts and culture; 
Heimatfilme58; thrillers; action 
movies; family- and entertainment 
series  
Interest in contents of daily 
newspaper59 
Politics; economy; culture; sport; 
local news; “all over the world” 
and miscellaneous; advertisements 
and small advertisements 
 
6.2.2 Cleavages 
A cleavage is in this thesis understood as a  
characteristic or issue which is represented by one particular lifestyle group and 
which is also connected to organisational membership and organisational interest 
representation.  
                                                 
54 Question: “Now, some questions concerning your leisure time. Please indicate with respect to every 
activity on this list how often you do this in your leisure time: daily, at least once a week, at least once a 
month, seldom or never” (English translation). 
55 Question: “On these cards different life areas are written down. We would like to know, how important 
each of these life areas are for you.” and here the values range from 1= not important to 7= very 
important” (English translation). 
56 Question: “In the following, I will mention different sorts of music. Please tell me – based on this list – 
how much you like listening to this kind of music.” The values range from 1= very much to 5= not at all 
(English translation). 
57 Question: “I have some cards here on which different television programmes are listed. Please tell me 
how much each of these programmes interest you: very much, much, medium, little or not at all?” 
(English translation). 
58 A Heimatfilm is a sentimental film in an idealised regional setting (cf. Pons Collins 1997:335). 
59 Question: “I have some cards here on which different contents of the daily newspaper are listed. Please 
tell me with regard to each contents how much those contents interests you: very much, much, medium, 
little or not at all?” (English translation). 
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As elaborated in Chapter 2.1.1, a distinction might be drawn between cleavages which 
originate from socio-economic structures and cleavages which to a lesser extent can be 
traced back to such structures. These are called ideological cleavages and are, according to 
Valen, defined as “contradictions which exist in the consciousness of individuals and 
which can be identified on the basis of their opinion and evaluation of certain issues” (cf. 
Aardal 1994:229). Furthermore, a distinction can be drawn between latent and manifest 
cleavages. Latent cleavages can be understood as social structural characteristics or issues 
which may have the “quality” and importance of becoming real societal cleavages, i.e. 
analyses show that societal groups differ with respect to certain characteristics or 
evaluations, but these have not yet reached the surface (cf. Figure 2.3). In contrast, a 
manifest cleavage implies that a particular characteristic or issue has been defined as a 
contradiction and has been institutionalised by organisations and parties. Nevertheless, a 
manifest cleavage may retreat into a state of latency, but become activated at short notice 
should interests be challenged. An example is the religious cleavage and its revival as 
presented in Chapter 3.1.3. A cleavage is, in this thesis, thus understood as a characteristic 
or issue which is represented by one particular lifestyle group and which is also connected 
to organisational membership and organisational interest representation. This is a rather 
broad definition, but it might be a suitable way of detecting new theoretically and 
empirically relevant social divisions and to study their political formation in times where 
the traditional cleavages seem to retreat into the background (cf. end of Chapter 2.3). 
1) Social Structural cleavages 
As emphasised in Chapter 6.2.1 an association is expected between the lifestyle groups and 
social structural characteristics. Rather than measuring the existence of social structural 
cleavages separately these will thus be analysed in association with the lifestyle groups in 
order to expand the knowledge of the lifestyle groups as well. The following social 
structural characteristics which may also be expected to point at cleavages will be included 
in the analysis: education, occupation, denomination, religious affiliation, church 
attendance, age, gender, income, family status and community size. These variables 
measure the possible representation of traditional cleavages in the lifestyle groups as they 
were also presented in chapters three and five. Although church attendance is not really a 
social structural characteristic, but rather an activity and is thus included in the definition 
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of lifestyle groups as well (cf. Table 6.1). However, with the decreasing impact of 
objective characteristics like denomination, church attendance is one of the most important 
measurements of the strength of religiosity. Thus, it has been included here too. 
In the old Länder, for example, the traditional impact of social structural variables on 
voting behaviour was visible also in 1998. An analysis of the 1998 ALLBUS data proved 
that the highest preference for the SPD could be found among the blue-collar workers 
(57.1%). Among those with trade union membership this number even increased to 67.3%. 
With regard to the impact of religion, 66.1% of those who go to church more than once per 
month have a preference for the CDU/CSU, whereas only 37.5% of Protestants have a 
preference for the CDU/CSU, compared to 43.8% for the SPD. 
As mentioned previously, questions which directly address perceived social conflicts – and 
thus both latent and manifest cleavages - between population groups in the German society 
were not included in the 1998 ALLBUS module. Looking at the frequency distributions of 
some of the social conflicts which were asked in previous surveys it might look as if they 
are of no significance anymore, as the percentage of respondents perceiving conflicts as 
“very strong” has dropped continuously with regard to almost every conflict. As does the 
number of people who consider the conflict between people located at the left and people 
located at the right “very strong” decline from 39.3% in West Germany in 1980 to 18.6% 
in 1990 (ALLBUS 1980-1998:95). This should not ignore the fact that the number of 
people considering this conflict “quite strong” has remained stable at about 48.0 % from 
the early 1980s until the 1990s. With regard to the traditional cleavage, work vs. capital, 
the number of people considering this a strong cleavage dropped from 41.3 % in 1980 to 
20.2 % in 1990 (ALLBUS 1980-1998:103). Nevertheless, taking into account the changes 
that have taken place in the German labour market during the past ten years, this cleavage 
might have gained importance. With regard to this cleavage as well, it should be 
emphasised the number of people considering the cleavage “quite strong” has remained 
quite stable at about 40% during the past decade. The only conflict which does not show a 
significant decrease over the past decade is the one between foreign workers and Germans. 
The number of respondents considering this conflict “very strong” has remained stable at 
23-24% during the past decade, whereas the number considering this cleavage “quite 
strong” has increased from 42.1% in 1980 to 47.2% in 1990 (ALLBUS 1980-1998:104). It 
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might be assumed that this conflict has also increased with the labour market problems 
after the reunification. 
2) Ideological cleavages 
As discussed in Chapter 2.1.1 ideological cleavages have become more important in recent 
decades as the impact of social structure on voting behaviour has decreased. According to 
Aardal (1994:229), Valen defines ideological cleavages as “contradictions which exist in 
the consciousness of individuals and which can be identified on the basis of their opinion 
and evaluation of certain issues”. These cleavages are based on socio-economic structures 
to a lesser extent than the traditional social structural ones. However, as was emphasised in 
Chapter 2.1.1 as well, it is necessary to differentiate between short-term issues and more 
permanent ideological contradictions which may be considered as cleavages.  
The following issues will be used to analyse possible ideological cleavages in the 
empirical part of this thesis: 
- In general, I think that social differences in our country are fair. 
- Worries about unemployment 
- Worries about the number of immigrants to Germany 
- Worries about the costs of the reunification 
- Socialism is in principle a good idea which was carried out badly 
- Worries about the environment  
- Post-materialism vs. materialism (Inglehart-Index) 
- Ideological left-right placement 
Whereas the first two variables address cleavages - which might have arisen as a 
consequence of modernisation - the third variable addresses the possible cleavage between 
immigrants and Germans which might become increasingly important due to the 
globalisation process. The following two variables are related to the reunification and a 
possible regional cleavage between the east and west. Furthermore, the question 
addressing environmental worries and post-materialism vs. materialism measure the 
existence of the so-called value cleavage (cf. Chapters 2, 3 and 5). In addition to the 
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above-mentioned variables, I will include the question whether it is the duty of the 
citizens’ to regularly participate at the elections. As emphasised in Chapter 4.3.2.6 this 
may also be considered as a measurement of value change. Finally, the left-right self-
placement of the individual has been included as a measurement for the existence of the 
left-right ideological cleavage.  
There are no issues in ALLBUS 1998 related to religious or ethical questions which 
facilitates the analysis of a moral - religious ideological cleavage. Denomination is 
included in the social structural variables presented above and church attendance may be 
used as a measurement for the strength of religiosity. The impact of denomination and 
church attendance on voting behaviour in West Germany was shown earlier in this section. 
However, as church attendance is decreasing, in particular in the younger generations, it 
would have been interesting to analyse whether attitudes to abortion, divorce etc. are better 
indicators of religiosity than church attendance. Other conflict dimensions which seem to 
be relevant are, for example, the one between supporters of nuclear power or globalisation 
and those that are against, as well as the conflict between Christianity and Islam. 
Nevertheless, as these variables are not available at present the analysis of their relevance 
in society has to be left for future analysis. Such analyses should then include several 
different issues that may measure old and new cleavage dimensions which are expected to 
be relevant in the German society. For example, in the 1997 Norwegian election study 
more than 40 issues were included and arranged into four ideological dimensions by means 
of principal components analysis. These four dimensions were: 1. immigration 2. public - 
private 3. environment/growth – protection and 4. moral - religion (Aardal 1999:74-75). 
Questions loading on the first dimension were, for example, “Immigration constitutes a 
serious threat to our national culture”, “In difficult times, we should concentrate on 
providing work for our on people rather than immigrants”. The public-private dimension 
included questions such as “Employment can easier be secured if the government is given 
more control of the banks and industry” and “It is more important to develop public 
services than to reduce taxation”. With regard to the third dimension, environment/growth-
protection, issues like ”To secure economic growth we still need to develop industry even 
if it conflicts with environmental considerations” and “We should start building gas power 
plants in Norway” could be found. Finally, issues like “We should promote a society 
where Christian values are more prominent” and “We should introduce legislation to 
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ensure a Christian upbringing in municipal kindergarten” loaded on the fourth dimension 
(cf. Aardal 1999:65ff.). 
3) The manifestation of cleavages through organisations and interest representation 
As was discussed in Chapter 2.1.1 and presented in Figure 2.3, a cleavage does not get 
institutionalised before parties, trade unions or other organisations are established. 
Furthermore, organisational memberships are important in order to distinguish lifestyle groups 
from social milieus as was discussed in Chapter 2.3. ALLBUS 1998 offers both an extensive 
list of occupational organisations and other organisations ranging from sports to alternative 
political groups. The list of memberships in trade unions and other occupational 
organisations and the respective frequencies in the east and west are presented in Table 
6.2. Thereafter an overview of other organisational memberships is given in Table 6.3.  
Table 6.2 Membership in trade unions and other occupational organisations in the 
west and the east (in %)60 
Present membership  West East 
Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB)  
Trade union 
8.7 11.9 
Deutsche Angestelltengewerkschaft (DAG) 
Trade union of the employees 
3.8 1.2 
Christlicher Gewerkschaftsbund Deutschland (CGB) 
Christian trade union 
0.1 0.2 
Union der Leitenden Angestellten (ULA) 
Union of the leading employees 
0.5 0.0 
Deutscher Beamtenbund (DBB) oder sonstige Beamtenorganisation  
Association of Civil servants  
1.5 0.2 
Bauernverband (Deutscher Bauernverband oder sonstige 
Farmer’s association 
1.0 0.4 
Einzel-oder Gerwerbeverband des Handwerks Einzelhandels und 
ähnlichem  
Trade association of the manual worker’s and the like 
1.8 2.1 
Unternehmerverband (BDI) oder sonstiger 
UnternehmerverbandAssociation of employers 
0.5 0.4 
Berufsverband der freien Berufe 
Association of the self-employed 
1.3 1.5 
Sonstiger Berufsverband 
Other  
4.7 2.8 
Total N = 2212 N = 1022 
(Source: ALLBUS 1998 ZA-Nr. 3000) 
                                                 
60 Question “Are you presently member of a trade union, an occupational organisation or an association of 
employers? Please go through the list and tell me where you are a member” (English translation). 77.2% 
of the respondents in the west and 79.5% in the east answered that they are not member of any trade 
union or other occupational organisation at present (west N=2212, east N=1022). The numbers include 
multiple answers.  
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Table 6.3 Former and present memberships in organisations in the east and 
west (in %)61 
Present Former Organisational membership  
West East West East 
Choral society  5.4 1.8 5.8 3.6 
Sports club  25.2 10.9 18.0 15.9 
Other hobby club  9.3 4.1 3.6 2.1 
Local- and citizens organisation  5.6 1.2 2.2 0.0 
Other social organisation 6.3 2.6 2.6 1.9 
Organisation of the expelled  1.3 0.6 0.6 0.2 
Social welfare, war victim organisation 3.7 1.2 0.9 0.7 
Church or religious organisation 3.0 0.8 1.4 0.4 
Youth, student organisation  0.9 0.4 2.8 22.9 
Political party  2.2 1.6 1.3 6.0 
Citizens’ initiative  1.6 0.8 1.2 0.3 
Alternative political group (environment, 
peace etc.)  
1.6 0.9 3.3 1.1 
Other memberships  5.8 5.6 1.5 5.4 
Total  N =2212 N = 1022 N = 2212 N = 1022 
(Source: ALLBUS 1998 ZA-Nr. 3000) 
As can be seen from Table 6.2 and 6.3 the number of people who are members in 
organisations is quite low. Still, the decision was made not to exclude any variables from 
the analysis a priori as the assumption is that organisations which have not previously been 
significant in distinguishing between social groups may (have) become so.  
Past memberships seem crucial to include as well, since one might assume that even if no 
longer a member, the impact of the organisation on the socialisation process of the 
individual might still be reflected in the behaviour and attitudes of the individual (cf. 
Chapter 2.3.1). As argued by Gensicke this is particularly important when comparing the 
old and new Länder because it facilitates the analysis of voluntary engagements in the 
former GDR and the consequences the social transformations have (had) on voluntary 
engagements in the new Länder (cf. Gensicke 2001:26). 
 
                                                 
61 Question: Past memberships were asked the following way: “And in which organisations or associations 
were you a former member, but are not anymore?” (English translation). In the west, 53.2% of the 
respondents answered not to be member in any of the organisations at present and 64.2% answered not to 
be former members of any of the organisations (N=2212). In the east 72.9 % of the respondents are not 
members in any of the organisations at present and 54.4% answered not to be formers members of any of 
the mentioned organisations The numbers include multiple answers. 
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Table 6.4 Organisations representing the interests of the respondent (in %)62 
Organisations representing the interests of the 
respondent  
West East 
Trade union 32.4 33.5 
Catholic Church 15.8 3.9 
Protestant Church 13.3 9.6 
Environmental organisation 43.0 28.0 
CDU 19.6 11.8 
CSU 14.3 4.4 
SPD 26.9 27.8 
FDP 5.5 2.3 
Bündnis90/Grüne 12.7 10.6 
Republikaner 1.6 1.5 
PDS 0.9 15.3 
Total N = 2212 N = 1022 
(Source: ALLBUS 1998 ZA-Nr. 3000) 
The organisation(s) representing the interests of a group is significant for the manifestation 
of a cleavage. As argued in Chapter 2, the establishment of ties between interest 
organisations and specific groups indicate that a process of Vergesellschaftung might be 
taking place (cf. Figure 2.1 and 2.3). In this process latent cleavages become manifest. In 
ALLBUS this question has been asked with respect to 11 organisations and parties and 
these are presented in Table 6.4. 
6.2.3 Social milieus 
The definition of a social milieu, as it is applied throughout this thesis and elaborated in 
Chapter 2.3, is that 
a social milieu will be defined if a relationship exists between a lifestyle group, 
cleavage(s), organisational membership, organisational interest representation and 
party preference.  
Furthermore, this relationship should be consistent in the sense that a religious orientated 
lifestyle group should not correspond with a secular party like, for example, the PDS. As 
ALLBUS 1998 does not include any variables on party identification or attachment, vote 
                                                 
62 Question: “On this list you will find organisations, of which many citizens feel represented. Independent 
of whether you are a member of an organisation, please tell me with respect to every organisation 
whether it represents your interests or is against your interests” (English translation). The numbers 
include multiple answers. West N=2212, East N= 1022. 
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intention63 will be used in this final step of the analysis of social milieus. This 
measurement may be more easily exposed to short-term volatility than party preference. In 
particular, this may be the case in an election like the one in 1998 where voters wanted to 
get rid of 16 years of Chancellor Helmut Kohl and were the election was more a vote 
against the CDU/CSU than a vote for the SPD (cf. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 1998:74) 
Nevertheless, as can be seen from Table 6.4, the list of interest organisations embed both 
organisations and political parties. All organisations are expected to also be related to the 
political parties represented in the table; the churches to CDU/CSU, the trade union to the 
SPD and environmental organisations to Bündnis90/die Grünen. Thus, if members of a 
lifestyle group consider the trade unions to represent their interest, it would also be 
expected that they consider the SPD to represent their interest. Furthermore, it may also be 
assumed that individuals are inclined to vote for the same party they claim to represent 
their interests or to parties closely linked organisations which are considered to represent 
the interests of a particular group (cf. Weßels 2000:142). Interest representation by 
political parties can thus be used as an extra measurement of milieu stability as well (cf. 
Figure 2.3). 
6.3 Strategy of data analysis 
In most lifestyle analyses factor analyses of the lifestyle variables are carried out prior to 
the cluster analysis (cf. Chapter 5). The benefit of this procedure is that the influence of 
random measurement errors is reduced through the creation of factors or components. 
Furthermore, as lifestyle analyses often include more than 50 variables the interpretation of 
the clusters become clearer when the number of variables have been reduced before they 
are included in the cluster analysis (cf. Bacher 1994:126). 
In the first step of the analysis the items used to measure lifestyle groups are extracted. 
Cases will be deleted if one or more of the input variables have missing values (casewise 
deletion). The items were presented in Table 6.1 and cover leisure activities (24 items), life 
areas important to the individual (8 items) and aesthetic preferences in the field of music (5 
                                                 
63 Question: “If there was a parliamentary election next Sunday which party would you give your 2. vote?” 
(English translation). At the Bundestagswahl the voters have to votes – the 1. vote for the candidate and 
the 2. vote for the party. It is the 2. vote which decides which party will win the election. 
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items), television (10 items) and newspaper contents (7 items). As the reduction of lifestyle 
variables in this analysis is of an exploratory nature, with no underlying statistical model, 
principal components analyses (PCA) will be carried out in the second step of the analysis 
based on the items extracted in step 1. Principal components analysis is a statistical 
technique that linearly transforms an original set of variables into a substantially smaller 
set of uncorrelated variables that represents most of the information in the original set of 
variables. Such a small set of uncorrelated variables is easier to understand and use in 
further analysis than a larger set of correlated variables (cf. Dunteman 1989:7). Although 
principal components analysis is similar to factor analysis, as both techniques try to 
explain part of the variation in a set of observed variables on the basis of a few underlying 
dimensions, important differences exist between the techniques. Principal components 
analysis is an explorative approach with no underlying statistical model of the observed 
variables. This approach focuses on the maximum variance properties of principal 
components where the first component explains the maximum variance, the second 
component the second highest variance and so on. Factor analysis, on the other hand, is a 
confirmatory approach which has an underlying statistical model. In contrast to PCA, 
factor analysis focuses on explaining the common variance rather than the total variance, 
in the observed variables on the basis of relatively few underlying factors (cf. Dunteman 
1989:9). The factor analytic model is thus applied when considering the correlation 
between two observed variables to be a result of their sharing of common sources or 
factors, and not as a result of one being a direct cause of the other (Kim/Mueller 1978:22).  
In the next step (Step 3 cf. Figure 6.1) cluster analysis will be carried out on the basis of 
the components found in the previous step. The aim of the cluster analysis is to group 
persons who are as homogeneous as possible with respect to the components (cf. Bacher 
1994:2). The cluster analysis will be carried out using K-means cluster analysis in SPSS 
10.0. K-means cluster attempts to identify relatively homogeneous groups of cases based 
on selected characteristics, using an algorithm that can handle large number of cases. In 
this procedure distances are computed using simple Euclidean distances (SPSS index, 
release 10.0). The K-means algorithm requires the user to specify the number of clusters 
and if an inappropriate number of clusters have been chosen the results may be misleading 
(SPSS index release 10.0). SPSS does not offer any test to determine which cluster number 
offers the best solution. Nevertheless, Bacher (2001:71ff) has shown how test criteria can 
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be computed in SPSS with a syntax programme in order to get some indications which 
solution may be the appropriate one. The following test criteria will be calculated 1. ETA2 
(k): the explained variance of all active characteristics of a cluster solution i.e. the 
improvement of k clusters compared to the zero-model where no cluster structure exists. 
The explained variance (eta2 ) is equal to 1 – the not explained variance (i.e. the error sum 
of squares within the clusters divided by the total sum of squares) where the error sum of 
squares are equal to the squared euclidian distances between object and cluster centre k 
(Bacher 1994:308f.). 2. PRE2 (k): The relative improvement compared to the previous 
cluster solution. Finally, F-MAX (k) is calculated based on the association between the 
explained and non-explained variance. Whereas the explained variance in ETA2 is 
dependent on the number of clusters and the explained variance thus automatically 
increases with a larger number of clusters, this interdependence is removed in F-MAX. 
The appropriate number of clusters is equal to the solution with the maximum F-MAX 
value. In this step the stability of the chosen cluster solution will be tested as well. 
The clusters - or lifestyle groups – will then be named on the basis of the most dominant 
characteristics of each single cluster where only components which are at least 0.4 
standard deviations above or below the total mean will be considered meaningful for 
characterising a cluster. No general rule could be found in statistical books with respect to 
which components might be considered significant for describing a cluster. Nevertheless, 
criteria such as at least 1/3 or 0.4 standard deviation above or below the total mean (cf. 
Giegler 1994:261f, Otte 1997:313) could be found in the literature. In this thesis the 
criteria of 0.4 standard deviations above or below the total mean will be applied in order to 
facilitate a clear distinction between the lifestyle groups as regards content. Further details 
on the principal components analyses and cluster analyses will be presented in Chapter 7.  
I have several times emphasised in this thesis that – from a theoretical perspective - it is 
expected that a lifestyle is rooted in the social structure and that differences between the 
lifestyle groups with respect to dominant social structural characteristics can be expected 
to exist. The lifestyle clusters found in the previous step will thus be compared with 
respect to social structural characteristics, to expand the knowledge of the lifestyle groups 
and simultaneously analyse to which extent social structural cleavages are reflected in the 
lifestyle groups. The relationships between the clusters and social structural variables will 
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thus be carried out in the fourth step by using cross-tabulations. In this step an analysis of 
the associations between the lifestyle groups and issues presented in Chapter 6.2.2 is 
carried out as well, with the aim of detecting possible (latent) ideological cleavages. 
Thereafter, the association between lifestyle groups and organisational membership will be 
measured too, in order to see whether some lifestyle groups are more inclined to prefer one 
kind of membership to another (cf. Tables 6.2. and 6.3). In this context the relationship 
between the lifestyle groups and the organisations representing the interests of the 
respective groups will be analysed as well (cf. Table 6.4). As argued in the previous 
section, interest organisations are important to the manifestation of cleavages, but may also 
be used as a measurement of milieu stability. In addition, the association between the 
lifestyle groups and two other variables will be explored here; political interest and 
satisfaction with democracy. Both variables are important to understand an individual’s 
acceptance of the existing political system. In particular with respect to the analysis of a 
possible “unpolitical milieu” (Hypothesis 5, Chapter 6.1), it might be expected that both 
political interest and democratic satisfaction would be lower here than in the other milieus.  
Finally, the association between lifestyle groups and party preference are analysed and if 
significant relationships exist between lifestyle groups, cleavages, organisational 
membership, organisational interest representation and party preference social milieus will 
be defined (Step 5).  
The strategy of data analysis described above is of an explorative nature; the existence of 
social milieus is analysed on the basis of simple associations between lifestyle groups and 
the selected variables i.e. cleavages, organisational membership, interest representation 
and party preference. The definition of a social milieu is thus taking place based on the 
empirical coincidence between lifestyle groups and these groups of variables. 
Nevertheless, two criteria will be applied which facilitate to distinguish the core of social 
milieus from the lifestyle groups. Firstly, the relationship between lifestyle groups, 
cleavages, organisational memberships, interest representation and party preference has to 
be consistent. This means, for example, that a lifestyle group characterised by religious 
values should be above average represented with regard to membership in religious 
organisations, consider the churches as their interest representation and have a voting 
preference for the CDU/CSU. Secondly, only in those cases where there is a significant 
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relationship between a lifestyle group, cleavage(s), organisational membership(s), interest 
representation and party preference this lifestyle group will be defined as a social milieu. 
The existence of such milieus would then again imply that the German party system is still 
characterised by relationship(s) between political parties and specific population groups 
which offer a certain level of stability in the volatile electorate.   
As the statistical meaningfulness of the proportions are dependent on the size of a cluster 
and the standard deviation, these have to be considered when interpreting the relationship 
between the lifestyle groups and the other variables (see Bacher 1994: 330ff.). For every 
variable in a cross-tabulation a significant test will thus be carried out; firstly, the mean 
will be calculated and secondly a t-test will be carried out between a variable in the total 
cluster using the mean which was found in the previous step as a test value. Only if the 
cluster specific proportion of a variable is significantly different from the whole sample, 
will the variable be considered statistically significant for describing a cluster.64 An 
overview of the strategy of data analysis is given in Figure 6.1.  
Due to their different socio-economic and socio-cultural developments the old and new 
Länder will be analysed separately. The results found in the west are presented in Chapter 
7.1, those in the east in Chapter 7.2. A comparison of the lifestyle groups found in the east 
and west will be discussed in Chapter 7.3, in particular with respect to the (possible) 
existence of a regional milieu (cf. Hypothesis 4, Chapter 6.1).  
                                                 
64 If the relationship between a variable and a cluster is significant at p < .05 (i.e. t= 1.96 or above or t= -
1.96 or below) this variable will be considered significant for this specific cluster.      
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Figure 6.1 Strategy of data analysis 
Step 1: Selections of groups of lifestyle variables: 
- leisure activities (24 items) 
- importance of life areas (8 items) 
- aesthetic preferences (22 items) 
Step 2: Principal Components Analyses (PCA) 
The extraction of principal components 1 ⇒ k 
Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser normalization 
Step 3: Cluster analysis 
Lifestyle groups are defined by means of cluster
analysis using factor scores found in Step 2.  
Step 4: Association between external variables and 
the lifestyle groups: 
- Social structural and ideological cleavages 
- past and present organisational memberships
- interest representation by organisation 
- party preference 
- (+ political interest and democratic
satisfaction) 
Firstly, measurement of the total association
between the respective variable and the 
lifestyle groups is analysed. Secondly, 
significant tests between cluster specific
proportions and the whole sample are carried
out. 
Step 5: The formation of social milieus 
If group specific significant associations occur with
respect to cleavages, organisational memberships,
interest representation, and party preference, a social
milieu will be formed ⇒ i.e. parties can rely on the 
support of particular milieus  
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7. THE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL MILIEUS IN GERMANY 
In this chapter the existence of social milieus in reunified Germany will be analysed. 
Separate analyses will be carried out for the east and the west. As was shown in the 
previous chapter the strategy of data analysis is the same for both parts, though. Firstly, 
principal components analyses will be used to reduce the number of lifestyle variables. 
Secondly, a cluster analysis including the components will be carried out to find lifestyle 
groups. Thirdly, analyses between lifestyle groups, cleavages, organisational membership, 
interest representation and party preference are carried out in order to analyse the existence 
of social milieus. Finally, a summary of the results found in the west and east will be given 
in Chapter 7.1.4 and 7.2.4, respectively. Although separate analyses will be carried out for 
the east and the west a comparison of the results will be summarised in Chapter 7.3.    
7.1 The formation of social milieus in the west 
7.1.1 The analysis of latent variables using principal components analyses 
Altogether 20 principal components could by extracted by means of principal components 
analyses compared to 59 original items. Five single variables were excluded from the 
analyses and four of them were included as standardised variables (z-scores) in the cluster 
analysis. These variables could not be arranged to a principal component. However, four of 
them were consider theoretically important and thus included in the cluster analysis. The 
principal components found within the three different groups of lifestyle variables are 
summarised in the following. In those cases components with eigenvalues less than 1 were 
included in the final solution this has been emphasised. The results of the principal 
components analyses are shown in Tables 7.1 until 7.5. 
1. Leisure activities: Within the area of leisure activity eight principal components were 
found based on 22 single items. These were: sports/modernity, culture, technology, social 
engagement, social contact, read magazines/walk and wander, active, party games in the 
family. This eight components solution had 62% explained variance and component seven 
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and eight had eigenvalues of 0.99 and 0.95 respectively as can be seen from Table 7.1.65 
The items “church attendance and attend religious meetings” and “educate oneself 
privately” were not included in the analysis, but included as standardised variables in the 
cluster analysis as they were considered to be important lifestyle variables from the 
theoretical perspective. The first item “church attendance and attend religious meetings” is 
a traditional variable whose importance is assumed to have decreased over the past 
decades as presented in Chapter 4.3.2.4, but is expected to still be significant in the older 
lifestyle groups. The second item “educate oneself privately” is expected to be important 
because it may be expected that it differentiates the more cultural-orientated and highly-
educated lifestyle groups from the more trivial-orientated ones. The principal component 
named “active” has a positive loading on the variable “do-it-yourself and repairs in the 
house/car/gardening” and a negative loading on the non-active variable “be lazy, do 
nothing”. 
                                                 
65 Number of valid cases N = 1970.  
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Table 7.1 Components based on leisure activities (west) 
     Components         
Sports/ 
Modernity Culture Technology 
Social 
engagement 
Social 
contact 
Read 
magazines/ 
walk, wander 
Active Party games in family 
V17 Read books  -5.915E-02 .652 .247 -3.878E-03 4.013E-02 .314 -6.222E-02 .139
V18 Read magazines .104 1.277E-02 .203 -5.322E-02 2.161E-02 .689 -3.502E-02 .244
V19 Listen to LP’s, 
CD’s, cassesettes 
.563 .294 .212 -.202 9.876E-02 -2.074E-02 -1.609E-03 .319
V20 Watch video .591 1.414E-02 .189 -7.878E-02 -1.189E-03 -6.492E-02 -.131 .450
V21 Occupy oneself 
with the computer 
.280 .131 .817 7.655E-02 4.177E-02 -4.696E-02 5.414E-02 2.854E-02
V22 Use internet and 
on-line services 
.155 .100 .844 .121 -1.153E-02 1.869E-02 -2.631E-02 -4.503E-02
V24 do nothing, be 
lazy 
.259 -.121 -8.561E-02 8.193E-03 2.232E-02 .315 -.654 8.133E-03
V25 Walk, wander -7.539E-02 .139 -.224 5.085E-03 8.460E-02 .667 2.184E-02 -.106
V26 Yoga, 
meditation, relaxation 
through self-hypnosis 
etc. 
.214 .506 5.997E-04 .257 -.129 6.965E-02 -3.775E-02 .178
V27 Go eating or 
drinking 
.692 9.425E-02 9.855E-02 .103 .109 .135 -6.908E-02 -.211
V28 Visit friends, 
neighbours, 
acquaintances 
.277 7.625E-02 1.729E-02 -5.035E-02 .782 5.273E-02 -.104 -4.063E-02
V29 Visit family, 
relatives 
-9.380E-02 9.787E-03 1.017E-02 .106 .810 7.752E-02 8.321E-02 .192
V30 Party games in 
family 
7.587E-02 .150 -7.647E-02 .204 .157 .119 8.989E-02 .739
V31 Short trips .400 .252 1.366E-02 .190 .204 .336 .181 -6.362E-02
V32 Participation in 
politics 
6.361E-02 .187 .128 .758 -1.186E-02 -5.751E-03 -.120 4.656E-02
V33 Honorary 
activities 
4.820E-02 .122 4.651E-02 .703 8.731E-02 -2.065E-02 .189 6.125E-02
V35 Artistic and 
musical activities 
.153 .716 1.161E-02 .103 8.810E-02 -7.610E-02 .173 .107
V36 Do-it yourself, 
repairs, gardening etc. 
.229 8.469E-03 -5.567E-02 8.895E-02 3.061E-03 .223 .752 6.033E-02
V37 Do active sports .619 .266 .129 9.916E-02 4.863E-03 5.189E-02 .192 9.759E-02
V38 Visit sport 
events 
.615 -.116 5.389E-02 .428 -4.359E-02 2.160E-02 .107 .139
V39 Go to the 
cinema, visit pop- or 
jazz concerts etc. 
.672 .357 .224 -1.015E-02 7.600E-02 -.121 -9.481E-02 4.908E-02
V40 Go to the opera, 
classical concerts etc. 
.291 .680 9.258E-02 .132 8.535E-02 7.692E-02 4.127E-02 -.175
Rotated Component Matrix. Extraction Method: Principal Components Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a  Rotation converged in11 iterations. 
 
2. Importance of life areas: In the second group of lifestyle variables three principal 
components were found based on six single items. These were: leisure time and 
recreation/friends and acquaintances; religion and church/neighbourhood; work/ politics 
and public life. The three components solution had 73% explained variance and the third 
component had an eigenvalue of 0.94 (cf. Table 7.2).66 The items “importance of own 
family and children” and “relatives” were not included in the principal components 
analysis, but included as standardised variables in the cluster analysis as these variables, 
                                                 
66 Number of valid cases N = 1997. 
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too, may be expected to be theoretically significant as they emphasise the importance of 
primary networks. 
Table 7.2 Components based on important life areas (west) 
 Components  
  
Leisure time and 
recreation/friends and 
acquaintances 
Religion and 
church/Neighbourhood 
Work/politics and public 
life 
V10 Occupation and work .300 -.265 .763
V11 Leisure and recreation .840 -6.808E-02 .194
V12 Friends and acquaintances .856 .194 4.982E-02
V14 Religion and church -.106 .813 -1.643E-02
V15 Politics and public life -8.511E-03 .403 .781
V16 Neighbourhood .310 .738 9.102E-02
Rotated Component Matrix. Extraction Method: Principal Components Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. 
a  Rotation converged in 5 iterations. 
 
3. Aesthetic characteristics: In the final group of lifestyle variables covering the aesthetic 
preferences of the respondents separate analyses were carried out in the areas music, 
television and newspaper contents (cf. Tables 7.3 until 7.5).  
In the field of music taste two principal components were found based on five single items. 
These were: folk music/German pop-music and classical music/jazz. The two components 
solution had 68% explained variance).67 Furthermore, the principal component “Folk 
music/German pop-music” has a negative loading on pop-and rock music (cf. Table 7.3).  
Table 7.3 Components based on music preference (west) 
 Components   
  Folk music/German pop-music Classical music/Jazz 
V41 Folk music .916 -2.534E-02
V42 German pop music .710 -7.929E-02
V43 Pop- and rock music -.724 .139
V44 Classical music 4.091E-02 .879
V45 Jazz -.251 .815
Rotated Component Matrix. Extraction Method: Principal Components Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. 
a  Rotation converged in 3 iterations. 
 
With respect to television taste four principal components were found based on 10 items: 
entertainment series/Heimatfilme; movies; reports/news and sports. The four components 
                                                 
67 Number of valid cases N = 2027.   
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solution had 68% explained variance and the fourth component had an eigenvalue of 
0.96.68 The results are given in Table 7.4. 
Until this point 170 cases are excluded from the analyses due to the casewise deletion of 
missing values on lifestyle items where no answer was given (cf. Chapter 6.3). 
Table 7.4 Components based on preference for television programmes (west) 
  Components      
  
Entertainment 
series/Heimatfilme/ 
Quiz 
Movies Reports/News Sports 
V53 Television and quiz shows .783 .110 -7.155E-02 .263
V54 Sports -2.392E-02 .149 .140 .901
V55 Feature movies .293 .688 2.817E-02 -2.631E-02
V56 News 3.133E-02 -.172 .711 .173
V57 Political magazines -9.850E-02 -4.303E-02 .807 .224
V58 Arts and culture -5.064E-02 .112 .736 -.283
V59 Heimatfilme .820 -5.268E-02 7.805E-02 -.179
V60 Thrillers .141 .788 3.214E-02 3.191E-02
V61 Action movies -.161 .767 -.228 .225
V62 Entertainment series .749 .276 -.144 -8.471E-02
Rotated Component Matrix. Extraction Method: Principal Components Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. 
a  Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
 
Turning to the last area of aesthetic preferences, the interest in newspaper contents, another 
128 cases are missing. The reason is that those respondents who expressed never to read 
newspaper in the previous filter variable are excluded form the following variables where 
the respondents are asked to rank their preferences for different kinds of newspaper 
contents. Three principal components were found based on six items (cf. Table 7.5). These 
are: reports/news; local news/ all over the world; sports. The three components solution 
had 75% explained variance and the third component had an eigenvalue of 0.98. The item 
“advertisements” was excluded from the principal components analysis as the analysis 
showed that this was the only item which could not be arranged to any component and the 
inclusion of this variable reduced the explained variance of the three components solution 
with about 10%. As emphasised in the first paragraph of Chapter 7.1.1 altogether five 
variables were not included in the principal components analyses, but four of these were 
included in the cluster analysis as they were considered to be important from the 
theoretical point of view. With regard to the variable “advertisements” no particular 
important contribution was expected from this item from a theoretical point with regard to 
                                                 
68 Number of valid cases N = 1972.  
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the existence of lifestyle groups. The variable was thus not included in the cluster 
analysis.69  
Table 7.5 Components based on preference for newspaper contents (west) 
 Components
  Reports/News Local News/all over the world Sports 
V67 Politics .825 1.743E-02 .236 
V68 Economy .837 4.556E-03 .257 
V69 Culture .724 .166 -.310 
V70 Sports .149 6.565E-02 .911 
V71 Local news -3.816E-02 .850 .135 
V72 All over the world .155 .839 -7.256E-02 
Rotated Component Matrix. Extraction Method: Principal Components Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with 
Kaiser Normalization. 
a  Rotation converged in 5 iterations. 
 
In the next step the 20 latent variables and four manifest variables described above were 
included in the cluster analysis in order to find lifestyle groups in the West German 
population. This procedure will be described in further detail in the following section. 
7.1.2 The analysis of lifestyle groups using cluster analysis  
Several cluster analyses were carried out for the West German population70 using QUICK 
CLUSTER in SPSS 10.0. As emphasised in Chapter 6.3 this procedure is based on the K-
means algorithm which requires the user to specify the number of clusters and if an 
inappropriate number of clusters have been chosen the results may be misleading (SPSS 
index release 10.0). Although SPSS does not offer any test to determine which cluster 
number offers the best solution a procedure offered by Bacher (2001:71ff, cf. Chapter 6.3) 
will be followed in order to receive indications which solution may be the appropriate one. 
The results of the test criteria are given in Table 7.6.  
Looking firstly at ETA2 the total explained variance increases with 3% and 4% from 
cluster solutions two until five, between solutions five and seven with 2% and from 
solution eight until 11 the explained variance increases only with 1% per solution. Finally, 
between solution 11 and 12 the explained variance increases again, although only with 2%. 
The results indicate that cluster solution five and seven might be appropriate, but also 12 
                                                 
69 Number of valid cases N = 1898.  
70 The sample includes residents in the old Länder who have the German citizenship only N = 2037.  
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might be a possible solution as the total explained variance increases again between 
solution 11 and 12. 
Table 7.6 Descriptive statistics for determining the number of clusters (west) 
 
Cluster number (k) Explained variance 
ETA2 (k) 
Proportional reduction of 
error PRE (k) 
F-MAX-Value (k) 
1 0,00 -99,00 -99,00 
2 0,10 0,10 191,20 
3 0,16 0,07 167,92 
4 0,19 0,04 137,59 
5 0,23 0,04 126,32 
6 0,25 0,03 115,99 
7 0,27 0,02 105,74 
8 0,28 0,02 96,72 
9 0,29 0,02 89,46 
10 0,30 0,01 83,45 
11 0,30 0,00 74,08 
12 0,32 0,02 72,59 
 
Now, looking at PRE (k) which is the relative improvement of k clusters compared to the 
previous cluster solution with k-1 clusters (proportional reduction of error) the following 
number of solutions might be considered appropriate. Until cluster solution three the PRE-
coefficient has a value of 7%, until the five cluster solution of 4%. Thereafter, the 
improvement stagnates or declines minimal continuously from cluster solution four until 
11 and then rises again. PRE (k) would thus indicate that the appropriate number of 
clusters could be three, five or 12. 
Whereas the explained variance in ETA2 is dependent on the number of clusters and the 
explained variance thus automatically increases with a larger number of clusters this 
interdependence is removed in the F-MAX (k) statistics (cf. Chapter 6.3). The appropriate 
number of clusters is equal to the solution with the maximum F-MAX value. Looking at 
the numbers in Table 7.6 the highest F-MAX value can be found in cluster solution two.  
Obviously, the indications given by these test criteria are too divergent to offer a clear 
basis for deciding the number of clusters. Thus, ETA2 was calculated for each of the 14 
principal components with the highest explained variance and each of the four single items 
in cluster solutions from five until nine. The seven cluster solution proved to have the 
highest ETA2 on most active principal components/variables as can be seen from the 
results which are presented in Table 7.7.  
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Table 7.7 Measures of association between important active cluster variables and 
cluster solutions (west) 
Number of clusters:   Eta Squared 
CLU 5 
Eta Squared 
CLU 6 
Eta Squared 
CLU 7 
Eta Squared 
CLU 8 
Eta Squared 
CLU 9 
Leisure activity: Technology  .485 .528 .476 .415 .464 
Music: Folk music/German pop-
music  .457 .479 .472 .495 .468 
Zscore: Leisure activity: Educate 
oneself privately  .414 .403 .431 .423 .398 
 Newspaper: Sports  .395 .350 .394 .353 .431 
Leisure activity: Culture  .374 .351 .389 .364 .374 
Television: 
Entertainment/Heimatfilme  .367 .389 .375 .401 .416 
Leisure activity: Sports/modernity .338 .360 .370 .361 .366 
Newspaper: Reports/news  .344 .340 .355 .358 .372 
Life areas: Religion and 
church/neighbourhood .281 .301 .338 .325 .355 
Music: Classical music/jazz .292 .294 .325 .288 .306 
Television: Reports/news .306 .314 .321 .342 .380 
Life areas: Work/politics and 
public life .265 .284 .288 .289 .278 
Life areas: Leisure time and 
recreation/friends and 
acquaintances  
.014 .234 .253 .287 .301 
Zscore: Leisure activity: Church 
attendance and religious meetings  .178 .165 .249 .177 .242 
Zscore: Importance: Relatives  .119 .238 .231 .228 .233 
Television: Feature movies  .085 .118 .163 .131 .191 
Zscore: Importance: Own family 
and children  .069 .121 .129 .346 .358 
Newspaper: Local news/all over the 
world .041 .093 .102 .108 .102 
 
In some cases the highest values of a principal component or variable could be found in the 
six or eight cluster solution. However, the deviations between the six and eight cluster 
solutions for these latent and manifest variables compared to the seven cluster solution 
were relatively small. Thus, the seven cluster solution was considered as the appropriate 
one and includes N = 1739 cases. Excluded in this cluster solution are the 170 cases which 
were lost due to the missing casewise deletion in the PCA analyses as well as the 128 cases 
which were not included in the principal components analysis of preferences for 
newspaper contents as these person answered never to read newspapers. A discussion of 
possible problems which might arise due to the loss of these 128 cases will take place after 
the presentations of the result of the cluster analysis in Table 7.8 and 7.9. The numbers in 
the table are based on z-scores or factor scores with a mean of zero and standard deviation 
of one. In order to test the stability of the seven cluster solution, several analyses were 
calculated using random samples on the basis of 80% of the cases. When compared to the 
original cluster solution, the seven cluster solutions found on the basis of random samples 
turned out to be quite similar with respect to both the dominant characteristics of a cluster 
and with respect to the size of a cluster. 
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Table 7.8 Final cluster centers of the active variables71 (west) 
Cluster 
1  (N = 221) 
12.7% 
2 (N = 233) 
13.4% 
3 (N = 284) 
16.3% 
4 (N = 273) 
15.7% 
5 (N= 331) 
19% 
6 (N = 172) 
9.9% 
7 (N = 225) 
13% 
Life areas: Leisure 
time and recreation/ 
friends and 
acquaintances 
.00713 -.21472 .25002 .07587 .37615 -1.40615 .32297 
Life areas: Religion 
and church 
/neighbourhood 
-.54072 .40322 .68349 .60937 -.28793 -.18784 -.95053 
Life areas: 
Occupation/ 
Politics and public life 
.41658 .57739 .32931 -1.08118 .12174 -.16135 -.06815 
Leisure activity: 
Sports/modernity .48412 -.13713 -.13964 -.91336 .29169 -.55808 1.09913 
Leisure activity: 
Culture .20146 1.22746 -.48921 -.27476 .45301 -.45920 -.69635 
Leisure activity: 
Technology 1.80771 -.07605 -.34300 -.29168 -.37574 -.31835 -.08916 
Leisure activity: Social 
engagement .02106 .68076 .51520 -.22154 -.49077 .04713 -.23016 
Leisure activity: Social 
contact -.04047 .00286 .11593 .26019 .14470 -.57995 -.06875 
Leisure activity: Read 
magazines /walk and 
wander 
.15771 .-13718 .44506 .15234 .04248 -.28408 -.43330 
Leisure activity: active .04729 .28178 .31625 -.36105 .08397 .02140 -.25666 
Leisure activity: Party 
games in the family -.21135 .02888 .00597 -.20491 .26438 -.26877 .26999 
Music: Folk 
music/German pop-
music 
-.75875 -.16255 .72939 .92540 -.32014 .45372 -.95533 
Music: Classical/jazz .41398 .96047 .00106 -.35552 .35235 -.61069 -.84294 
Television: 
Entertainment/ 
Heimatfilme 
-.76468 -.51618 .53307 .99968 -.18614 .06450 -.57135 
Television: Feature 
movies .12370 -.26824 -.02874 -.44138 .38434 -.62902 .64164 
Television: Reports/ 
news .30064 .85156 .57003 -.46678 -.03160 -.35041 -.88033 
Television: Sports .20492 -.49818 .76341 -.65980 -.55711 .40032 .75847 
Newspaper: 
Reports/news .53784 .93715 .35996 -.76825 -.08502 -.36530 -.72387 
Newspaper: Local 
news/all over the 
world 
-.39210 -.08773 .30016 .36715 .05121 -.65945 .03094 
Newspaper: Sports .21357 -.44331 .75280 -.81796 -.54301 .28969 .89332 
Zscore:  Life areas: 
Own family and 
children 
-.19069 .21788 .36574 .26750 .27950 -.64985 -.32896 
Zscore:  Importance: 
Relatives -.28527 .23308 .47048 .53327 .08959 -1.04131 -.35518 
Zscore:  Leisure 
activity: Educate 
oneself privately 
1.22543 .77783 -.41192 -.74886 -.04047 -.59360 .00327 
Zscore:  Leisure 
activity: Church 
attendance and 
religious meetings 
-.46133 .60591 .30075 .66578 -.40679 -.13901 -.64172 
                                                 
71  Due to the different scales used in the questionnaire the results in the areas leisure activities and aesthetic 
preferences have been pooled in order to make the interpretation clearer i.e. in the area of values a 
negative value = not important, positive value = important; leisure activity a negative value = never, 
positive value = daily; aesthetic preferences a negative value = not at all, positive value = very much.  
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The main characteristics of the lifestyle groups have been summarised in Table 7.9. In 
every of the five areas the items have been listed according to their strength, i.e., for 
example, in the first cluster technology has the highest positive value with respect to 
leisure activities followed by private education and sports/modernity whereas the highest - 
and in this case only - negative value can be found with respect to church attendance. 
Please recall that only values of 0,4 and more or -0,4 or less will be considered meaningful 
for characterising a cluster (cf. Chapter 6.3). The clusters have been named according to 
the most dominating characteristics of a cluster. 
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Table 7.9 Lifestyle groups in the Western German population72 
12.7% (N = 221) 
Technologically and 
educationally  
orientated, modern 
person 
(TEDUMO) 
Leisure activities: Preference for: Technology; educate oneself privately and sports/modernity. Distance 
towards: Church attendance and attend religious meetings. 
Life areas: Work/politics and public life are important. Religion and church/neighbourhood are not important. 
Music taste: Preference for: Classical music/jazz. Distance towards: Folk music/German pop-music.73 
Television taste: Distance towards: Entertainment series/Heimatfilme. 
Newspaper contents: Preference for: Reports/news. 
13.4% (N = 233) 
Cultural and 
educational orientated, 
socially engaged 
religious person 
(CUEDSO) 
Leisure activities: Preference for: Culture; educate oneself privately; social engagement and church attendance 
and attend religious meetings.     
Life areas: Work/politics and public life and religion and church/neighbourhood are important. 
Music taste: Preference for classical music/jazz.   
Television taste: Preference for: Reports/news. Distance towards: Entertainment series/Heimatfilme and sports.  
Newspaper contents: Preference for: Reports/ news. Distance towards: Sports. 
16.3% (N = 284) 
The sports interested, 
traditional-orientated, 
socially engaged 
person (SPTRSO) 
Leisure activities: Preference for: Social engagement and read magazines/walk and wander. Distance towards: 
Culture and educate oneself privately. 
Life areas: Religion and church/neighbourhood and relatives are important. 
Music taste: Preference for: Folk music/German pop-music.  
Television taste: Preference for: Sports; Reports/news; Entertainment series/Heimatfilme. 
Newspaper contents: Preference for: Sports. 
15.7% (N = 273) 
The traditional-
orientated, religious 
person  
(TRAREL) 
Leisure activities: Preference for: Church attendance and attend religious meetings. Distance towards: 
Sports/modernity and educate oneself privately. 
Life areas: Religion and church/neighbourhood and relatives are important. Work/politics and public life are 
unimportant. 
Music taste: Preference for: Folk music/German pop-music.  
Television taste: Preference for: Entertainment series/Heimatfilme. Distance towards: Sports; reports/news and 
movies. 
Newspaper contents: Distance towards: Sports and reports/ news. 
19%  (N = 331) 
The culturally active, 
anti-sports orientated 
person (ANSPCA) 
Leisure activities: Preference for: Culture. Distance towards: Social engagement and church attendance and 
attend religious meetings.  
Life areas: No particular characteristics. 
Music taste: No particular characteristics. 
Television taste:  Distance towards: Sports. 
Newspaper contents: Distance towards: Sports. 
9.9% (N = 172) 
The no value- 
orientated, rather 
passive person 
(NOVAPA) 
Leisure activities: Distance towards: Educate oneself privately; social contact; sports/modernity and culture. 
Life areas: Leisure time and recreation/friends and acquaintances; relatives and own family and children are 
unimportant.  
Music taste: Preference for: Folk music and German pop-music. Distance towards: classical music/jazz. 
Television taste: Preference for: sports. Distance towards: Movies.  
Newspaper contents: Distance towards: Local news/all over the world. 
13%  (N = 225) 
The modern, anti-
religious, sports-
orientated person 
(MODSPO) 
Leisure activities: Preference for: Sports/modernity. Distance towards: Culture; church attendance and attend 
religious meetings and read magazines/walk and wander. 
Life areas: Distance towards Religion and church/neighbourhood. 
Music taste: Distance towards: Folk music/German pop-music and classical music/jazz.  
Television taste: Preference for: Sports and movies. Distance towards: Reports/news and entertainment 
series/Heimatfilme. 
Newspaper contents: Preference for: Sports. Distance towards: Reports/ news. 
 
In order to test how the respondents who never read newspapers (128 cases) are distributed 
among the lifestyle groups the following procedure was carried out. Firstly, a cluster 
analysis was carried out with all variables listed in Table 7.8 except for the newspaper 
components, but with the standardised filter variable asking about how often the 
                                                 
72 The size of the lifestyle groups have been calculated on the basis of the number of respondents included 
in the cluster analysis. Total sample N = 1739.  
73 Please recall that the component Folk music and German pop-music included a negative loading on pop- 
and rock music. 
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respondents reads newspapers (0.0 = never until 7.0 seven days a week). Thereafter, the 
old and new seven cluster solutions including the missing values were cross-tabulated. The 
results showed that the largest number of people who never read newspaper could be found 
in the “modern, anti-religious, sports-orientated person” (43 cases), followed by the 
“traditional-orientated, religious person” (23 cases) and the “no-value orientated, rather 
passive person” (22 cases). The rest of the respondents who do not read newspaper were 
evenly distributed among the other lifestyle groups. Although the first three mentioned 
groups would have been larger if these respondents would have been included, the number 
is rather small and there seems to be no systematic bias in the distribution, so that the 
effect of these missing values on the following analyses presented in Chapter 7.1.3 can be 
expected to have – if any at all – only minimum impact on the results.  
7.1.3 The relationship between lifestyle groups, cleavages, organisational 
memberships, interest representation and party preference  
In this chapter the results of the analyses between the lifestyle groups and the external 
variables are presented and discussed. As elaborated in Chapter 6.3 the aim is to analyse to 
which extent social milieus still exist which are based on a relationship between lifestyle 
groups, cleavages, organisational membership, organisational interest representation and 
party preference. As argued in Chapter 6.3 only if the cluster specific proportion of a 
variable is significantly different from the whole sample, the variable will be considered 
statistically significant for describing a cluster. In most cases it is the above average 
significant values which are of interest as most hypotheses assume a positive relationship 
between certain variables. However, if results come up which are contradictory to the 
expectations, i.e. either not significant where this would have been expected or below 
average or above average significant where the opposite would have been expected this 
will of course be discussed as well. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the results the 
numbers which proved to be significantly above or below average have been marked in 
bold in the respective tables. 
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7.1.3.1 The association between lifestyle groups and cleavages 
 
1) Social structural cleavages 
As was emphasised in Chapter 6.3 certain expectations exist with respect to the social 
structural characteristics based on the lifestyle characteristics of a group. It may, for 
example, be expected that the first group the “technologically and educationally-orientated, 
modern person” will be dominated by younger, highly educated people, who belong to no 
religious society and hardly ever go to church. The lifestyle group of the “traditional-
orientated religious person” is on the other hand expected to be dominated by older, rather 
lower educated people who often go to church. Nevertheless, in order to explore whether 
these expectations can also be confirmed empirically the association between social 
structural characteristics and the lifestyle groups are analysed. The results are presented in 
Table 7.10. 
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Table 7.10 The association between social structural characteristics and the lifestyle 
groups (west)74 
 TEDUMO 
(12.7%) 
CUEDSO 
(13.4%) 
 
SPTRSO  
(16. 3%) 
TRAREL 
(15.7%) 
ANSPCA 
(19%) 
NOVAPA 
(9.9%) 
MODSPO 
(13%) 
Total X2 Cramer’sV 
Religious cleavage:           
Denomination:         15* .102 
Roman-Catholic 46.0 52.5 57.4 52.4 43.6 46.7 56.4 50.9   
Protestant  54.0 47.5 42.6 47.6 56.4 53.3 43.6 49.1   
 100% 
N = 161 
100% 
N = 183 
100% 
N = 263 
100% 
N = 254 
100% 
N = 250 
100% 
N = 150 
100% 
N = 163 
100% 
N = 1424 
  
Religious affiliation:         107*** .249 
Yes 74.5 86.0 95.8 96.3 82.0 91.2 73.7 85.9   
No 25.5 14.0 4.2 3.7 18.0 8.8 26.3 14.1   
 100% 
N = 220 
100% 
N = 229 
100% 
N = 284 
100% 
N = 273 
100% 
N = 328 
100% 
N = 171 
100% 
N = 224 
100% 
N = 1729 
  
Church attendance:          323*** .252 
Once a month or more 10.0 39.7 35.1 47.1 10.7 23.2 4.5 24.6   
Several times a year 18.5 21.1 27.9 20.5 22.6 20.2 17.6 21.5   
Seldom 36.0 27.2 27.5 25.5 38.8 25.6 33.8 31.0   
Never 35.5 12.1 9.4 6.8 27.8 31.0 44.1 22.8   
 100% 
N = 211 
100% 
N = 232 
100% 
N = 276 
100% 
N = 263 
100% 
N = 327 
100% 
N = 168 
100% 
N = 222 
100% 
N = 1699 
  
Occupational cleavage/ 
social status: 
        505*** .273 
Self-employed 20.8 7.9 3.6 0.7 5.6 6.6 2.8 6.4   
Upper white-collar 22.2 19.4 5.0 (0.0)75 10.2 6.0 5.6 9.4   
Lower white-collar 22.2 17.2 11.8 7.0 26.2 9.6 31.3 18.1   
Blue-collar 9.9 5.3 16.1 1.5 11.1 15.0 32.7 12.6   
No main occupation 25.0 50.2 63.6 90.8 46.9 62.9 27.6 53.5   
 100% 
N = 212 
100% 
N = 227 
100% 
N = 280 
100% 
N = 271 
100% 
N = 324 
100% 
N = 167 
100% 
N = 214 
100% 
N = 1695 
  
Education:         614*** .422 
No education/primary school 9.6 18.7 71.7 87.5 40.7 77.5 48.9 51.0   
Middle school 38.4 33.9 22.3 11.0 37.6 16.0 40.6 28.7   
High school level 52.1 47.4 6.0 1.5 21.7 6.5 10.5 20.3   
 100% 
N = 219 
100% 
N = 230 
100% 
N = 283 
100% 
N = 273 
100% 
N = 327 
100% 
N = 169 
100% 
N = 219 
100% 
N = 1720 
  
University degree or degree 
in applied sciences: 
        257*** .384 
No/ in education/no answer 69.7 66.1 96.5 99.6 88.8 94.2 97.8 88.0   
Yes 30.3 33.9 3.5 0.4 11.2 5.8 2.2 12.0   
 100% 
N = 221 
100% 
N = 233 
100% 
N = 284 
100% 
N = 273 
100% 
N = 331 
100% 
N = 172 
100% 
N = 225 
100% 
N = 1739 
  
Income:         177*** .260 
< or = DM 1999  32.7 41.0 30.9 72.3 59.2 50.8 40.1 47.4   
DM 2000 – 3999 40.3 39.2 60.8 25.2 34.3 44.4 52.4 42.2   
DM 4000 and above 27.0 19.9 8.3 2.5 6.5 4.8 7.5 10.4   
 100% 
N = 159 
100% 
N = 166 
100% 
N = 217 
100% 
N = 202 
100% 
N = 245 
100% 
N = 126 
100% 
N = 187 
100% 
N = 1302 
  
Stadt-Land cleavage:           
Community size:         82*** .153 
Small 10.9 10.3 21.5 20.9 8.8 12.2 10.2 13.7   
Medium 39.8 48.9 56.7 54.2 51.4 51.7 51.6 50.9   
Large 49.3 40.8 21.8 24.9 39.9 36.0 38.2 35.3   
 100% 
N = 221 
100% 
N = 233 
100% 
N = 284 
100% 
N = 273 
100% 
N = 331 
100% 
N = 172 
100% 
N = 225 
100% 
N = 1739 
  
Gender:         357*** .453 
Male 71.0 38.2 68.0 12.8 24.8 55.8 70.2 46.6   
Female 29.0 61.8 32.0 87.2 75.2 44.2 29.8 53.4   
 100% 
N = 221 
100% 
N = 233 
100% 
N = 284 
100% 
N = 273 
100% 
N = 331 
100% 
N = 172 
100% 
N = 225 
100% 
N = 1739 
  
Age:         755*** .380 
18-29 28.5 6.4 2.1 1.1 19.0 1.7 40.9 14.1   
30-44 43.9 28.8 10.9 6.2 40.5 18.0 40.0 26.9   
45-59 22.2 36.1 34.5 18.3 26.9 30.8 15.6 26.3   
60 and above 5.4 28.8 52.5 74.4 13.6 49.4 3.6 32.7   
 100% 
N = 221 
100% 
N = 233 
100% 
N = 284 
100% 
N = 273 
100% 
N = 331 
100% 
N = 172 
100% 
N = 225 
100% 
N = 1739 
  
Family status:          486*** .305 
Married 52.0 62.2 73.9 52.4 61.9 61.0 40.9 58.3   
Separated/ Divorced 5.4 9.9 9.2 2.6 11.2 11.6 11.6 8.7   
Widowed 2.7 9.4 14.1 41.8 7.9 19.8 1.3 14.1   
Single 39.8 18.5 2.8 3.3 19.0 7.6 46.2 18.9   
 100% 
N = 221 
100% 
N = 233 
100% 
N = 283 
100% 
N = 273 
100% 
N = 331 
100% 
N = 172 
100% 
N = 225 
100% 
N = 1738 
  
                                                 
74 Significance levels: p < .05=* , p < .01=** and p < .001=***. The percentage distribution of the lifestyle 
groups are not based on the total number of respondents in the analysis, but on the total number of 
respondents in the respective clusters. The 71.0% men in the first cluster is, for example, based on the 
subpopulation with N=221.  
75 No cell counts. 
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In the following the main social structural characteristics of the lifestyle groups are given: 
The technologically and educationally orientated, modern person: single men, age 18-44 with a middle 
school or high school level, university degree or degree in applied sciences who live in large cities are above 
average represented in this group. They work above average as self-employed, lower and upper white-collar 
and are above average represented in the highest income category. Finally, this group has an above average 
number of people with no religious affiliation and number of people who never go to church.    
Cultural and educational orientated, socially engaged religious person: This lifestyle group is above average 
represented among women age 45-59 with a high school level, university degree or degree in applied 
sciences who have a high level of income. They work above average as upper white-collars and go to church 
more than once a month. 
The sports interested, traditional-orientated, socially engaged person: married men, age 45 and above with no 
education or primary education and a middle level of income are above average represented in this group. 
They live above average in small communities, have no main occupation and go to church once a month or 
several times a year. 
The traditional-orientated, religious person: Widows age 60 and above with no education or primary 
education who have a low level of income, no main occupation and live in small cities are above-average 
represented in this lifestyle group. Finally, they go to church more than once a month. 
The culturally active, anti-sports orientated person: This group is above average represented by 
separated/divorced, Protestant women, age 18-44 with a medium level of education and low level of income. 
They work above average as low white-collars and are above average represented by people who never or 
seldom go to church. 
 
The no value-orientated, rather passive person: Men, age 60 and above with no education or primary 
education and no main occupation who never go to church are above average represented in this group.   
 
The modern, anti-religious, sports-orientated person:  Single men, age 18-44 with a middle level of education 
and middle level of income who work as lower white-collars and blue-collars are above average represented 
in this group. Finally, they are above average represented by people who never go to church and who have 
no religious affiliation. 
As can be seen from the summary above, the expected relationships between lifestyle 
characteristics and social structural characteristics can also be found empirically. So do the 
lifestyle groups of the cultural-orientated and the technologically-orientated ones relate to 
the higher educated who work above average as self-employed and white-collar workers 
and who have a high level of income. Furthermore, the modern, technologically-orientated 
lifestyle groups are younger and higher educated than the traditional-orientated ones and 
they are less religious. 
Table 7.10 and the summary of the results make clear that the lifestyle groups differ 
significantly with respect to social structural characteristics. Looking first at the traditional 
religious cleavage which has changed from being one between Protestants and Catholics to 
religious and secular people (cf. Figure 3.1) the following becomes evident; whereas 
denomination does not distinguish between the lifestyle groups, the question about 
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religious affiliation versus no religious affiliation distinguishes significantly. In both 
younger, modern orientated lifestyle groups i.e. the “technologically and educationally 
orientated, modern person” and the “modern, anti-religious, sports-orientated person” the 
number of people with no religious affiliation is significantly above average (25%) 
whereas in the traditional-orientated and older lifestyle groups the number of people with 
no religious affiliation is below average. With respect to church attendance the picture is 
the same. Although this is no objective social structural characteristic it is often used as a 
measurement of the strength of religiosity (cf. Chapter 6.2.2). As can be seen from the 
table the two groups with the lowest number of people with no religious affiliation, the 
“sports-interested, traditional-orientated, socially engaged person” and the “traditional-
orientated religious person” have an above average number of people who go to church 
once a month or more. Furthermore, the second highest number of people who go to 
church more than once a month can be found in the group of the “cultural and educational 
orientated, socially engaged religious person” which is not surprising considering the 
religious-orientated lifestyle of the members of this group. Finally, the two modern-
orientated lifestyle groups with the highest number of people with no religious affiliation 
also have the highest number of people who never go to church, although both the passive 
lifestyle group and the “culturally active, no-sports-orientated” group follow closely. In 
summary, there is a clear indication that the cleavage between religious and secular people 
exists in the West German population.  
With regard to the other traditional cleavage between work and capital which in the 1950s 
and 1960s changed to one between trade union orientated employees and self-employed 
orientated, bourgeois middle class (cf. Figure 3.1) the results can be summarised as 
follows. The first two lifestyle groups are above average dominated by self-employed and 
upper white-collars whereas in the other groups there is a below average or average 
number of people in these occupational categories. On the other hand the highest number 
of blue-collar workers and lower white-collars can be found in the “modern, anti-religious, 
sports-orientated person”. The cleavage between workers and employers thus still seems to 
be present in the West German society as well, although the relationship with organisations 
still has to be analysed and discussed. This will take place in section three later in this 
chapter.  
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Finally, a few words can be said about the traditional Stadt-Land cleavage. As can be seen 
from the results the modern lifestyle group dominated by highly educated, younger people 
has the highest number of members who live in large cities (49.3%) whereas the two 
traditional-orientated lifestyle groups have the lowest number of members living in large 
cities (21.8% and 24.9%) and the highest number of people who live in small cities (21.5% 
and 20.9%). 
As can be seen from Table 7.10 the lifestyle groups differ significantly with respect to the 
other social structural characteristics as well. The three variables education, university 
degree and income may be seen as indicators for the social status of the members of a 
lifestyle group. With regard to all three variables clear differences exits between some of 
the lifestyle groups. So do the “technologically and educationally orientated, modern 
person” and the “cultural and educational orientated, socially engaged religious person” 
both have the highest numbers of members with high school level, university degree or 
degree in applied sciences and with an income of an income of DM 4000 or above. The 
traditional-orientated lifestyle groups do on the other hand have the highest number of 
people with primary school or no education, the highest number with people without 
university degree and the highest number of people with an income at the lower or middle 
level. A similar pattern can also be found in the group of the “no value-orientated, rather 
passive person”.  
Also with regard to the other social structural characteristics interesting differences exist. 
So are three of the lifestyle groups, for example, mainly represented by men and two by 
women. Furthermore, two lifestyle groups are to approx. 70% dominated by the younger 
age groups, one is to 75% dominated by people above 60 years and another two lifestyle 
groups are to approx. 50% dominated by people over 60 years. With regard to family status 
it is not surprisingly that the highest number of singles can be found in the two modern-
orientated lifestyle groups. 
2) Ideological cleavages 
Now turning to the ideological cleavages, the results of the analyses are presented in Table 
7.11. Starting with the value cleavage measured by materialism vs. post-materialism, 
“worries about the environment” and “voting as a duty of the citizens” the picture is as 
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follows: there are significant differences with respect to post-materialist vs. materialist 
attitudes among the lifestyle groups. Whereas the “technologically and educationally 
orientated, modern person” and the “cultural and educational orientated, socially engaged 
religious person” have the highest number of post-materialists, the lifestyle group of the 
“traditional orientated, religious person” has the highest number of materialists. This 
would support the theory of Inglehart that the younger, more highly educated generations 
develop post-materialist attitudes whereas the older, lower educated ones stick to the 
materialist values, although it should not be ignored that in all groups the mixed values 
category is the biggest one (cf. also Chapter 4.3.1). With respect to “worries about the 
environment” the picture is quite similar; the “cultural and educational orientated, socially 
engaged religious person” has the highest number of people with big worries and the 
“traditional orientated, religious person” has the lowest number of people with big worries. 
With regard to this item, the “technologically and educationally orientated, modern 
person” does not prove a significant number of people with big worries as might have been 
expected. Altogether, it should be emphasised though that the number of people having big 
worries about the environment is fairly high in most groups. Turning to the third value 
variable included here, “voting as a duty”, not surprisingly the “traditional orientated, 
religious person” is above average represented by people who consider voting as a duty 
and the “youngest” lifestyle groups are those with the highest number of people who do 
not agree with this statement. Looking at Table 7.11 it becomes clear, though, that the 
number is even higher in the second and third lifestyle group and altogether in all groups 
more than ¾ consider voting as a duty. However, in summary the result indicate that a 
value cleavage exists in the West German population.  
Looking at the cleavages which might have developed as a consequence of modernisation, 
“social differences are fair” and “worries about unemployment” the picture is the 
following; whereas the first variable turns out not to be significant in distinguishing 
between the lifestyle groups the second one was not included in the overview because 
28,6% of the cells had counts less than five. In general, there seems to be a consensus 
among the groups that social difference in Germany are not fair, although as can be seen 
from Table 7.11 the number who disagree to this statement are the highest in the “no 
value-orientated, rather passive person” and the lowest in the “technologically and 
educationally orientated, modern person”. Based on the above presented variables, no clear 
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indications of a cleavage between winners and losers of the modernisation process can be 
found. With regard to a possible globalisation cleavage, measured by the issue “worries 
about the number of immigrants” the highest numbers of those with big worries (over 
60%) can be found in the traditional-orientated and “oldest” lifestyle groups i.e. the “sports 
interested, traditional-orientated, socially engaged person”, the “traditional-orientated, 
religious person” and the “no value-orientated, rather passive person”. Simultaneously, 
these lifestyle groups have the highest number of people with no education or only primary 
school (cf. Table 7.10). In contrast the first two lifestyle groups which are educationally 
orientated and which also embed the highest number of people with high school and 
university degree have an under average representation of people with big worries about 
number of immigrants.  
A regional cleavage between eastern and western Germany is measured on the basis of the 
issues ”worries about costs of the German reunification” and “socialism is in principle a 
good idea which was carried out badly”. The results show that over 50% of the members of 
the “sports interested, traditional-orientated, socially engaged person” and the “no value-
orientated, rather passive person” have big worries about the costs of unification. 
Considering the fact that these groups also had they highest number of people with big 
worries about immigrants and rather low social status (cf. Table 7.10) the assumption 
arises that both groups may represent losers of the modernisation process who are afraid 
that the more people who have to share the available jobs and money available the less will 
be available to them. In western Germany there seems to be an agreement among all 
groups that socialism is not a good idea. More than 50% of the members of all groups do 
not agree to the statement that “socialism is in principle a good idea which was carried out 
badly”. Only the group of the “no value-orientated, rather passive person” has with almost 
75% a significantly higher number of people who do not agree to the statement. Finally, 
the subjective left-right placement shows that more than 70% of the members of the 
different lifestyle groups place themselves in the middle. Only the “traditional-orientated, 
religious person” and the “no value-orientated, rather passive person” place themselves 
significantly less to the left and the “sports interested, traditional-orientated, socially 
engaged person” places itself significantly above average to the right. It is not surprisingly 
that the traditionally-orientated and older lifestyle groups place themselves significantly 
less to the left or above average to the right. However, what is missing is an above average 
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support of the left which could have been expected, for example, in the “modern, anti-
religious, sports-orientated person” due to the high number of blue-collar workers and 
lower white-collars in this group. The high number of people placing themselves in the 
middle of all lifestyle groups raises the question to which extent it is correct to talk about 
“the middle” as if this is a uniform group.  
Table 7.11 The relationship between ideological cleavages and lifestyle groups (west)76 
 TEDUMO 
(12.7%) 
CUEDSO 
(13.4%) 
SPTRSO  
(16. 3%) 
TRAREL 
(15.7%) 
ANSPCA 
(19%) 
NOVAPA 
(9.9%) 
MODSPO 
(13%) 
Total X2 Cramer’sV 
Values:            
Post-materialist index: N = 214 N = 229 N = 281 N = 270 N = 329 N = 164 N = 221 N = 1708 199*** .241 
Post-materialists 39.3 34.9 12.5 7.0 22.2 12.8 17.2 20.5   
Materialists 8.9 7.9 20.3 38.9 15.8 18.3 14.9 18.4   
Mixed 51.9 57.2 67.3 54.1 62.0 68.9 67.9 61.1   
Worries about 
environment: 
N = 220 N = 232 N = 282 N = 273 N = 331 N = 172 N = 224 N = 1734 65*** .137 
Big 52.3 61.2 51.1 37.7 55.6 40.1 52.2 50.4   
Some 40.9 33.6 42.6 51.3 41.7 44.2 37.1 41.8   
None 6.8 5.2 6.4 11.0 2.7 15.7 10.7 7.8   
Voting as duty: N = 216 N = 232 N = 284 N = 263 N = 326 N = 162 N = 220 N = 1703 29*** .130 
Agree 85.6 90.5 90.1 89.7 83.1 85.8 76.8 86.1   
Do not agree 14.4 9.5 9.9 10.3 16.9 14.2 23.2 13.9   
Modernisation:           
Social differences fair: N = 214 N = 228 N = 274 N = 246 N = 315 N = 160 N = 217 N = 1654 n.s.  
Agree 41.6 32.9 39.1 36.2 33.7 29.4 30.0    
Do not agree 58.4 67.1 60.9 63.8 66.3 70.6 70.0    
Globalisation:           
Worries about number of 
immigrants: 
N = 220 N = 232 N = 282 N = 273 N = 329 N = 172 N = 224 N = 1732 92*** .163 
Big 38.6 42.2 69.1 60.4 46.5 62.8 59.8 54.2   
Some  42.7 41.4 24.5 32.2 42.9 30.2 32.6 35.4   
None 18.6 16.4 6.4 7.3 10.6 7.0 7.6 10.5   
West –East:           
Worries about costs of 
German unification:  
N = 220 N = 232 N = 282 N = 273 N = 330 N = 172 N = 225 N = 1734 57*** .128 
Big 44.5 32.3 58.9 43.6 41.2 52.9 43.6 45.2   
Some 39.5 45.7 29.8 41.0 47.9 37.8 44.0 41.0   
None 15.9 22.0 11.3 15.4 10.9 9.3 12.4 13.8   
Socialism good idea:  N = 211 N = 223 N = 265 N = 204 N = 288 N = 145 N = 198 N = 1534 20** .113 
Agree 46.0 39.0 45.7 42.2 46.2 26.9 39.9 41.9   
Do not agree 54.0 61.0 54.3 57.8 53.8 73.1 60.1 58.1   
Left-right placement: N = 210 N = 222 N = 270 N = 254 N = 318 N = 161 N = 210 N = 1645 31** .097 
Left 16.7 19.8 15.2 8.3 17.9 8.7 15.7 14.9   
Middle 74.8 70.7 71.9 81.9 76.4 82.6 77.1 76.2   
Right 8.6 9.5 13.0 9.8 5.7 8.7 7.1 8.9   
                                                 
76 Results including variables with 20% or more cells with counts lower than 5 were not included in the 
table. Significance levels: p < .05=*, p < .01=**, p < .001=***, n.s. = not significant. The percentage 
distribution of the lifestyle groups are not based on the total number of respondents in the analysis, but on 
the total number of respondents in the respective clusters. The 39.3% post-materialists in the first cluster 
is, for example, based on the subpopulation with N=214. 
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The results seem to indicate that within the different lifestyle groups the majority seems to 
place themselves in what they consider to be the middle. The question would then be how 
to politically address the “middle” of, for example, the modern and traditional lifestyle 
groups simultaneously. The issues presented above can of course only be simple 
measurements of possible manifest and latent cleavages as a detailed analysis would 
require sets of variables as was discussed in detail in Chapter 6.2.2.  
3) The association between lifestyle group, organisational membership and 
organisational interest representation 
As presented in Figure 2.3 in Chapter 2.4 and discussed in Chapter 2.1.1 and 6.2.2 
cleavages become manifest if they are perceived by social groups and if they are 
represented by organisations and parties. In Table 7.12 the association between 
organisational memberships and lifestyle groups are presented. With regard to the 
occupational organisations an above average representation of DGB members can be found 
among the “sports interested, traditional-orientated, socially engaged person” and the 
“modern, anti-religious, sports-orientated person”. In particular in the latter group this 
might be connected to the high number of blue-collar workers in this group (cf. Table 
7.10). Although the DAG has the highest support of member in the lifestyle groups which 
have the highest number of people working as upper or lower white-collars, the t-test did 
not prove any significant relationships when cluster size was taken into consideration (cf. 
Chapter 6.3). Looking at the other organisations the members in the modern, younger 
lifestyle groups are significantly above average members in sports organisations and the 
traditional religious group and passive group below. With regard to “choral society” the 
only group which is significantly above average represented here is the “sports-interested, 
traditional-orientated, socially engaged person”. As this group is dominated by men age 60 
and above the assumption that might be that these are members of male choirs. A 
significant number of members in choirs among the religious lifestyle groups which might 
have been expected was not found, although the “cultural and educational orientated, 
socially engaged religious person” has the second highest number of members in choirs 
and the traditional-orientated, religious one has the highest number of people with past 
memberships in choirs, even though this variable is not significant. Now, turning to the 
membership in church or religious organisations not surprisingly the modern, younger 
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secular lifestyle groups has hardly any members in such organisations. The only above 
average number of members can be found in the group of the “cultural and educational 
orientated, socially engaged religious person”. This fits with the overall religious profile of 
this group. The other religious orientated group did not show a significant number of 
members in church and religious organisations which could have been expected. This 
might be connected to the big number of people above 60 years in this group. The only 
lifestyle group which is significantly above average members in political parties and local 
and citizens organisations is the “sports-interested, traditional-orientated, socially engaged 
person”. With regard to social welfare, war victim organisations and other organisations 
the “cultural and educational orientated, socially engaged religious person “ is the only 
group with an above average representation. The above average memberships in different 
kinds of organisations among the above mentioned two lifestyle group could have been 
expected as these are the only two groups who have a lifestyle orientated social 
engagement (cf. Table 7.9).  
Turning to the past memberships the “technologically and educationally orientated, 
modern person” and the “cultural and educational orientated, socially engaged religious 
person” are the only groups with an above average number of people in alternative 
political organisations. Furthermore, the first group also has an above average number of 
people who are former members in youth, student organisations. Although the second 
group has the second highest number here it is not significant. Nevertheless, with both 
types of organisations the higher number in these lifestyle groups would have been 
expected considering their high education and post-materialist attitudes. Finally, the 
“culturally active, anti-sports orientated person” has an above average number of people 
with past memberships in sports organisations. Obviously the anti-sports attitude of this 
group is related to television and newspaper (cf. Table 7.9) and not sports in general. 
Considering the fact that this group is to ¾ represented by women mainly between the age 
of 30-44 this result is not very surprising. 
Both with respect to the occupational and the other organisations one thing gets obvious 
and that is the low number of people who are members of any organisation at all (cf. also 
Tables 6.2 and 6.3). The “traditional-orientated, religious person” is, for example, under 
average members in altogether nine organisations and the “modern, anti-religious, sports-
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orientated person” in eight, followed by the “culturally active, anti-sports-orientated 
person” who is below average represented in five organisations. This does not necessarily 
mean that people are not longer willing to engage. As research shows, in particular the 
younger generation simply does not want to participate in the traditional organisations with 
rigid structures. With regard to political issues they involve without being members, for 
example, in demonstrations organised by the anti-globalisation movement attac. 
Nevertheless, the results presented above still prove that there are differences in the 
organisational membership structure between the lifestyle, but obviously organisations 
have lost the position – at least the traditional strong position - as a link between social 
groups and political parties. In the following the association between the lifestyle groups 
and interest representation, both by organisations and parties will be presented. As argued 
previously the fact that parties have been included here as well does not have any impact 
on the analysis of the impact between lifestyle groups and party preference as all analyses 
are single bivariate measurements. Thus, if a lifestyle group has both an interest 
representation by a particular party and the members of this group above average vote for 
this party, this might be seen as an indication of a stable relationship between a lifestyle 
group and a political party. The relationship between lifestyle groups and parties follow in 
Chapter 7.1.3.2. 
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Table 7.12 The association between organisational membership and lifestyle groups 
(west)77 
 
 TEDUMO 
(12.7%) 
CUEDSO 
(13.4%) 
 
SPTRSO  
(16. 3%) 
TRAREL 
(15.7%) 
ANSPCA 
(19%) 
NOVAPA 
(9.9%) 
MODSPO 
(13%) 
Total X2 Cramer’sV 
Membership in 
organisations: 
N = 221 N = 233 N = 284 N = 273 N = 331 N = 172 N = 225 N = 1739   
DGB  10.0 6.0 14.1 2.6 7.3 9.3 13.8 8.9 34*** .139 
DAG 5.9 5.6 3.2 (0.0) 78 4.2 4.1 7.1 4.1 20** .108 
Sports club  40.3 33.0 30.3 5.9 22.7 16.9 45.3 27.3 137*** .281 
Choral society 2.3 9.0 14.8 2.9 3.9 6.4 1.8 6.0 63*** .190 
Church or religious 
organisations 
0.9 9.9 3.9 4.0 0.9 2.9 (0.0) 3.2 52*** .173 
Political party 5.4 5.6 6.3 0.4 0.3 1.2 (0.0) 2.7 49*** .167 
Local and citizen’s 
organisations 
3.6 7.7 10.2 8.8 2.1 5.8 1.8 5.8 33*** .138 
Social welfare, war victim 
organisations 
1.4 9.4 6.3 5.1 2.4 2.9 1.3 4.2 32*** .136 
Other organisations 9.5 10.7 8.8 2.2 3.6 5.8 2.2 6.0 34*** .140 
Other hobby organisations 12.2 11.2 13.0 5.1 10.3 7.6 10.2 10.0 13* .086 
Other social organisations 5.9 6.4 9.9 6.6 8.2 3.5 7.1 7.1 n.s.  
Past memberships in 
organisations: 
N = 221 N = 233 N = 284 N = 273 N = 331 N = 172 N = 225 N = 1739   
Alternative political group  7.7 6.9 1.4 0.4 4.2 0.6 0.9 3.2 44*** .159 
Sports club 24.0 23.6 15.5 9.9 25.7 14.5 18.2 19.0 36*** .143 
Youth, student 
organisations 
6.8 4.7 1.1 0.7 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.8 25*** .119 
Local and citizen’s 
organisations 
1.4 0.4 4.2 4.4 1.5 2.9 0.4 2.2 20** .106 
Choral society 6.3 6.9 7.0 8.4 6.3 4.7 1.8 6.1 n.s.  
Other hobby organisations 4.1 3.0 6.0 4.8 3.3 3.5 2.2 3.9 n.s.  
Other social organisation  1.8 2.1 3.9 3.3 2.1 5.8 2.7 3.0 n.s.  
 
The association between the lifestyle groups and interest representation is presented in 
Table 7.13. With regard to the interest representation by the Catholic and Protestant church 
the traditional orientated lifestyle groups have an above average representation whereas the 
two younger, modern-orientated groups and the “culturally active, anti-sports-orientated“ 
feel below average represented by the churches. This is not surprising considering the fact 
that these lifestyle groups have the highest number of people with no religious affiliation 
and who never go to church. Although the “cultural and educational orientated socially 
                                                 
77 Variables with 20% or more cells with counts lower than 5 were not included in the table. Significance 
levels: p < .05=*, p < .01=**, p < .001=*** and n.s. = not significant. The percentage distribution of the 
lifestyle groups are not based on the total number of respondents in the analysis, but on the total number 
of respondents in the respective clusters. The 10.0% DGB members in the first cluster is, for example, 
based on the subpopulation with N=221. 
78 No cell counts. 
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engaged, religious person” has the third highest number who considers the Catholic 
Church to represent their interest, this value is not significant. A significant above average 
interest representation by the Protestant Church can be found here, though. Looking at the 
interest representation by the parties which are supposed to be close to the churches, the 
CDU and CSU only the “sports-interested, traditionally-orientated, socially engaged 
person” is above average represented here, but in this group the number of people who 
consider the SPD to represent their interests is above average, too, which certainly does not 
fit with the theoretical assumptions. Actually, this group is the only one which also has an 
above average representation for the SPD. Although the “modern, anti-religious, sports-
orientated person” is the only group which feel represented by the trade unions (50.7%) 
they do not feel above average represented by the SPD. With regard to environmental 
organisations and Bündnis 90/die Grünen the association is not as clear as could have been 
expected, either. Whereas the “technologically and educationally orientated, modern 
person” feel above average represented by both environmental organisations and Bündnis 
90 /die Grünen, the other post-materialist orientated group, the “cultural and educational 
orientated, socially engaged, religious person” feel above average represented by 
environmental organisations, but not by Bündnis 90/die Grünen. Considering the fact that 
this is a religious orientated group this outcome is not surprising, but questions of course 
the validity of the lifestyle group. A possible explanation might be the high level of 
education among the members of this group as this is often related to post-materialist value 
orientations. Oppositely, the “modern, anti-religious, sports-orientated person” does not 
consider environmental organisations to represent their interest above average, but has the 
second highest number who considers Bündnis 90/die Grünen to represent their interests. 
Finally, FDP is neither above nor below average represented in any of the lifestyle groups, 
although the “technologically and educationally orientated, modern person” and the 
“cultural and educational orientated, socially engaged religious person” which also have 
the highest number of self-employed have the highest number of people who consider the 
FDP to represent their interest.  
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Table 7.13 The association between organisational interest representation and 
lifestyle groups (west) 79 
 TEDUMO 
(12.7%) 
CUEDSO 
(13.4%) 
 
SPTRSO  
(16. 3%) 
TRAREL 
(15.7%) 
ANSPCA 
(19%) 
NOVAPA 
(9.9%) 
MODSPO 
(13%) 
Total X2 Cramer’sV 
Interest representation: N = 221 N = 233 N = 284 N = 273 N = 331 N = 172 N = 225 N = 1739   
Catholic Church 6.8 21.5 25.0 31.1 7.9 12.8 5.8 16.2 117*** .259 
Environmental 
Organisations 
56.1 56.7 33.8 36.3 56.5 25.6 42.7 44.7 91*** .229 
Trade Union 33.9 33.9 38.7 15.4 36.9 25.0 50.7 33.6 81*** .215 
Bündnis90/Grüne 21.3 16.7 7.4 1.5 15.7 5.8 20.0 12.5 78*** .212 
Protestant Church 8.6 21.9 19.0 22.0 13.3 7.6 3.1 14.3 65*** .193 
CDU 22.2 25.8 29.2 24.5 14.8 18.6 12.0 21.1 36*** .144 
CSU 19.5 21.0 21.1 17.6 10.0 14.5 8.4 15.9 31*** .134 
SPD  23.5 26.2 36.6 25.3 28.7 23.8 30.2 28.2 16* .096 
FDP 9.5 7.7 5.3 2.9 5.7 5.2 5.8 5.8 n.s.  
 
7.1.3.2 The association between lifestyle groups and party preference 
Now, looking at the last criteria which has to be fulfilled in order to define a lifestyle group 
as a social milieu, the association between lifestyle groups and party preference will be 
analysed. As seen from Table 7.14 there is a significant above average support for the 
CDU/CSU among the traditional-orientated lifestyle groups and a significant above 
average support for the SPD among the “culturally active, anti-sports orientated”, the “no 
value-orientated, rather passive” and the “modern, anti-religious, sports-orientated 
person”. The FDP is not supported above average from any of the lifestyle groups, but has 
the highest number of support from the first to lifestyle groups which might have been 
expected based on the above average number of self-employed in these groups (cf. Table 
7.10). Furthermore, the Bündnis90/die Grünen they receive above average support from 
the member of the “technologically and educationally orientated, modern person” and the 
“culturally active, anti-sports orientated person”. In particular with regard to the first group 
this relationship would have been expected based on the high number of post-materialists 
and people who consider environmental organisations and Bündnis90/die Grünen to 
represent their interests. It should not be ignored, however, that both the CDU/CSU and 
                                                 
79 Variables with 20% or more cells with counts lower than 5 were not included in the table. Significance 
levels: p < .05=*, p < .01=**, p < .001=*** and n.s. = not significant. The percentage distribution of the 
lifestyle groups is not based on the total number of respondents in the analysis, but on the total number of 
respondents in the respective clusters. The 21.3% who see their interests represented by Bündnis90/die 
Grünen in the first cluster is, for example, based on the subpopulation with N=221. 
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SPD have a higher support among the members of this group than Bündnis90/die Grünen 
(between 30-40%). This does not diminish the fact, though, that this group has the highest 
number of voters for Bündnis90/the Greens. Finally, the highest number of non-voters can 
be found in the passive group and the modern, sports-orientated group. To which extent 
this above average inclination not to vote in these groups is also related to political interest 
and democratic satisfaction is explored in Table 7.15. 
Table 7.14 The association between lifestyle groups and party preference (west) 80 
 TEDUMO 
(12.7%) 
CUEDSO 
(13.4%) 
 
SPTRSO  
(16. 3%) 
TRAREL 
(15.7%) 
ANSPCA 
(19%) 
NOVAPA 
(9.9%) 
MODSPO 
(13%) 
Total X2 Cramer’sV 
Vote next election: N = 156 N = 171 N = 234 N = 188 N = 231 N = 120 N = 148 N = 1248 120*** .155 
CDU/CSU 30.8 36.3 43.2 49.5 22.5 31.7 17.6 33.7   
SPD 37.2 39.2 44.9 44.7 56.3 57.5 56.8 47.8   
FDP 9.6 8.8 5.1 1.1 5.2 3.3 6.1 5.5   
Bündnis90/die Grünen 16.0 12.3 3.8 1.6 13.4 4.2 12.2 9.0   
Other parties 6.4 3.5 3.0 3.2 2.6 3.3 7.4 4.0   
 N = 161 N = 173 N = 239 N = 203 N = 248 N = 135 N = 167 N = 1326 33*** .156 
Would not vote 3.1 1.2 2.1 7.4 6.9 11.1 11.4 5.9   
 
As can be seen from Table 7.15 the first three groups there is a significantly above average 
strong political interest among the members and in the last four groups there is a below 
average strong political interest. Almost 60% of the “culturally active, anti-sports-
orientated person” has a medium political interest, though, whereas 53.1% of the 
traditional religious group and 36.4 % of the “modern, anti-religious, sports-orientated 
person” has an above average weak political interest. Looking at democratic satisfaction 
more than 60% in all groups express to be satisfied. The only significant above average 
number can be found in the traditional, religious group (82.2%) whereas a below average 
number of people who are satisfied with democracy can be found among the “culturally 
active, anti-sports orientated person” and the passive group. Alt least with regard to the 
“no value-orientated, rather passive person” the assumption that the below average 
political interest and democratic satisfaction might be linked to the inclination not to vote 
seems confirmed. 
                                                 
80 Significance levels: p < .05=*, p < .01=** and p < .001=***. The percentage distribution of the lifestyle 
groups are not based on the total number of respondents in the analysis, but on the total number of 
respondents in the respective clusters. The 30.8% CDU/CSU voters in the first cluster is, for example, 
based on the subpopulation with N=156 and the 3.1% non-voters on a subpopulation of 161. 
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Table 7.15 The association between political interest, democratic satisfaction and the 
lifestyle groups (west) 81 
 
 TEDUMO 
(12.7%) 
CUEDSO 
(13.4%) 
 
SPTRSO  
(16. 3%) 
TRAREL 
(15.7%) 
ANSPCA 
(19%) 
NOVAPA 
(9.9%) 
MODSPO 
(13%) 
Total X2 Cramer’sV 
Political interest: N = 220 N = 233 N = 284 N = 273 N = 329 N = 172 N = 225 N = 1736 437*** .355 
Strong 55.0 60.1 40.1 5.9 16.7 20.9 12.9 29.4   
Medium 36.4 34.8 48.2 41.0 58.1 48.8 50.7 46.0   
Weak 8.6 5.2 11.6 53.1 25.2 30.2 36.4 24.5   
Democratic satisfaction: N = 220 N = 233 N = 282 N = 264 N = 328 N = 170 N = 222 N = 1719 29*** .131 
Satisfied 78.2 78.1 75.9 82.2 68.9 64.7 68.5 74.1   
Not satisfied 21.8 21.9 24.1 17.8 31.1 35.3 31.5 25.9   
 
7.1.4 Summary – the formation of social milieus in the west 
The analyses presented in Chapter 7.1.3 made clear that differences exist between the 
lifestyle groups with respect to cleavages, organisational memberships, interest 
representations and party preferences. In this chapter I will summarise the main 
characteristics of each lifestyle group with regard to the above mentioned areas and discuss 
to which extent each lifestyle group fulfils the criteria of being a milieu. At this point, I 
thus once again want to emphasise that a social milieu will be defined if a relationship 
exists between a lifestyle group, cleavage(s), organisational membership, 
organisational interest representation and party preference. Furthermore, this 
relationship should be consistent in the sense that a religious orientated lifestyle group 
should not correspond with a secular party like, for example, the PDS.  
The technologically and educationally-orientated, modern person: Cleavages: With regard to social 
structural cleavages this group is above average represented by younger to middle-aged, non-religious, single 
men with a high social status who live in large cities. Concerning the ideological cleavages it is characterised 
by an above average proportion of post-materialists and below average number of materialists and mixed 
types. Furthermore, a below average number has big worries about number of immigrants and an above 
average have some and no worries. Organisational membership: They are members in sports clubs at present 
and have past memberships in alternative political groups and youth, student organisations. Furthermore, 
members of this group are below average members in traditional organisations like choral societies, church 
or religious organisations and social welfare, war victim organisations. Interest representation: Members of 
this group feel represented by environmental organisation and Bündnis 90/die Grünen and not represented by 
the churches. Party preference: Members of this group have an above average preference for Bündnis 90/die 
Grünen, a below average preference for the SPD as well as a below average inclination not to vote. Finally, 
the members of this group have a strong political interest. Social milieu: As the members of this group 
have a post-materialist value orientation, were past members in alternative political groups and youth, 
                                                 
81 Significance levels: p < .05=*, p < .01=** and p < .001=***. 
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student organisations, feel represented by environmental organisations and Bündnis 90/ die Grünen 
and have a party preference for Bündnis 90/ die Grünen this may be considered a Green social milieu.    
Cultural and educational orientated, socially engaged religious person: Cleavages: This group is above 
average represented by middle aged, religious women with a high social status. An above average proportion 
of post-materialists and below average number of materialists can be found in this lifestyle group. A below 
average number have big worries about the number of immigrants and an above average number have no 
worries. Furthermore, the majority of this group has big worries about the environment whereas a below 
average number has big worries about the costs of the German reunification and an above average proportion 
has no worries. The highest proportion of people agreeing to the statement that voting is the duty of the 
citizen can be found in this lifestyle group. Organisational membership: Members of this lifestyle group 
presently involve in church or religious organisations, social welfare, war victim organisation and other 
organisations. They were previously members in alternative political groups. Interest representation: The 
Protestant church and environmental organisation are considered to represent the interests of the members of 
this group above average (the Catholic Church was only nearly significant). Party preference: A below 
average preference for the SPD exists in this group. Not surprisingly this group has the lowest number of 
persons who would not vote. Finally, this group has the highest number of people with a strong political 
interest. Social milieu: The characteristics of this group may indicate that this is an upper conservative 
social milieu, although the members of this group do not have a party preference for the CDU/CSU 
above average which might have been expected. However, it has a below average preference for the 
SPD. Still the preference for the SPD was higher than for the CDU/CSU (cf. Table 7.14). Furthermore, 
this group seems to be quite heterogeneous as an above average number of post-materialists and 
people considering environmental organisations to represent their interest can be found in this group 
and this is not a typical characteristic of the upper conservative (cf. also Chapter 5.2.1). In summary, 
the characteristics of this group are to divergent to define it as a social milieu.    
The sports interested, traditional-orientated, socially engaged person:  Cleavages: This group is above 
average represented by middle aged to older men with a low/medium social status who live in smaller cities 
and go to church above average. However, they have no other particular religious characteristics. With 
regard to the ideological cleavages, the members of this group have a below average number of post-
materialists and above average number of mixed types. Furthermore, the majority of this group has big 
worries about the number of immigrants as well as a below average proportion of members with only some 
or no worries. Also with respect to the costs of reunification the majority has big worries. The second highest 
number of people agreeing to the statement that voting is the duty of the citizens can be found here. Finally, 
an above average proportion of the members place themselves to the right. Organisational membership: 
They are above average members in the trade union (DGB), choral society, political party and local and 
citizens organisation. A below average proportion of the members of this group are past members in 
alternative political groups and youth and student organisations. Interest representation: The churches, the 
CDU, CSU and SPD are considered to represent the interests of the members of this group above average 
and environmental organisations and Bündnis90/die Grünen below average. Party preference: Not 
surprisingly, an above average party preference exists for the CDU/CSU and below average preference for 
the Bündnis90/die Grünen. Also this group has a below average number of non-voters. Finally, this lifestyle 
group has the third highest number of people with strong political interest. Social milieu: According to the 
characteristics this group includes a mixture of both traditional workers and traditional conservatives. 
This group is thus obviously too heterogeneous and thus cannot be considered a social milieu.     
The traditional-orientated, religious person: Cleavages: With regard to social structural cleavages this group 
is above average represented by religious widows with a low social status who live in small cities. Of all 
lifestyle groups this is the only one with an above average number of materialists. This coincides with the 
below average number of post-materialists and mixed types. The majority has big worries about the number 
of immigrants and a below average proportion of people with no worries. With respect to worries about the 
environment this group has a significant number of people with some worries and a below average number 
with big worries. Furthermore, most members of this group consider voting a duty and place themselves in 
the middle of the left-right scale. Organisational membership: The members of this group are characterised 
by the below average membership – both past and present – in almost all of the analysed organisations. 
Interest representation: The Catholic and Protestant churches represent the interests of the members of this 
group above average and environmental organisation, trade union and Bündnis90/Grüne below average. 
Party preference: They have a preference above average for the CDU/CSU and below average for the FDP 
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and Bündnis90/die Grünen. Finally, the majority of the members of this group have a weak political interest, 
but over 80% are satisfied with democracy. Social milieu: Although this group is missing the 
organisational link of religious organisations all other characteristics of this group clearly indicate that 
this may be seen as a traditional religious milieu. 
The culturally active, anti-sports orientated person: Cleavages: This group is rather vague with respect to 
social structural cleavages. The clearest characteristic is the non-religious profile of the members of this 
group. In addition, they are above average represented by young to middle-aged divorced women with a 
low/medium social status. With regard to the ideological cleavages a below average number of people of this 
group has big worries about immigrants, but an above average number do have some worries. Furthermore, a 
below average number has no worries about the environment, but almost half of the members of this lifestyle 
group has some worries about the costs of the reunification. Finally, they place themselves below average on 
the right. Organisational membership: This lifestyle group, too, is characterised by a below average 
participation in organisations. The only significant membership was found in the past membership in sports 
club. Interest representation: Environmental organisations represent the interests of this group above 
average and the Catholic Church, the CDU and CSU below average. Party preference: There is an above 
average preference for the SPD and Bündnis 90/die Grünen among the members of this group and a below 
average preference for the CDU/CSU. Finally, the majority has a medium level of political interest and more 
than 1/3 of the members of this group are not satisfied with democracy. Social milieu: The characteristics 
of this group are to weak to make any indications with respect to a milieu. 
 
The no value-orientated, rather passive person: Cleavages: Non-religious, older men with a low social status 
are above average represented in this group. It has the highest level of mixed types and is also characterised 
by a below average number of post-materialists. Furthermore, this group has the second highest number of 
people with big worries about the number of immigrants, the second lowest number of people with big 
worries about the environment and the highest number of people with no worries about the environment. In 
addition, the majority of this group has big worries about the costs of reunification. Of all lifestyle groups 
this one is the only one who differs significantly with respect to the evaluation of socialism; almost ¾ do not 
agree to the statement that “socialism” is a good idea. Not surprisingly, a below average number of people of 
this group place themselves to the left whereas over 80% place themselves in the middle. Organisational 
membership: The members of this group are not characterised by any organisational preferences. However, 
they are below average represented in sports clubs as well as with respect to past memberships in alternative 
political groups. Interest representation: No organisations are considered to represent the interests of this 
lifestyle group above average, but environmental organisation, trade union, Bündnis 90/ die Grünen and the 
Protestant Church are considered to represent the interests below average. Party preference: The majority 
has a preference for the SPD and a below average preference for Bündnis 90/die Grünen. Furthermore, this 
group has the second highest number of people who would not vote. Finally, this group is characterised by a 
below average number of people with strong political interest and of all groups this one has the highest 
number of people who are not satisfied with democracy. Social milieu: This group as well has too few 
characteristics to make any indications about a social milieu. Interesting with this group, however, is 
the above average level of materialists and above average level of worries about immigrants and costs 
of reunification. And, although this group below average considers socialism as a good idea an above 
average proportion have a party preference for the SPD. Furthermore this is the only group which 
does not feel represented by any organisation. Finally, they are above average represented among non-
voters and people dissatisfied with democracy. All these characteristics may indicate that this is a 
“passive, dissatisfied milieu”, although it does not really fulfil the criteria of a social milieu as it is 
characterised by a lack of memberships, interest representations and party preference rather than the 
existence of a relationship between these variables.   
 
The modern, anti-religious, sports-orientated person: Cleavages: This group is above average represented by 
non-religious, single, younger to middle-aged, single men with a low/medium social status. The majority of 
this group has a mixed type value orientation and this group has the highest number of people (almost ¼) 
who do not agree to the statement that voting is a duty. Organisational membership: Almost half of the 
members of this group are in sports clubs and an above average number are also members in the DGB (trade 
union). With respect to all other memberships – both past and present – this group is either below average 
represented or it does not differ significantly from the other groups. Interest representation: Trade union and 
Bündnis 90/ die Grünen are considered to represent the interests of this group above average and the 
churches, the CDU and CSU below average. Party preference: This group has an above average preference 
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for the SPD or not to vote and below average preference for the CDU/CSU. Finally, more than one third of 
the members of this group have a weak political interest and the second lowest proportion of people with a 
strong political interest. Social milieu: The members of this group are above average represented among 
those with a middle level of education and income who work as lower white-collars and blue-collars 
(cf. Table 7.10). Furthermore, the association with the DGB, interest representation by the trade union 
and party preference for the SPD indicates that this might be a worker’s milieu.  
To facilitate a comparison between the lifestyle groups and the respective variables some 
of the results presented above – which are particularly important in analysing the existence 
of social milieus in the West German population - have been summarised in Figure 7.1. 
The figure should be read vertically, for example, the lifestyle group of the 
“technologically and educationally-orientated, modern person” (TEDUMO) is 
characterised by non-religious, young to middle-aged single men with a high social status 
who live in large cities. The members of this group have post-materialists value 
orientations, no worries about immigrants, are at present members of sports clubs and are 
former members of alternative political groups and youth student organisations. Finally, 
this group considers environmental organisations and Bündnis90/die Grünen to represent 
their interest and have a party preference for the Bündnis90/die Grünen. In summary, this 
lifestyle group may be considered a Green milieu.  
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Figure 7.1 Social milieus in the West German population 
Lifestyle groups 
⇒ 
Criteria  
     ⇓ 
TEDUMO 
(12.7%) 
CUEDSO 
(13.4%) 
 
SPTRSO  (16. 
3%) 
TRAREL 
(15.7%) 
ANSPCA (19%) NOVAPA 
(9.9%) 
MODSPO 
(13%) 
Cleavages        
Social structure Non-religious, 
high social status, 
young to middle-
aged, men, single, 
large cities 
High church 
attendance, high 
social status, 
middle-aged 
women 
High church 
attendance, 
low/medium  
social status,  
middle-aged and 
older married 
men, small cities
High church 
attendance, low 
social status, 
older widows, 
small cities 
Low church 
attendance, 
low/medium 
social status,  
separated/ 
divorced, young 
medium-aged 
women 
Low church 
attendance, low 
social status, 
older men 
Non-religious, 
Low/medium 
social status, 
young to 
middle-aged, 
single men 
Post-mat index +  Post-materialist 
- Materialists 
- Mixed 
 + Post-
materialist 
- Materialists 
- Post-
materialists 
 + Mixed 
- Post-
materialists 
+ Materialists 
- Mixed 
 - Post-
materialists 
+ Mixed 
+ Mixed 
Worries about 
environment 
 + big 
- some 
 - big 
+ some 
- none - big 
+ none 
 
Voting as duty  + agree + agree + agree   - agree 
Worries about 
number of 
immigrants 
- big 
+ some 
+ none 
- big 
+ none 
+ big 
- some 
- none 
+ big 
- none 
- big 
+ some 
+ big  
Worries about 
costs of 
reunification 
 - big 
+ none 
+ big 
- some 
 + some + big 
- none 
 
Socialism good 
idea 
     - agree 
 
 
Left-right 
placement 
  + right - left 
+ middle 
 
- right   
Present 
organisational 
memberships 
 Sports club Church and 
religious 
organisations; 
social welfare, 
war victim 
organisations; 
other 
DGB; Choral 
society; political 
party; local and 
citizen’s 
organisations 
   DGB; sports 
club 
Past 
organisational 
memberships 
Alternative 
political group; 
youth, student 
organisations 
Alternative 
political group 
  Sports club   
Interest 
representation 
Environmental 
organisations; 
Bündnis 90/die 
Grünen 
Protestant 
church; 
Environmental 
organisations  
Catholic church; 
Protestant 
church; 
CDU; CSU; 
SPD 
Catholic 
church; 
Protestant 
church 
 
Environmental 
organisations 
 Trade union; 
Bündnis 90/ 
die Grünen 
Party preference Bündnis 90/die 
Grünen 
 CDU/CSU CDU/CSU SPD ; Bündnis 
90/ die Grünen 
SPD; non-vote SPD; non-vote
Political interest Strong Strong Strong Weak Medium - Strong Weak 
Democratic 
satisfaction 
   Satisfied - Satisfied - Satisfied  
 
The formation of social milieus 
 
Social milieu Green milieu   Religious 
milieu  
 Passive, 
dissatisfied 
milieu 
Worker’s 
milieu 
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As presented in Figure 7.1 a religious milieu exists in the west which is characterised by a 
religious orientated lifestyle, religious affiliation and high church attendance, materialist 
and conservative value orientations, interest representation by the churches and party 
preference for the CDU/CSU. The link to religious organisations is missing, nevertheless 
this will be considered a social milieu as all other characteristics are clear. Furthermore, a 
worker’s milieu seems to exist. Although no particularly work-orientated lifestyle exists, 
this milieu has the largest proportion of lower white-collars as blue-collar workers, trade 
union (DGB) membership, interest representation by the trade unions and party preference 
for the SPD. A Green milieu of post-materialists with a technology/modern and education-
orientated lifestyle, high social status, past memberships in alternative political groups and 
youth, student organisations, interest representation by environmental organisations and 
Bündnis 90/die Grünen was found as expected as well.  
Finally, two “social milieus” were indicated; the “upper conservative” and the “passive 
dissatisfied” milieus, although these do not really fulfil the criteria of being defined social 
milieus. The “upper conservative” is too heterogeneous as it includes both an above 
average number of religious conservatives which are above average members in traditional 
social and religious orientated organisations and an above average number of post-
materialists, members in alternative political groups and people who consider 
environmental organisations to represent their interest. Finally, this group has no particular 
party preference. Altogether, this lifestyle group does not fulfil the criteria of being defined 
as a social milieu. The “passive dissatisfied” is quite interesting compared to the other 
groups due to its passive lifestyle, lack of important life areas, low social position and lack 
in organisational memberships and interest representation. Furthermore, the members are 
below average satisfied with democracy and incline above average not to vote. Although it 
cannot be defined as a social milieu in the traditional sense the societal disintegration of 
this group should nonetheless be considered important, also with respect to voting 
behaviour. This lifestyle group will thus be considered as a social milieu. 
Turning to the question of latent and manifest cleavages, the results indicate the existence 
of the following manifest cleavages in the West German society; the one between 
religiosity - represented by the religious milieu - and secularism which is represented by 
the three other milieus. With regard to other traditional social structural cleavages, there is 
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slight difference between the social milieus with respect to community size and the so-
called Stadt-Land cleavage. Whereas the Green milieu is above average represented in 
large cities, the religious milieu can be found in the smaller communities (cf. Chapter 
7.1.3.1 and Figure 7.1). 
Furthermore, a value cleavage could be found between the Green milieu representing post-
materialist values above average and the religious milieu and passive, dissatisfied milieu 
which are both above average materialists and/or below average post-materialists. With 
respect to the variable “voting as a duty” which was assumed to be another measurement 
of value change, the religious milieu agrees above average to this statement and the 
worker’s milieu below average. This might be traced back to the fact that the worker’s 
milieu consists of a younger to middle-aged generation whereas the religious milieu is 
represented by the older generation. Actually, considering all groups, and not just the 
social milieus, those with the highest age level agree to this statement whereas among the 
younger groups the support of the statement is either below average or insignificant. 
Finally, the last cleavage which showed significant differences between the social milieus 
is the globalisation cleavage; whereas the Green milieu has below average worries about 
the number of immigrants, both the religious and the passive milieu have above average 
worries.  
Now, looking at the differences between all analysed groups, i.e. both the social milieus 
and the lifestyle groups which could not (yet) be defined as social milieus, the following 
latent cleavages seem to exist in the West German population; the cleavage between work 
and capital between the worker’s milieu on the one side and those with a high social status 
and high number of self-employed, i.e. the “cultural and educational orientated, socially 
engaged religious person”, but also the Green milieu on the other side. As discussed 
previously, although the latter fulfils the criteria of being a Green milieu the preference for 
CDU/CSU and SPD is higher than for Bündnis90/die Grünen in this group.  
Concerning the cleavage between east and west, big worries about the costs of unification 
can be found among those groups in the west which have an above average number of 
lower white-collars and blue-collars and people with low/medium social status. The 
explanation may be that these groups see their jobs and general social position to a larger 
extent threatened than people with higher education who work as upper white-collars or 
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self-employed. As discussed in Chapter 7.1.3.1 all groups seem to agree that socialism is 
not a good idea, only the passive milieu agrees below average to this statement. However, 
as was also emphasised both variables become more important when comparing the 
differences between the west and the east in Chapter 7.3. 
Finally, the social milieus and lifestyle groups do not seem to have any significant 
differences with regard to the ideological cleavage measured be left-right self-placement. 
Although the worker’s milieu could have been expected to be above average represented at 
the left this is not the case. However, this may also confirm the move of the modern 
worker towards the middle.  
With regard to the other social structural cleavages like gender, age and family status clear 
differences exist between the social milieus and lifestyle groups as well and this may 
indicate the existence of latent cleavages. For example, if the younger to middle-aged 
population with a high social status remain single throughout the life cycle.   
A summary of the results found in the west is presented in Figure 7.2. Only lifestyle 
groups which fulfil the criteria of being defined as social milieus are included in the 
overview. Those characteristics which are of particular importance to the definition of the 
milieus have been marked in bold.  
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Cleavage:  
- non-religious 
- large cities 
- high social status 
- post-materialist 
- no worries about number of immigrants 
Organisational membership:  
- sports club 
- alternative political groups (past) 
- youth, student organisation (past) 
Interest representation:  
- environmental organisations 
- Bündnis 90/die Grünen 
Party preference: 
- Bündnis 90/die Grünen 
TEDUMO Green milieu 
Cleavage:  
- high church attendance 
- small cities 
- low social status 
- materialist 
- no worries about environment 
- Conservative (voting as duty, below left placement) 
- worries about immigrants 
Interest representation:  
- Catholic Church 
- Protestant Church 
Party preference: 
- CDU/CSU 
TRAREL 
Religious 
milieu 
Cleavage: 
- non-religious 
- low/medium social status 
- Mixed Postmat  
- Liberal (voting no duty) 
Organisational membership:  
DGB, sports club 
Interest representation:  
- Trade Union, Bündnis 90/Grüne 
Party preference: 
- SPD, - no-vote 
MODSPO 
Worker’s 
milieu 
Cleavage:  
- low church attendance 
- low social status  
- not post-materialist,  
- no worries about environment 
- worries about immigrants 
-  worries about costs of unification 
Organisational membership: none  
Interest representation: none  
Party preference:  
SPD, no-vote 
NOVAPA 
Passive 
dissatisfied 
milieu 
Lifestyle group Criteria Social milieu 
Figure 7.2 Social milieus in the west 
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7.2 The formation of social milieus in the east 
7.2.1 The analysis of latent variables using principal components analyses 
Altogether 21 principal components could by extracted by means of principal components 
analyses compared to 59 original single items. Seven single variables were excluded from 
the analyses and six of them were included as standardised variables (z-scores) in the 
cluster analysis. As was the case in the west, these variables could not be arranged to a 
component. However, six of them were consider theoretically important and thus included 
in the cluster analysis.  
The principal components found within the three different groups of lifestyle variables are 
to a great extent similar to those found in the analysis of western Germany and are 
summarised in the following. In those cases components with eigenvalues less than 1 were 
included in the final solution this has been emphasised. The results of the principal 
components analyses are shown in Tables 7.16 until 7.20. 
1. Leisure activities: Within the area of leisure activity eight principal components were 
found based on 19 single items. These were: modernity, culture, sports, technology, social 
engagement, social contact, active and read (cf. Table 7.16). The eight components 
solution had 67% explained variance and component seven and eight had eigenvalues of 
0.97 and 0.856 respectively.82 The items “church attendance and attend religious 
meetings”, “educate oneself privately”, “party games in family”, “walk and wander” and 
“go on short trips” were not included in the analysis, but included as standardised variables 
in the cluster analysis. The first two items were included in the analysis for the same 
reason as in the west: “church attendance and attend religious meetings” is a traditional 
variable whose importance has decreased since World War II and will probably be of even 
less importance in the east than the west due to the forced secularisation in the east (cf. 
Chapter 4.3.2.4). “Educate oneself privately” was included as it might be expected that this 
item, too, is an indication of cultural-orientated and education-orientated lifestyle group(s). 
The other three items were included as it can be expected that these relate with other 
lifestyle variables; “party games in family” and “walk and wander” may, for example, 
overlay with “importance of family and children” as these are typical activities families do. 
                                                 
82 Number of valid cases N = 977. 
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This may also be the case with the item ”go on short trips”, although this may also be an 
activity of the upper lifestyle groups who go on weekend trips to golf, visit a concert etc. 
In the east, too, the component “active” has a positive loading on the variable “do-it-
yourself and repairs in the house/car/gardening” and a negative loading on the non-active 
variable “be lazy, do nothing”. 
Table 7.16 Components based on leisure activities (east) 
      Components         
 Modernity Culture Sports Technology Social engagement 
Social 
contact Active Read 
V17  Read books  1.766E-02 .445 -.109 6.543E-02 .129 -1.198E-02 -3.127E-02 .657 
V18  Read magazines .140 -1.695E-02 .149 7.622E-02 4.193E-02 7.593E-02 -3.604E-02 .856 
V19 Listen to LP’s, 
CD’s, cassesettes .819 .159 -1.172E-02 6.755E-02 6.526E-02 3.231E-02 3.481E-02 .147 
V20 Watch video .779 2.192E-03 .178 8.488E-02 9.103E-02 -8.835E-02 4.011E-02 6.817E-03 
V21 Occupy oneself 
with the computer .238 .221 .130 .735 .114 -7.753E-02 .116 .108 
V22 Use internet and 
on-line services 6.453E-02 6.911E-02 2.394E-02 .893 .100 2.548E-02 -3.572E-02 3.489E-02 
V24 do nothing, be 
lazy 4.189E-03 -9.656E-02 8.046E-02 -3.435E-02 -7.918E-02 .176 -.740 .123 
V26  Yoga, 
meditation, relaxation 
through self-hypnosis 
etc. 
-8.396E-02 .657 .373 7.711E-02 4.714E-02 -.165 7.245E-03 .119 
V27 Go eating or 
drinking .462 .252 .286 .202 -9.404E-02 .180 -.127 .119 
V28 Visit friends, 
neighbours, 
acquaintances 
7.425E-02 8.460E-02 .129 .115 -2.573E-02 .754 -.211 -8.199E-03 
V29 Visit family, 
relatives -3.858E-02 1.566E-03 -.114 -.143 8.780E-02 .768 .150 7.522E-02 
V32 Participation in 
politics -2.793E-02 .168 9.231E-02 .192 .777 -3.484E-02 -5.636E-02 5.075E-02 
V33 Honorary 
activities .117 7.401E-02 .112 7.496E-03 .806 9.348E-02 .122 7.403E-02 
V35 Artistic and 
musical activities .271 .697 -5.976E-02 7.691E-02 .137 9.250E-02 .125 5.099E-02 
V36 Do-it yourself, 
repairs, gardening etc. 1.862E-02 -2.322E-02 .232 1.254E-02 -1.644E-02 .134 .770 6.828E-02 
V37 Do active sports .228 .425 .617 .104 .118 9.400E-03 .138 4.553E-02 
V38 Visit sport 
events .189 5.074E-02 .802 4.499E-02 .174 -3.542E-03 8.025E-02 4.742E-02 
V39 Go to the 
cinema, visit pop- or 
jazz concerts etc. 
.552 .359 .399 .145 -5.133E-02 .111 -4.736E-02 -5.694E-02 
V40 Go to the opera, 
classical concerts etc. .187 .679 .162 .149 .119 .134 -3.147E-02 7.544E-02 
Rotated Component Matrix. Extraction Method: Principal Components Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a  Rotation converged in 8 iterations. 
 
2. Importance of life areas: In the second group of lifestyle variables four principal 
components were found based on seven single items (cf. Table 7.17). These were: leisure 
time and recreation/friends and acquaintances; work; family/neighbourhood; religion and 
church/politics and public life. The four components solution had 73% explained variance. 
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The third and fourth component had eigenvalues of 0.989 and 0.882 respectively. 83 The 
item “importance of relatives” was not included in the analysis, but included as a 
standardised variable in the cluster analysis. 
Table 7.17 Components based on important life areas (east) 
 Components s 
  
Leisure time and 
recreation/friends and 
acquaintances 
Work Family/Neighbourhood 
Religion and 
church/politics and 
public life 
V9   Own family and children 3.751E-02 .192 .889 -.120 
V10 Occupation and work .115 .864 5.366E-02 -4.677E-02 
V11 Leisure and recreation .749 .381 2.179E-02 -.105 
V12  Friends and acquaintances .865 -5.659E-02 .147 7.521E-02 
V14 Religion and church -7.178E-02 -.196 -.102 .761 
V15 Politics and public life .106 .454 .171 .669 
V16 Neighbourhood .352 -.284 .598 .385 
Rotated Component Matrix. Extraction Method: Principal Components Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a  Rotation converged in 7 iterations. 
 
3. Aesthetic characteristics: In the final group of lifestyle variables covering the aesthetic 
preferences of the respondents separate analyses were carried out in the areas music, 
television and newspaper contents.  
In the field of music taste two principal components were found based on five items (cf. 
Table 7.18). These were: folk music/German pop-music and classical music/jazz. The two 
components solution had 68% explained variance. As was also the case in western 
Germany, the component Folk music and German pop-music had a negative loading on 
pop-and rock music here as well.84 
Table 7.18 Components based on music preference (east) 
 Components   
  Folk music/German pop-music Classical musicJazz 
V41 Folk music .900 -4.371E-02 
V42 German pop music .748 4.135E-02 
V43 Pop- and rock music -.722 .301 
V44 Classical music 9.394E-02 .839 
V45 Jazz -.285 .790 
Rotated Component Matrix. Extraction Method: Principal Components Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a  Rotation converged in 3 iterations. 
With respect to television taste four principal components were found based on ten items: 
reports/news; entertainment series/Heimatfilme/Quiz; movies; sports. The four 
                                                 
83 Number of valid cases N = 997. 
84 Number of valid cases N = 998.  
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components solution had 68% explained variance and the results are presented in Table 
7.19. The fourth component had an eigenvalue of 0.946.85  
Until this point 68 cases were excluded from the analyses due to the casewise deletion of 
missing values on lifestyle items where no answer was given (cf. Chapter 6.3). 
Table 7.19 Components based on preference for television programmes (east) 
  Components      
  Reports/News Entertainment series/Heimatfilme/Quiz Movies Sports 
V53  Television and quiz shows -4.498E-02 .724 .187 .279 
V54  Sports .145 -6.341E-02 8.412E-02 .909 
V55  Feature movies .122 .303 .691 -5.765E-02 
V56  News .765 5.417E-02 -2.890E-02 .264 
V57  Political magazines .826 -.147 5.663E-02 .171 
V58  Arts and culture .754 -1.770E-02 -5.632E-02 -.239 
V59  Heimatfilme 9.798E-03 .771 -.108 -.162 
V60  Thrillers 2.262E-02 5.049E-02 .820 1.008E-02 
V61  Action movies -.224 -.192 .744 .252 
V62 Entertainment series -8.050E-02 .803 .104 -.119 
Rotated Component Matrix. Extraction Method: Principal Components Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a  Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
 
Turning to the last area of aesthetic preferences, the interest in newspaper contents, another 
61 cases are missing. The reason is that – as was the case in the west - those respondents 
who expressed never to read newspaper in the previous filter variable are excluded form 
the following variables where the respondents are asked to rank their preferences for 
different kinds of newspaper contents. Three principal components were found based on 
six items (cf. Table 7.20). These are: reports/news; local news/all over the world and 
sports. The three components solution had 75% explained variance and the third 
component had an eigenvalue of 0.931.86 The item “advertisements” was excluded from the 
principal components analysis in the east as well as the inclusion of this variable reduced 
the explained variance of the three components solution with about 8%. As emphasised in 
the first paragraph of Chapter 7.1.1 altogether seven variables were not included in the 
principal components analyses, but six of these were included in the cluster analysis as 
they were considered to be important from the theoretical point of view. With regard to the 
variable “advertisements” no particular important contribution was expected from this item 
from a theoretical point with regard to the existence of lifestyle groups. The variable was 
thus not included in the cluster analysis in the east either. 
                                                 
85 Number of valid cases N = 976.  
86 Number of valid cases N = 937.  
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Table 7.20 Components based on preference for newspaper contents (east) 
 Component
  Reports/News Local News/all over the world Sports 
V67 Politics .817 .162 .219 
V68 Economy .852 1.655E-02 .186 
V69 Culture .754 .119 -.166 
V70 Sports .104 8.765E-02 .963 
V71 Local news -1.568E-02 .866 3.536E-02 
V72 All over the world .245 .787 7.779E-02 
Rotated Component Matrix. Extraction Method: Principal Components Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a  Rotation converged in 4 iterations. 
 
 
In the next step the 21 latent variables and six manifest variables described above were 
included in a cluster analysis in order to find lifestyle groups in the East German 
population. This procedure will be described in further detail in the following section 
7.2.2 The analysis of lifestyle groups using cluster analysis  
As for the West German population several cluster analyses were carried out for the East 
German population87 as well using QUICK CLUSTER in SPSS 10.0. In order to find 
indications of the most appropriate number of clusters for the eastern German population 
ETA2 (k), PRE (k) and F-MAX (k) was carried out for cluster solutions from one until 12 
as well. The results are shown in Table 7.21. 
Table 7.21 Descriptive statistics for determining the number of clusters (east) 
 
Cluster number (k) Explained variance 
ETA2 (k) 
Proportional reduction of 
error PRE (k) 
F-MAX-Value (k) 
1 0,00 -99,00 -99,00 
2 0,09 0,09 86,77 
3 0,14 0,06 73,61 
4 0,17 0,03 60,52 
5 0,20 0,03 53,02 
6 0,21 0,02 47,19 
7 0,23 0,02 43,96 
8 0,24 0,01 39,99 
9 0,26 0,02 38,60 
10 0,27 0,02 36,27 
11 0,29 0,02 35,32 
12 0,30 0,01 32,92 
Looking at the results of ETA2 the largest increase in explained variance can be found up 
till the 5-cluster solution. Thereafter, the explained variance grows with 2% between 
solutions six and seven, eight and nine and ten and eleven. According to these results the 
appropriate number of clusters could be five, seven, nine and eleven. 
                                                 
87 The sample includes residents in the new Länder who have the German citizenship only N = 1003.  
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With regard to PRE (k) the relative improvement decreases between solutions three and 
four, five and six, seven and eight, increases again between eight and nine and falls again 
between eleven and twelve. This would indicate that a 3-cluster solution, a 5-cluster 
solution, a 7-cluster solution, a 9-cluster solution and an 11-cluster solution might be 
appropriate. Finally, the highest F-MAX value could be found at the 2-cluster solution.  
As was the case in the west, these test criteria did not offer a clear and satisfactory basis 
for deciding the number of clusters in the eastern German population. Thus, ETA2 was 
calculated for each of the 17 principal components with the highest explained variance and 
each of the six single items in cluster solutions from five until seven. The six and seven 
cluster solutions proved to have quite high ETA2 values on all latent and manifest 
variables. Only in the case of technology and church attendance a higher value could be 
found in the seven cluster solution. When comparing the six and seven cluster solution it 
turned out that the major difference was the existence of a cluster with only 26 respondents 
in the seven cluster solution whose main characteristic was that they considered religion 
and church/politics and public life an important value in life. A cluster with so few 
respondents and only one dominant characteristic did not seem to be a meaningful 
contribution.88 Thus, the six cluster solution was considered as the appropriate one and 
includes N = 1003 cases. Excluded in this cluster solution are the 68 cases which were lost 
due to the missing casewise deletion in the PCA analyses as well as the 61 cases which 
were not included in the principal components analysis of preferences for newspaper 
contents as these persons answered never to read newspapers. A discussion of possible 
problems which might arise due to the loss of these 61 cases will take place after the 
presentations of the lifestyle groups in Table 7.24. ETA2 on most latent and manifest 
variables included in the five until seven cluster solutions can be found in Table 7.22 and 
the results of the cluster analysis is given in Table 7.23. As in the west, the numbers in the 
Table 7.23 are based on z-scores or factor scores with a mean of zero and standard 
deviation of one.  
                                                 
88 The solution includes N = 874 cases. 
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Table 7.22 Measures of association between important active cluster variables and 
cluster solutions (east) 
Number of clusters:  Eta Squared 
CLU5 
Eta Squared 
CLU6 
Eta Squared 
CLU7 
 Music: Folk music/German pop-music .396 .426 .373 
 Life areas: Work  .297 .363 .412 
Television: Entertainment/Heimatfilme .353 .354 .374 
Leisure activity: Modernity  .334 .330 .301 
Leisure activity: Sports  .122 .326 .285 
Zscore: Leisure activity: Educate 
oneself privately .373 .318 .337 
Life areas: Own family and 
children/neighbourhood  .399 .318 .382 
Newspaper: Sports  .143 .308 .345 
Television: Reports/news  .348 .300 .314 
Newspaper:Reports/news  .348 .295 .306 
Television: Sports .143 .291 .314 
Music: Classical music/jazz  .272 .256 .230 
Zscore: Life areas: Relatives  .238 .214 .248 
Leisure activity: Culture  .208 .188 .217 
Life areas: Religion and church/ 
politics and public life  .169 .184 
.196 
Zscore: Leisure activity: Walk/wander .086 .135 .153 
Zscore: Leisure activity: Short trips  .121 .132 .126 
Television: Movies  .132 .131 .109 
Life areas: Leisure time and 
recreation/friends and acquaintances  .087 .126 .162 
Zscore: Leisure activity: Party games 
in family  .097 .125 .124 
Leisure activity: Technology  .120 .114 .314 
Newspaper: Local news/all over the 
world  .094 .109 .140 
 Zscore: Leisure activity: Church 
attendance and attend religious 
meetings  
.090 .044 .109 
 
 
In order to test the stability of the six cluster solution, several analyses were calculated 
using random samples on the basis of 80% of the cases. When compared to the original 
cluster solution, the six cluster solutions found on the basis of random samples was 
considered acceptable with respect to the similarity the dominant characteristics of a 
cluster and with respect to the size of a cluster. 
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Table 7.23 Final cluster centers of the active variables89 (east) 
Cluster 
1 (N=179) 
20.5% 
2 (N=139) 
15.9% 
3 (N=139) 
15.9% 
4 (N=194) 
22.2% 
5 (N=139) 
15.9% 
6 (N=84) 
9.6% 
Leisure activity: Modernity   -.82645 -.11133 -.33630 .34853 .91971 .31677 
Leisure activity: Culture   -.36115 .25360 -.41286 .63624 -.40275 .30016 
Leisure activity: Sports   -.36517 .98868 -.39388 -.53071 .40292 .60830 
Leisure activity: Technology -.27175 .09887 -.18281 .00684 -.07117 .99244 
Leisure activity: Social engagement -.18502 .28707 -.13782 .31065 -.38389 .13551 
Leisure activity: Social contact .37306 -.02277 -.46964 .11793 -.16040 -.03900 
Leisure activity: Active -.52557 .36176 .27652 .24152 -.06924 -.43863 
eisure activity: Reading -.07074 .33802 -.60791 .37929 -.17277 -.18526 
Zscore: Leisure activity: Educate 
oneself privately -.78177 .56451 -.55870 .45028 .00841 .68256 
Zscore: Leisure activity: Walk and 
wander .52029 .08100 -.49782 .21241 -.37943 -.14632 
Zscore: Leisure activity: Party 
games in family -.29145 .77562 -.19439 .06264 -.07770 -.17251 
Zscore: Leisure activity: Short trips -.43085 .42972 -.38098 .17335 -.12702 .53692 
Zscore: Leisure activity: Church 
attendance and religious meetings .12171 -.05722 -.21569 .22182 -.34775 .11414 
Life areas: Leisure time and 
recreation/friends and acquaintances -.02765 .30363 -.63099 .22360 .29874 -.47587 
Life areas: Work -1.08709 .41551 .06777 .49578 .31322 .12108 
Life areas: Own family and 
children/neighbourhood .23236 .41017 .22323 .22321 -.23842 -1.63856 
Life areas: Religion and 
church/politics and public. Life .15145 .09347 -.48338 .39814 -.67623 .57578 
Zscore: Life areas: Relatives .34255 .25609 -.33876 .27683 -.05944 -1.22123 
Music: Folk music/German pop-
music .96932 .04428 .29126 -.07416 -.95105 -.87051 
Music: Classical music/jazz -.39522 .50331 -.51961 .64074 -.45268 .44986 
Television: Reports/news .04999 .42707 -.61502 .72766 -.70231 .13341 
Television: Entertainment/ 
Heimatfilme/Quiz .94268 .09322 .28590 -.32883 -.59366 -.88160 
Television: Movies -.54448 .22196 -.02789 -.00066 .60044 -.11197 
Television: Sports -.14910 .93741 -.47735 -.54826 .45517 .15148 
Newspaper: Reports/news -.33099 .37667 -.56977 .75071 -.62719 .34652 
Newspaper: Local news/all over the 
world .30103 .17659 -.51581 .23084 .01719 -.57614 
Newspaper: Sports -.26719 .93490 -.53622 -.52316 .41942 .44332 
 
 
The main characteristics of the lifestyle groups have been summarised in Table 7.24. In 
every of the five areas the items have been listed according to their strength, i.e., for 
example, in the first cluster walk/wander has the highest positive value with respect to 
leisure activities and modernity the highest negative value followed by private education. 
Please recall that only values of 0,4 and more or –0,4 or less will be considered meaningful 
for characterising a cluster. Again the clusters have been named on the basis of the most 
dominating characteristics of a cluster.  
                                                 
89  Due to the different scales used in the questionnaire the results in the areas leisure activities and aesthetic 
preferences have been pooled in order to make the interpretation clearer i.e in the area of values a 
negative value = not important, positive value = important; leisure activity a negative value = never, 
positive value = daily; aesthetic preferences a negative value = not at all, positive value = very much.  
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Table 7.24 Lifestyle groups in the Eastern German population90 
20.5% (N =179) 
Traditional, non-
working person 
(TRANWO) 
 
Leisure activities: Preference for: Walk and wander. Distance towards: Modernity; educate oneself privately; 
active and short trips. 
Life areas: Work is not important.  
Music taste: Preference for: Folk music/German pop-music.91 
Television taste: Preference for: Entertainment series/Heimatfilme/Quiz. Distance towards: Movies. 
Newspaper contents: No particular characteristics 
15.9% (N = 139) 
Sports-,work- and 
family-orientated 
person 
(SPWOFA) 
Leisure activities: Preference for: Sports; party games in family; educate oneself privately and short trips.    
Life areas: Occupation and family/neighbourhood are important. 
Music taste: Preference for classical music/jazz.   
Television taste: Preference for: Sports and reports/news.  
Newspaper contents: Preference for: Sports.  
15.9% (N = 139) 
Passive, not- interested 
person 
(PANOIN) 
Leisure activities: Distance towards: Reading; educate oneself privately; walk and wander; social contacts and 
culture. 
Life areas: Leisure time/friends and acquaintances and religion and church/politics and public life are not 
important. 
Music taste: Distance towards: Classical music/jazz.  
Television taste: Distance towards: Reports/news and sports. 
Newspaper contents: Distance towards all three components. 
22.2% (N = 194) 
Cultural-orientated, 
educated person  
(CULEDU)  
Leisure activities: Preference for: Culture and educate oneself privately. Distance towards: Sports. 
Life areas: Work and religion and church/politics and public life are important. 
Music taste: Preference for: Classical music/jazz.  
Television taste: Preference for: Reports/news. Distance towards: Sports. 
Newspaper contents: Distance towards: Sports. 
15.9%  (N = 139) 
Modern, sports-
orientated person 
(MODSPO) 
Leisure activities: Preference for: Modernity and sports.  
Life areas: Religion and church/politics and public life are not important. 
Music taste: Distance towards: Folk music/German pop-music and classical music/jazz.  
Television taste: Preference for: Movies and sports. Distance towards: Reports/news and entertainment 
series/Heimatfilme/Quiz. 
Newspaper contents: Preference for: Sports. Distance towards: Reports/news. 
9.6% (N = 84) 
Technologically 
interested, not network 
orientated person  
(TECNON)   
Leisure activities: Preference for: Technology; educate oneself privately; sports; short trips. Distance towards: 
Active. 
Life areas: Family/neighbourhood, relatives and leisure time and recreation/friends and acquaintances are 
unimportant. Religion and church/politics and public life are important.   
Music taste: Preference for: Classical music/jazz. Distance towards: Folk music/German pop-music. 
Television taste: Distance towards: Entertainment series/Heimatfilme/Quiz.  
Newspaper contents: Preference for: Sports. Distance towards: Local news/all over the world. 
In order to test how the respondents who never read newspapers (61 cases) are distributed 
among the lifestyle groups the following procedure was carried out in the east as well. 
Firstly, a cluster analysis was carried out with all variables listed in Table 7.23 except for 
the newspaper components, but with the standardised filter variable asking about how 
often the respondents reads newspapers (0 = never until 7. seven days a week). Thereafter, 
the old and new six cluster solutions including the missing values were cross-tabulated. 
The results showed that the largest number of people who never read newspapers could be 
found in the “cultural-orientated, educated person” and the “modern, sports-orientated 
person” (altogether 22 cases) and the “traditional, non-working person” (11 cases). The 
rest of the respondents who do not read newspaper were evenly distributed among the 
other lifestyle groups. Although the three groups would have been larger if these 
                                                 
90 The size of the lifestyle group have been calculated on the basis of the number of respondents included in 
the cluster analysis N = 874.  
91 Please recall that the component Folk music/German pop-music included a negative loading on pop- and 
rock music. 
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respondents would have been included, the number is rather small in the east as well and 
there seems to be no systematic bias in the distribution, so that the effect of these missing 
values on the following analyses presented in Chapter 7.2.3 can be expected to have – if 
any at all – only minimum impact of the results. 
7.2.3 The relationship between lifestyle groups, cleavages, organisational 
memberships, interest representation and party preference  
In this chapter the results of the analysis between the lifestyle groups and the external 
variables in the east are presented and discussed. Again, the aim is to analyse to which 
extent social milieus still exist which are based on a relationship between lifestyle groups, 
cleavages, organisational membership, organisational interest representation and party 
preference. As argued in Chapter 6.3 and repeated also in Chapter 7.1.3 only if the cluster 
specific proportion of a variable is significantly different from the whole sample, the 
variable will be considered statistically significant for describing a cluster. In most cases it 
is the above average significant values which are of interest as most hypotheses assume a 
positive relationship between certain variables. However, if results come up which are 
contradictory to the expectations, i.e. either not significant where this would have been 
expected or below average or above average significant where the opposite would have 
been expected this will of course be discussed as well. In order to facilitate the 
interpretation of the results the numbers which proved to be significantly above or below 
average have been marked in bold in the respective tables here as well. 
7.2.3.1 The association between lifestyle groups and cleavages 
 
1) Social structural cleavages 
As was the case in the west, too, certain expectations exist with respect to the social 
structural characteristics of the members of a lifestyle groups. So does the first group, for 
example, obviously consist of rather old people, who no longer work. The members of the 
second group seem on the other hand to be in their middle ages, working and married with 
children. The highly educated people in higher job positions with higher income probably 
represent the fourth group, the “cultural-orientated, educated person”. However, as in the 
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case of West Germany these expectations will be tested empirically. The results can be 
found in Table 7.25. 
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Table 7.25 The association between social structural characteristics and the 
lifestyle groups (east)92 
 TRANWO 
(20.5%) 
SPWOFA 
(15.9%) 
PANOIN 
(15.9%) 
CULEDU 
(22.2%) 
MODSPO 
(15.9%) 
TECNON 
(9.6%) 
TOTAL X
2
 Cramer’sV 
Religious cleavage:          
Denomination:        n.s.  
Catholic 10.2 12.0 20.7 19.6 20.0 32.0 16.7   
Protestant 89.8 88.0 79.3 80.4 80.0 68.0 83.3   
 100% 
N = 88 
100% 
N = 25 
100% 
N = 29 
100% 
N = 46 
100% 
N = 20 
100% 
N = 25 
100% 
N =233 
  
Religious affiliation:        64*** .271 
Yes 53.1 22.6 24.6 28.9 15.8 32.5 30.5   
No 46.9 77.4 75.4 71.1 84.2 67.5 69.5   
 100% 
N = 179 
100% 
N = 137 
100% 
N =138 
100% 
N = 194 
100% 
N = 139 
100% 
N = 83 
100% 
N = 870 
  
Church attendance:         57*** .150 
Once a month or more 9.6 3.6 1.5 11.1 3.0 7.6 6.5   
Several times a year 10.7 2.9 7.7 8.5 0.7 8.9 6.7   
Seldom 29.4 31.4 19.2 19.0 19.4 31.6 24.5   
Never 50.3 62.0 71.5 61.4 76.9 51.9 62.3   
 100% 
N = 177 
100% 
N = 137 
100% 
N = 130 
100% 
N = 189 
100% 
N = 134 
100% 
N = 79 
100% 
N = 846 
  
Occupational 
cleavage/social status: 
         
Occupation:        214*** .250 
Self-employed 0.6 7.3 5.1 5.3 2.3 9.9 4.6   
Upper white-collar 0.6 10.2 1.4 11.1 3.0 13.6 6.2   
Lower white-collar 3.4 19.7 14.5 25.9 23.5 17.3 17.2   
Blue-collar 0.6 25.5 21.0 15.3 34.1 16.0 17.8   
No main occupation 94.9 37.2 58.0 42.3 37.1 43.2 54.3   
 100% 
N = 178 
100% 
N = 137 
100% 
N = 138 
100% 
N = 189 
100% 
N = 132 
100% 
N = 81 
100% 
N = 855 
  
Education:        332*** .437 
No education/primary 
school 
83.8 18.7 47.1 18.3 14.8 14.3 35.6   
Middle school 9.5 55.4 44.9 49.7 74.1 40.5 44.5   
High school level 6.7 25.9 8.0 31.9 11.1 45.2 20.0   
 100% 
N = 179 
100% 
N = 139 
100% 
N =138 
100% 
N = 191 
100% 
N = 135 
100% 
N = 84 
100% 
N = 866 
  
University degree or degree 
in applied sciences: 
       66*** .275 
No/ in education/no answer 95.0 79.9 93.5 73.2 94.2 72.6 85.2   
Yes 5.0 20.1 6.5 26.8 5.8 27.4 14.8   
 100% 
N = 179 
100% 
N = 139 
100% 
N = 139 
100% 
N = 194 
100% 
N = 139 
100% 
N = 84 
100% 
N = 874 
  
Income:        71*** .217 
< or = DM 1999  79.2 42.6 78.2 49.1 70.0 57.7 62.7   
DM 2000 –3999 20.8 53.3 21.8 48.5 28.3 39.4 35.6   
DM 4000 and above (0.0)
 93 4.1 (0.0) 2.3 1.7 2.8 1.7   
 100% 
N = 154 
100% 
N = 122 
100% 
N = 110 
100% 
N = 171 
100% 
N = 120 
100% 
N = 71 
100% 
N = 748 
  
Stadt-Land cleavage:          
Community size:        38*** .147 
Small 35.8 36.7 44.6 28.4 32.4 21.4 33.8   
Medium 44.1 31.7 36.0 33.5 38.8 33.3 36.6   
Large 20.1 31.7 19.4 38.1 28.8 45.2 29.6   
 100% 
N = 179 
100% 
N = 139 
100% 
N = 139 
100% 
N = 194 
100% 
N = 139 
100% 
N = 84 
100% 
N = 874 
  
Gender:        103*** .343 
Male 29.6 61.9 33.8 26.8 57.6 73.8 43.5   
Female 70.4 38.1 66.2 73.2 42.4 26.2 56.5   
 100% 
N =179 
100% 
N = 139 
100% 
N =139 
100% 
N = 194 
100% 
N = 139 
100% 
N = 84 
100% 
N = 874 
  
Age:        436*** .408 
18-29 (0.0) 10.8 3.6 12.4 36.0 40.5 14.6   
30-44 4.5 41.0 33.8 35.6 48.9 33.3 31.7   
45-59 14.0 28.1 36.0 32.5 12.9 19.0 24.1   
60 and above 81.6 20.1 26.6 19.6 2.2 7.1 29.5   
 100% 
N =179 
100% 
N = 139 
100% 
N =139 
100% 
N = 194 
100% 
N = 139 
100% 
N = 84 
100% 
N = 874 
  
          
Family status:         281*** .327 
Married 50.3 71.9 63.3 60.8 43.9 26.2 54.8   
Separated/ Divorced 7.3 10.1 18.0 10.3 12.9 19.0 12.1   
Widowed 39.1 2.9 10.8 9.8 1.4 2.4 12.8   
Single 3.4 15.1 7.9 19.1 41.7 52.4 20.3   
 100% 
N =179 
100% 
N = 139 
100% 
N =139 
100% 
N = 194 
100% 
N = 139 
100% 
N = 84 
100% 
N = 874 
  
                                                 
92 Significance levels: p < .05=*, p < .01=**, p < .001=*** and n.s.= not significant. The percentage 
distribution of the lifestyle groups are not based on the total number of respondents in the analysis, but on 
the total number of respondents in the respective clusters. The 83.8% with no education/primary 
education in the first cluster is, for example, based on the subpopulation with N=179.  
93  No cell counts. 
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In the following the main social structural characteristics of the lifestyle groups are 
presented: 
Traditional, non-working person: The majority of the members of this group are widows age 60 and above 
with no or only primary education, no main occupation and a low level of income. Finally, they live above 
average in medium size communities.  
 
Sports-,work- and family-orientated person: The majority of the members of this group are married  men 
with a middle level of education, no religious affiliation and a middle level of income. The age group 30-44 
are above average represented in this group and so are blue-collar workers.  
 
Passive, not- interested person: Married women age 45-59 with no or only primary education, a low level of 
income who never go to church and live in small communities are above average represented in this group. 
 
Cultural-orientated educated person: Women age 45-59 with a high school degree (or equivalent) and 
university degree or degree in applied sciences who work as upper white-collars or lower white-collars are 
above average represented in this group. Furthermore, about half of the members have a middle level of 
income and an above average proportion live in large cities and go to church more than once a month.  
  
Modern, sports-orientated person: This group is above average represented by single men age 18-44 with a 
middle level of education. The majority has no religious affiliation and never goes to church. Finally, an 
above average number of members of this group work as blue-collar workers.  
 
Technologically interested, not network orientated person: Single men age 18-29 with a high school degree 
(or equivalent) and university degree or degree in applied sciences who live in large cities are above average 
represented in this group. 
 
As can be seen from the summary above, expected relationships between lifestyle groups 
and social structural characteristics exist in the east as well. So is the lifestyle group of the 
“traditional, non-working person” above average represented by older people with no main 
occupation, the “cultural-orientated educated person” is characterised by higher educated 
people working as white-collars and the technologically and modern orientated lifestyle 
groups are above average represented among younger people.  
With regard to the religious cleavage there is no significant difference between Protestants 
and Catholics in the east which could also be expected due to the fact that the east is a 
dominantly Protestant area. Furthermore, in all groups – except the “traditional, non-
working person” - the number of people with no religious affiliation is almost 70% and 
higher. This is very different to the finding in the west where the situation was the 
opposite. This is reflected in church attendance as well. In all groups above 50% of the 
members answer never to go to church, although among the “traditional, non-working 
person” this number is below average. Not easy to explain is the significant number of 
people who go to church more than once a month among the “cultural-orientated educated 
person” combined with the below average number of people with religious affiliation 
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among the members of this group. A possible explanation of this phenomenon could be the 
special situation of the Protestant Church as a meeting place for peace and citizen’s 
movements in the former GDR. Should this be the case, church attendance would in this 
case not be a measurement of religiosity. In the east there is thus no indication of a 
religious cleavage between the lifestyle groups.  
Now, looking at the existence of a possible cleavage between work and capital the results 
in Table 7.25 show that the “sports-, work- and family-orientated person” and the 
“modern, sports-orientated person” have an above average number of blue-collar workers 
and the “cultural-orientated, educated person” has an above average number of upper 
white-collars and lower white-collars. No groups are above average represented among the 
self-employed, although the group of the “technologically interested, not network 
orientated person” and the “sports-, work- and family-orientated person” have close to 
10% self-employed. In contrast to the results found in the west, there are no indications of 
a cleavage between employees and self-employed in the east, although the higher number 
of self-employed and lower number of blue-collars in the west than in the east might 
indicate the existence of a work-capital cleavage when considering the whole of Germany. 
Another obvious difference between the east and west is the high number of members with 
a low income in all lifestyle groups and low number of people with high income. Although 
the “sports-, work- and family-orientated person” and the “cultural-orientated educated 
person” are below average represented among those with low income and above average 
among those with a medium income, the number of people with a high income varies from 
0% to 4.1% in the east compared to 2.5% to 27% in the west. I will get back to the 
discussion of possible east-west cleavages in Chapter 7.3. With regard to education the 
oldest, traditional-orientated group has the highest number of people with no or a low 
education followed by the “passive, not-interested person”. The “cultural-orientated, 
educated person” and the “technologically interested, not network orientated person” have 
the highest number of people with higher education and university degree whereas the 
“sports-, work- and family-orientated person” and the “modern, sports-orientated person” 
have an above average number of people with a medium level of education. Certain 
differences thus exist with respect to social status in the east as well, but these are not as 
easy to interpret as in the west. For example, about 70% of the members of the highly 
educated “cultural-orientated, educated person” are between 30-59 years. Still 42.3% of 
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the members have no main occupation. This may be related to the special situation which 
arose after unification where many highly educated lost their jobs due to close connections 
with the SED regime and/or because skills demanded and thus emphasised in the 
educational system of the GDR were not required anymore in reunified Germany. Finally, 
both highly educated lifestyle groups are above average represented in larger cities which 
was the case in the west as well, whereas the passive orientated lifestyle group is above 
average represented in small cities. The difference between the lifestyle groups are too 
small, though, to argue that a Stadt-Land cleavage might exist. Significant differences exist 
with respect to the social structural characteristics gender, age and family status as well. 
Whereas the modern and technologically orientated lifestyles are above average 
represented by younger at partly middle-aged, single men, the traditional orientated 
lifestyle is, not surprisingly, dominated by widows age 60 and above. Both the “sports-, 
work-, and family-orientated” and the “modern, sports-orientated person” are dominated 
by men age 30-44, but 70% of the members of the first group are married, the members of 
the second group are above average single. Finally, the passive group is dominated by 
middle-aged, married women. 
2) Ideological cleavages 
With regard to the value cleavage which is measured by the items post-materialism, 
“worries about the environment” and “voting as a duty” the group with the highest number 
of post-materialists is the “technologically interested, not network orientated person” 
whereas the “traditional, non-working person” is below average represented among the 
post-materialists (cf. Table 7.26). Not surprisingly this group has the highest number of 
materialists, closely followed by the “passive, not interested person” whereas the “cultural-
orientated, educated person” and the “modern, sports-orientated person” are below average 
represented in this category. As was the case in the west, though, in all lifestyle groups 
over 50% of the members belong to the mixed value types. Looking at the next item - 
“worries about the environment” - the “traditional, non–working person” has a below 
average number of people with big worries and above average number of people with no 
worries. This might have been expected due to the materialist value orientation of this 
group. Although the group of the “technologically interested, not network orientated 
person” has an above average number of people with post-materialist value orientation, 
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this group does not differ significantly with regard to worries about the environment. The 
only group which expresses a significant concern in this field is the “cultural-orientated, 
educated person”. Over 50% of the members of this group have big worries about the 
environment and only 2.1% none. Finally, an above average number of the traditional and 
educated group consider voting to be a duty and a below average number of the “sports-, 
work- and family-orientated person” and the “modern, sports-orientated person” consider 
voting to be a duty. Altogether, though, the level the level of people who agree to the 
statement that voting is a duty was lower in the east than the west (cf. Table 7.11).  
Turning to the items which are assumed to indicate cleavages related to the modernisation 
process "worries about unemployment “ and “social differences are fair” the following 
results can be found. With regard to unemployment over 80% of all lifestyle groups have 
big worries. Although the highest number can be found among the “sports-, work- and 
family-orientated person” and the “cultural-orientated, educated person” there thus seems 
to be a consensus among all groups that unemployment is a problem. Concerning the 
question whether social differences are fair this variable was not significant in 
distinguishing between lifestyle groups in the east either. In all groups over 85% do not 
agree to the statement that social differences are fair. Although the number of people not 
agreeing to this statement was high in the west, too, the level was lower than in the east 
with respect to this item as well.  
With regard to the “worries about immigrants”, the only group which has above average 
worries in this area is the “sports-, work- and family-orientated person” whereas the 
“cultural-orientated, educated person” and “technologically interested, not network 
orientated person” worry below average. The reason for the big worries in the first group 
might be the worry that more immigrants might make the situation at the job market even 
tighter. Although the “cultural-orientated, educated person” has a below average number 
of people with big worries about immigrants almost 50% have some worries. As argued 
previously, this might be related to the fact that although the members of this group are 
highly educated many lost or were in danger of loosing their job after reunification as 
academic qualifications achieved during the SED regime was not demanded anymore. 
Furthermore, almost ¼ of the “technologically interested, not network orientated person” 
do not worry about immigrants. This is probably related to the young age and high 
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educational level of the members of this group. As over 40% of the members of this group 
have no main occupation and are between 18-29 it might also be assumed that parts of the 
members of this group are still in education and are thus not yet confronted with the job 
market and its problems.  
Both items which are supposed to measure the existence of a regional cleavage between 
the east and west, “worries about the costs of reunification” and “socialism is a good idea”, 
do not distinguish between the lifestyle groups in the east. Most people have some or no 
worries about the economic consequences of the reunification and almost 70% and more of 
the members of the lifestyle group think that “socialism was a good idea which was carried 
out badly”. These results obviously differ significantly to those found in the west and will 
be discussed in further detail in Chapter 7.3. Finally, over 70% of the members in all 
lifestyle groups place themselves in the middle of the left-right scale and only the passive 
lifestyle group is above average represented in the middle and below average represented 
at the left whereas the members of the cultural and educated lifestyle group place 
themselves above average to the left and below average in the middle. Compared to the 
results in the west the level of left placement is higher in the east than the west and the 
level of right placement is higher in the west than in the east.   
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Table 7.26 The association between ideological cleavages and lifestyle groups (east)94 
 TRANWO 
(20.5%) 
SPWOFA 
(15.9%) 
PANOIN 
(15.9%) 
CULEDU 
(22.2%) 
MODSPO 
(15.9%) 
TECNON 
(9.6%) 
TOTAL X
2
 Cramer’sV 
Values:          
Post-materialist index: N = 179 N = 136 N = 136 N = 186 N = 139 N = 83 N = 859 53*** .176 
Post-materialists 5.6 10.3 8.8 14.5 13.7 26.5 12.1   
Materialists 38.5 27.9 36.0 16.7 19.4 20.5 26.9   
Mixed 55.9 61.8 55.1 68.8 66.9 53.0 61.0   
Worries about 
environment: 
N =178  N = 138 N = 138 N = 194 N = 139 N = 84 N = 871 42*** .155 
Big 27.0 43.5 31.9 52.6 36.7 39.3 38.8   
Some 60.1 52.2 58.0 45.4 53.2 54.8 53.6   
None 12.9 4.3 10.1 2.1 10.1 6.0 7.6   
Voting as duty: N = 174 N = 138 N = 130 N = 193 N = 131 N = 82 N = 848 25*** .171 
Agree 78.2 62.3 67.7 80.8 61.8 69.5 71.2   
Do not agree 21.8 37.7 32.3 19.2 38.2 30.5 28.8   
Modernisation:          
Worries about 
unemployment:  
N = 178 N = 137 N = 138 N = 194 N = 139 N = 84 N =870  25** .119 
Big 87.6 96.4 95.7 95.9 94.2 84.5 92.9   
Some 11.2 3.6 3.6 3.6 5.8 14.3 6.6   
None 1.1 (0.0)95 0.7 0.5 (0.0) 1.2 0.6   
Social differences fair: N = 174 N = 139 N = 130 N = 191 N = 136 N = 83 N = 853 n.s.  
Agree 8.0 10.1 7.7 11.5 8.1 14.5 9.7   
Do not agree 92.0 89.9 92.3 88.5 91.9 85.5 90.3   
Globalisation:          
Worries about number of 
immigrants: 
N = 178 N = 137 N = 138 N = 194 N = 139 N = 84 N = 870 33*** .137 
Big 50.0 56.9 54.3 39.2 49.6 32.1 47.6   
Some  38.8 35.0 30.4 46.9 42.4 44.0 39.8   
None 11.2 8.0 15.2 13.9 7.9 23.8 12.6   
West-East:          
Worries about costs of 
German unification:  
N = 178 N = 137 N = 138 N = 194 N = 139 N = 84 N =870  n.s.  
Big 18.0 25.5 19.6 16.0 21.6 17.9 19.5   
Some 43.8 43.8 39.9 50.5 43.2 42.9 44.5   
None 38.2 30.7 40.6 33.5 35.3 39.3 36.0   
Socialism good idea:  N = 160 N = 135 N = 117 N = 189 N = 131 N = 78 N = 810 n.s.  
Agree 80.0 70.4 82.9 74.6 75.6 67.9 75.7   
Do not agree 20.0 29.6 17.1 25.4 24.4 32.1 24.3   
Left-right placement: N = 173 N = 138 N = 133 N = 187 N = 138 N = 79 N = 848 27**  
Left 17.3 24.6 12.8 31.6 17.4 22.8 21.5   
Middle 77.5 72.5 84.2 65.2 74.6 72.2 74.1   
Right 5.2 2.9 3.0 3.2 8.0 5.1 4.5   
 
3) The association between lifestyle group, organisational membership and 
organisational interest representation 
As cleavages become manifest if they are perceived by social groups and if they are 
represented by organisations and parties analyses of the association between organisational 
memberships and lifestyle groups were carried out for the east as well. The results of the 
organisational membership structure of the lifestyle groups is given in Table 7.27 and the 
interest representation by organisations and parties follow in Table 7.28. 
                                                 
94 Variables with 20% or more cells with counts lower than 5 were not included in the table. Significance 
levels: p < .05=*, p < .01=**, p < .001=*** and n.s.= not significant. The percentage distribution of the 
lifestyle groups are not based on the total number of respondents in the analysis, but on the total number 
of respondents in the respective clusters. The 5.6% post-materialists in the first cluster is, for example, 
based on the subpopulation with N=179.  
95  No cell counts. 
Social Milieus in Germany – an Empirical Analysis 
 
191
 
Table 7.27 The association between organisational membership and lifestyle groups 
(east)96 
 TRANWO 
(20.5%) 
SPWOFA 
(15.9%) 
PANOIN 
(15.9%) 
CULEDU 
(22.2%) 
MODSPO 
(15.9%) 
TECNON 
(9.6%) 
TOTAL X
2
 Cramer’sV 
Membership in 
organisations: 
N = 179 N = 139 N = 139 N = 194 N = 139 N = 84 N = 874   
DGB  1.1 23.7 9.4 16.0 15.8 7.1 12.2 45*** .227 
Sports club  2.2 20.9 4.3 11.3 17.3 17.9 11.4 42*** .220 
Other hobby organisations 2.2 10.1 1.4 5.7 2.2 1.2 4.0 22*** .157 
Choral society 0.6 5.0 (0.0)97 2.1 0.7 2.4 1.7 14* .127 
Other organisations 4.5 7.2 2.9 8.8 5.0 2.4 5.5 n.s  
Past memberships in 
organisations: 
N = 179 N = 139 N = 139 N = 194 N = 139 N = 84 N = 874   
Sports club 7.8 25.2 7.2 15.5 23.0 25.0 16.2 35*** .201 
Youth, student 
organisations 
8.4 25.2 22.3 26.8 34.5 21.4 22.8 34*** .198 
Choral society 4.5 2.2 2.2 5.2 4.3 3.6 3.8 n.s.  
Political party 6.7 6.5 5.8 7.7 5.8 1.2 6.1 n.s.  
Other organizations 7.8 4.3 6.5 5.7 4.3 6.0 5.8 n.s.  
 
In the east the problem with the low number of people who are members in any 
organisation at all is even more visible than in the west. Except for trade union, all other 
occupational organisations had about 50% cells with counts less than five and with regard 
to memberships – both past and present – in other organisations the picture is not much 
better. Nevertheless, looking at the present memberships the “sports-, work- and family-
orientated person” is significantly above average represented among trade union members 
and the “traditional, non-working person” below average. Actually almost ¼ of the 
members of the first group are DGB members. Also with regard to membership in sports 
clubs and other hobby organisations the “sports-, work- and family-orientated person” is 
the only group which is above average represented whereas both the traditional group and 
passive group are below average represented among the sports clubs and the passive group 
with regard to other hobby organisations as well. Furthermore, the traditional and passive 
group are below average members in choral societies and although the “sports-, work- and 
family-orientated person” has the highest number of members here as well this number is 
not significant when taking cluster size into account.  
                                                 
96 Variables with 20% or more cells with counts lower than 5 were not included in the table. Significance 
levels: p < .05=*, p < .01=**, p < .001=*** and n.s. = not significant. The percentage distribution of the 
lifestyle groups are not based on the total number of respondents in the analysis, but on the total number 
of respondents in the respective clusters. The 1.1% DGB members in the first cluster is, for example, 
based on the subpopulation with N=179.  
97  No cell counts. 
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With regard to past memberships the “sports-, work- and family-orientated person” is 
above average represented here as well and the traditional and passive groups below 
average. Interesting is the high level of past memberships in youth, student organisations 
in the east which is more than 20% in all groups except for the “traditional, non-working” 
one where a below average number of members can be found and the “cultural-orientated, 
educated person” where the highest number of former members can be found (34.5%). In 
the west the number of members in this category is much lower. The reason for this high 
number of former memberships in youth, student organisations in the east can probably be 
traced back to memberships in the Freie Deutsche Jugend (FDJ). The FDJ was the socialist 
youth organisation of the GDR and became over the years more or less the youth 
organisation of the SED. In 1981 the FDJ had 2.3 million members i.e. 77.2% of the 
population between 14 and 25 years. With the reunification in 1990 the organisation lost 
its political influence and in 1992 the organisation had only 850 members (cf. Chronik der 
Wende:2002, see also van Deth 2001:211).  
In summary, the results – and lack of results due to the low number of people who are 
members in organisations in the east - indicate that organisations do not play a major role 
in the east. This can probably be traced back to the strong state control which restricted the 
establishment of free organisational structures. To which extent organisations have 
managed to develop links after the reunification or maintain links to particular social 
groups throughout the SED-regime will be analysed in the following. Table 7.28 includes 
the association between the lifestyle groups and interest representation, both by 
organisations and by parties. As argued previously the fact that parties have been included 
here as well does not have any impact on the analysis of the impact between lifestyle 
groups and party preference as all analyses are single bivariate measurements. Thus, if a 
lifestyle group has both an interest representation by a particular party and the members of 
this group above average vote for this party, this might be seen as an indication of a stable 
relationship between a lifestyle group and a political party. The relationship between 
lifestyle groups and parties follow in Chapter 7.2.3.2. 
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Table 7.28 The association between interest representation and lifestyle groups (east)98 
 TRANWO 
(20.5%) 
SPWOFA 
(15.9%) 
PANOIN 
(15.9%) 
CULEDU 
(22.2%) 
MODSPO 
(15.9%) 
TECNON 
(9.6%) 
TOTAL X
2
 Cramer’sV 
Interest representation: N = 179 N = 139 N = 139 N = 194 N = 139 N = 84 N = 874   
Trade Union 15.6 43.2 33.1 43.8 41.0 26.2 34.1 46*** .229 
Bündnis90/Grüne 7.8 7.9 2.9 13.9 7.9 27.4 10.3 41*** .215 
Environmental 
Organisations 
28.5 27.3 19.4 36.1 17.3 44.0 28.3 30*** .185 
Protestant Church 15.1 7.9 4.3 13.9 0.7 10.7 9.3 29*** .182 
PDS 11.2 16.5 9.4 23.2 14.4 11.9 15.0 17** .138 
CDU 15.6 7.9 5.8 13.9 6.5 13.1 10.8 14* .128 
Catholic Church 5.6 2.2 2.2 5.2 1.4 6.0 3.8 n.s.  
SPD  31.8 34.5 23.7 26.8 24.5 27.4 28.3 n.s.  
 
Both the “sports-, work- and family-orientated person” and the “cultural-orientated, 
educated person” consider the trade union to represent their interests above average (above 
40 %) whereas the “traditional, non-working” group consider the trade union to represent 
its interest below average. The number is quite high among the  “modern, sports-orientated 
person as well, but this number was not significant when taking cluster size into account. 
Although the highest number of people who consider the SPD to represent their interests 
can be found among the “sports-, work- and family-orientated person” as well the level of 
interest representation by the SPD is so similar among all lifestyle groups that the variable 
is not significant in distinguishing between the lifestyle groups.  
Furthermore, the “technologically interested, not network orientated person” has the 
highest number of people who see their interests represented by Bündnis90/die Grünen, 
whereas the “passive, not-interested” group has the lowest number in this category. 
Looking at the interest representation by environmental organisations the  “technologically 
interested, not network orientated person” has the highest number here as well (44%) 
followed by the “cultural-orientated, educated person” (36.1%). The traditional group and 
the “modern, sports-orientated group” are below average represented in this category. 
Looking at the interest representation by the churches the “traditional, non-working” group 
feel above average represented by the Protestant Church and the passive and modern, 
sports-orientated groups below average. The Catholic Church is very low in all groups and 
                                                 
98 Variables with 20% or more cells with counts lower than 5 were not included in the table. Significance 
levels: p < .05=*, p < .01=**, p < .001=*** and n.s. = not significant. The percentage distribution of the 
lifestyle groups are not based on the total number of respondents in the analysis, but on the total number 
of respondents in the respective clusters. The 15.6% who consider the trade unions to represent their 
interests is in the first cluster, for example, based on the subpopulation with N=179. 
Social Milieus in Germany – an Empirical Analysis 
 
194
does not distinguish between the lifestyle groups. Again this could have been expected 
considering the Protestant dominance in the east. Although the highest number of people 
who consider the CDU to represent their interests can be found among the “traditional, 
non-working” group, this number is not significantly above average when taking cluster 
size into account. The passive and modern, sports-orientated groups see their interests 
below average represented by the CDU, though. Finally, almost ¼ of the members of the 
“cultural-orientated, educated person” consider the PDS to represent their interests. This 
might be traced back to both the above average left-placement of the members of this 
group and the above average number of members with past memberships in youth, student 
organisations (cf. Table 7.24 and Table 7.27). 
7.2.3.2 The association between lifestyle groups and party preference 
Finally, the last criteria which has to be fulfilled in order to define a lifestyle group as a 
social milieu, the association between lifestyle groups and party preference will be 
analysed. As can be seen from Table 7.29 the highest support for the CDU/CSU can be 
found among the traditional group, although this number is (only nearly) not significant 
when taking cluster size into account. This would coincide with the traditional value 
orientation and interest representation by the Protestant Church and the CDU, even though 
in the case of the latter the level was not significant either (see Table 7.28). The “sports-, 
work- and family-orientated person” is below average represented here which coincides 
with the DGB membership and interest representation by the trade union, although no 
above average support for the SPD can be found in this group. Nevertheless, over 50% had 
a preference for the SPD. The highest support for the SPD, although not significantly 
above average, can be found in the passive group and a below average SPD support among 
the “cultural-orientated, educated person” even though the number is over 40%. As this 
latter group considers the trade union to represent their interest above average a support for 
the SPD would have been expected as well. However, the high support for the PDS in this 
lifestyle group indicated that the PDS obviously catches parts of the left-orientated 
members in this group. Looking at the support for Bündnis90/die Grünen the 
“technologically interested, not network orientated person” is significantly above average 
represented here and receives altogether 18.9% of the votes from this group. This 
coincides with the interest representation by Bündnis90/die Grünen and environmental 
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organisations presented in Table 7.28. The traditional and passive groups are - on the other 
hand - below average represented here. With regard to the passive group this is also 
reflected in the below average representation by Bündnis90/die Grünen and environmental 
organisations. Finally, the PDS is – as could have been expected – significantly above 
average represented among the “cultural-orientated, educated person” which coincides 
with the high level of interest representation by the members of this group. Now, looking 
at the inclination not to vote, the passive group is above average represented in this 
category. Over 20% of the members of this group intend not to vote. The second highest 
number can be found among the “modern, sports-orientated person”, although this number 
is not significant taking the cluster size into account. The “sports-, work- and family-
orientated person” and the “cultural-orientated, educated person” are below average 
represented among the non-voters. To which extent the tendency not to vote may also be 
connected to political interest and democratic satisfaction is analysed in Table 7.30.  
Table 7.29 The association between party preference and lifestyle groups (east)99 
 TRANWO 
(20.5%) 
SPWOFA 
(15.9%) 
PANOIN 
(15.9%) 
CULEDU 
(22.2%) 
MODSPO 
(15.9%) 
TECNON TOTAL X
2
 Cramer’sV 
Vote next election: N = 124 N = 101 N = 66 N = 126 N = 82 N = 53 N = 552 87*** .199 
CDU/CSU 26.6 11.9 15.2 20.6 17.1 17.0 18.8   
SPD 58.9 56.4 62.1 40.5 43.9 39.6 50.5   
Bündnis90/die Grünen 1.6 7.9 (0.0)100 7.9 4.9 18.9 6.2   
PDS 10.5 22.8 19.7 25.4 14.6 9.4 17.8   
Other parties 2.4 1.0 3.0 5.6 19.5 15.1 6.7   
 N = 131 N = 104 N = 85 N = 130 N = 93 N = 57 N = 600 35*** .241 
Would not vote 5.3 2.9 22.4 3.1 11.8 7.0 8.0   
 
As can be seen form the table the “sports-, work- and family-orientated person” and the 
“cultural-orientated, educated person” are above average represented among those with a 
strong political interests and below average among those with a weak interest. Among the 
“traditional, non-working person”, the passive, not-interested person” and the “modern, 
                                                 
99 Significance levels: p < .05=*, p < .01=** and p < .001=***. The percentage distribution of the lifestyle 
groups are not based on the total number of respondents in the analysis, but on the total number of 
respondents in the respective clusters. The 10.5% PDS voters in the first cluster is, for example, based on 
the subpopulation with N=124. FDP and Republikaner were included in the category “other parties” as 
well as analyses showed that the number of cells with counts less than five increased dramatically if one 
and/or both parties were included separately. 
100  No cell counts. 
Social Milieus in Germany – an Empirical Analysis 
 
196
sports-orientated person” the situation is the opposite. Here the strong political interest is 
below average and a weak political interest above average in all groups. In the passive 
group the number of people with weak political interest is the highest with over 50%. As 
this is also the group with the lowest level of democratic satisfaction it might be assumed 
that the tendency not to vote might be linked to the low political interest and low level of 
democratic satisfaction.    
Table 7.30 The association between political interest, democratic satisfaction and 
lifestyle groups (east)101 
 TRANWO 
(20.5%) 
SPWOFA 
(15.9%) 
PANOIN 
(15.9%) 
CULEDU 
(22.2%) 
MODSPO 
(15.9%) 
TECNON 
(9.6%) 
TOTAL X
2
 Cramer’sV 
Political interest: N = 179 N = 139 N = 139 N = 192 N = 137 N = 84 N = 870 179*** .320 
Strong 17.3 38.1 9.4 46.4 13.1 36.9 27.0   
Medium 35.8 54.0 40.3 46.4 46.7 44.0 44.3   
Weak 46.9 7.9 50.4 7.3 40.1 19.0 28.7   
Democratic satisfaction: N =175 N = 139 N = 131 N = 192 N = 138 N = 82 N = 857 14** .127 
Satisfied 55.4 61.2 42.7 58.3 48.6 59.8 54.4   
Not satisfied 44.6 38.8 57.3 41.7 51.4 40.2 45.6   
 
7.2.4 Summary – the formation of social milieus in the east 
The analyses presented in Chapter 7.2.3 showed that differences exist between the lifestyle 
groups with regard to cleavages, organisational memberships, interest representations and 
party preferences. In this chapter, I will summarise the main characteristics of each 
lifestyle group in the above mentioned areas and discuss to which extent each lifestyle 
group fulfils the criteria of being defined as a milieu: 
Traditional, non-working person: Cleavages: This group is above average represented by older widows with 
a low social status who live in medium sized cities. With regard to the ideological cleavages, this lifestyle 
group is characterised by an above average proportion of materialists and below average number of post-
materialists. Furthermore, a below average number has big worries about the environment and an above 
average has no worries. The majority agrees to the statement that “voting is a duty” and although the 
majority has big worries about unemployment the proportion is below average when compared to the other 
groups. Nevertheless, an above average has some worries about unemployment. Organisational 
membership: They are below average members in most organisations – both past and present. Interest 
representation: Members of this group feel above average represented by the Protestant Church and below 
average represented by the trade union. Party preference: Members of this group have the highest preference 
for the CDU/CSU (although this number is not significantly above average) and a below average preference 
for Bündnis 90/die Grünen, PDS and other parties. Finally, the members of this group are above average 
represented among those with weak political interest. Social milieu: The characteristics indicate that this 
                                                 
101 Significance levels: p < .05=*, p < .01=** and p < .001=***. 
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could be a traditional, conservative milieu. However, even though, this group has the highest number 
of people who have an interest representation for the churches and the CDU and party preference for 
the CDU/CSU, the number of people who consider the trade union and the SPD to represent their 
interests and number of people who have a preference for the SPD is much higher. Hence, this lifestyle 
group does not fulfill the criteria of being defined a social milieu.  
Sports-,work- and family-orientated person: Cleavages: The members of this group are above average 
represented by non-religious, middle-aged, married men with a medium social status. A below average 
number of this group consider voting a duty. Furthermore, an above average number have big worries about 
the number of immigrants and about unemployment whereas a below average number has no worries. 
Organisational membership: Members of this lifestyle group are above average members in DGB, sports 
clubs and other hobby organisations and were also above average former members in sports clubs. Interest 
representation: The trade union is considered to represent the interests of the members of this group and the 
number of people who consider the SPD to represent their interest is also the highest in this group, although 
this variable is not significant. Party preference: Although the majority of the members of this group have a 
party preference for the SPD (56.4%) this is not significantly stronger than in the other groups. However, the 
members of this group have a below average preference for the CDU/CSU, FDP and other parties. Finally, 
this group has the lowest number of persons who would not vote and the majority of its members have a 
strong or medium level of political interest. Social milieu: This is a work-orientated lifestyle group with 
an above average number of blue-collar workers with a medium level of income, high worries about 
unemployment, trade union membership and interest representation by the trade union. All this may 
indicate the existence of a worker’s milieu although no significantly higher preference for the SPD 
exists among the members of this group compared to the other groups.  
Passive, not-interested person: Cleavages: Non-religious, middle-aged, married women who live in small 
cities and have a low social status are above average represented in this group. The members of this group 
have an above average number of materialists. Furthermore, the group is below average represented among 
those with only some worries about the number of immigrants. The majority places themselves in the middle 
of the left-right scale and a below average number to the right. Organisational membership: The members of 
this group are below average represented in almost all organisations, both past present Interest 
representation: Furthermore, they do not feel above average represented by any organisation, but below 
average represented by Bündnis90/die Grünen, environmental organisations, Protestant Church, PDS and 
CDU. Party preference: This group has a below average preference for the Bündnis90/die Grünen and the 
highest support for the SPD, although this number is not significant. This group has the highest number of 
non-voters, too. Finally, the majority of the members of this group have only weak political interest and they 
are below average satisfied with democracy. Social milieu: This group as well has too few characteristics 
to make any indications about a social milieu. Interesting with this group, however, is the above 
average level of materialists and above average level of some worries about immigrants. Furthermore, 
this is the only group which does not feel represented by any organisation and the only group except 
the “traditional, non-working person” who involves below average in organisations. Finally, the 
members of this group are above average represented among non-voters, among people with a weak 
political interest, and among people dissatisfied with democracy. All these characteristics – together 
with the lifestyle characteristics (cf. Table 7.24) - may indicate that this is a “passive, dissatisfied 
milieu”, comparable to the “no value-orientated, rather passive person” found in the west although 
this “milieu”, too, does not really fulfil the criteria of a social milieu either as it is characterised by a 
lack of memberships, interest representations and party preference rather than the existence of a 
relationship between these variables.   
Cultural-orientated educated person: Cleavages: With regard to social structure this group is above average 
represented by middle-aged women with a medium/high social status who live in large cities and go to 
church once a month. This lifestyle group has a below average number of materialists and above average 
number of mixed types. The majority has big worries about the environment and a below average proportion 
of people has some or no worries. With respect to worries about the number of immigrants almost half of the 
members have some worries and a below average number has big worries. Again, unemployment is the area 
where most worries exist, although the level of worries is high in all East German lifestyle groups. 
Furthermore, most members of this group consider voting a duty and place themselves above average on the 
left of the left-right scale and below average in the middle. Organisational membership: The members of this 
group are not characterised by any particular organisational structure, neither past nor present. Interest 
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representation: Trade union, environmental organisation, PDS represent the interests of the members of this 
group above average. Party preference: They have a preference above average for the PDS and below 
average for the SPD and are below average inclined not to vote. Finally, almost half of the members of this 
group have a strong political interest. Social milieu: Although the members of this group have big 
worries about the environment and consider environmental organisations to represent their interests, 
this does not go to the benefit of Bündnis 90/die Grünen. Similarly, the SPD does not profit from the 
above average interest representation by the trade unions and left placement of the members; the 
preference for the SPD is even below average in this group. Although not significant above average 
this group has the second highest number of people who were former members in youth, student 
organisations and has the highest number of former members in political parties. Furthermore, this is 
the only group which has an above average interest representation by the PDS and party preference 
for the PDS, the PDS seems to win voters in the east located at the left spectrum. Considering the fact 
that the members of this group also belong above average to the highly educated and the advanced age 
groups, this attachment to the PDS may be a result of their status during the SED regime (cf. Chapter 
4.1.2). However, the characteristics of this group are not completely homogenous and possible to 
explain from the theoretical point of view. Obviously, the cultural, educated lifestyle embeds different 
kinds of groups. So does, for example, this group – as the only group of all - also have an above 
average number of people who go to church more than once a month. This indicates that this may also 
be a group of “bourgeois-humanists” (cf. Chapter 5.2.2) although this cannot be proved empirically. 
Nevertheless, it may be correct to consider this at least partly a left-orientated milieu. 
Modern, sports-orientated person: Cleavages: Non-religious, young to middle-aged, single men with a 
low/medium social status are above average represented in this group. With regard to ideological cleavages  
this group is characterised by a below average number of materialists and a below average number agreeing 
to the statement that voting is a duty. Furthermore, a below average number of people of this group has no 
worries about immigrants and no worries about unemployment. Organisational membership: This group has 
the highest number of people with past members in youth, student organisations. Interest representation: 
Environmental organisations, the Protestant Church and the CDU represent the interest of the members of 
this group below average. Party preference: An above average number have a preference for “other” parties. 
Separate analyses showed that the number of people intending to vote for the Republikaner was the highest 
in this group.102 Finally, an above average number of this group has a weak political interest and a below 
average number has a strong one. Social milieu: The characteristics of this group are to weak to make 
any indications with respect to a milieu. However, the rather passive lifestyle, the domination of single 
men age 18-44 working above average as blue-collar workers with worries about immigrants and 
unemployment and -although not significant - high number of people who place themselves to the 
right and have a preference for the Republikaner and not to vote -may indicate that this is a group 
embeds dissatisfied protest voters or right-wing minded people. 
 
Technologically interested, not network orientated person: Cleavages: With regard to social structural 
characteristics this group is above average represented by young, single men who live in large cities and 
have a rather high social status. This group has the highest level of post-materialists. Furthermore, this group 
has the highest number of people with no worries about the number of immigrants and a below average 
number of people with big worries. With respect to unemployment the members of this group have a below 
average number with big worries and an above average number with some worries. Organisational 
membership: The members of this group are not characterised by any organisational preferences, but are 
below average members in hobby organisations. Interest representation: Bündnis90/die Grünen and 
environmental organisations are considered to represent the interests of this lifestyle group above average. 
Party preference: An above average prefer Bündnis90/die Grünen and a below average the PDS. Finally, 
this group is characterised by a below average number of people with weak political interest.  Social milieu: 
Although this group is missing the relationship to membership in alternative political groups, parallels 
may be found to the west German Green milieu; this group, too has an above average post-materialist 
value orientation, feel represented by Bündnis 90/die Grünen and environmental organisations and 
have an above average party preference for Bündnis 90/ die Grünen.  
 
                                                 
102 To avoid a high number of cells with no counts, the vote intention for the Republikaner was included into 
“other parties” in the final analysis.  
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To facilitate a comparison between the lifestyle groups and the respective variables some 
of the results presented above – which are particularly important in analysing the existence 
of social milieus in the east German population - have been summarised in Figure 7.3. 
Again, the figure should be read vertically, for example, the lifestyle group of the 
“traditional, non-working person” (TRANWO) is characterised by older widows with a 
low social status who live in medium size cities. The members of this group have 
materialist value orientations, have no worries about the environment, consider voting a 
duty and have no worries about unemployment. Furthermore, the members of this group 
are not above average members in organisations, neither present nor past and consider the 
Protestant Church to represent their interests. In summary, this lifestyle group does not 
fulfil the criteria of being defined as a milieu as clear links are missing both with regard to 
organisations and party preference. 
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Figure 7.3 Social milieus in the East German population 
Lifestyle 
Groups    ⇒ 
Criteria 
     ⇓ 
TRANWO 
(20.5%) 
SPWOFA 
(15.9%) 
PANOIN (15.9%) CULEDU 
(22.2%) 
MODSPO 
(15.9%) 
TECNON (9.6%)
Cleavages:       
Social structure Low social status, 
older widows, 
medium size 
cities 
Non-religious, 
medium social 
status, middle-
aged, married 
men 
Low church 
attendance, low 
social status, 
married, middle-
aged women, 
small cities 
High church 
attendance, 
medium/high 
social status, 
middle-aged 
women, large 
cities  
Non-religious, 
low/medium 
social status, 
young to middle-
aged, single men 
Young, single 
men, 
medium/high 
social status, 
large cities 
Post-mat index -post-materialist 
+ materialist 
 
 + materialist - materialist 
+ mixed 
- materialist + post-materialist
 
Worries about 
environment 
- big 
+ none 
 
  + big 
- some 
-none 
  
Voting as duty + agree - agree  + agree - agree  
Worries about 
unemployment 
- big 
+ some 
+ big 
- none 
 + big 
- some 
- none - big 
+some 
Worries about 
number of 
immigrants 
 + big 
-none 
- some - big 
+ some 
- none - big 
+ none 
Left-right placement   - left 
+ middle 
+ left 
- middle 
  
Present 
Organisational 
Memberships 
 DGB; sports club; 
other hobby 
organisations 
    
Past Organisational 
Memberships 
 Sports club   Youth, student 
organisations 
 
Interest 
representation 
Protestant  
Church 
Trade union   Trade union; 
environmental 
organisations; 
PDS 
 Bündnis 90/die 
Grünen; 
environmental 
organisations 
Party preference   No-vote PDS Other party Bündnis 90/die 
Grünen 
Political interest Weak Strong and 
medium 
Weak Strong Weak - Weak 
Democratic 
satisfaction 
  - Satisfied    
 
The formation of social milieus 
Social milieu  (Worker’s 
milieu) 
Passive, 
dissatisfied 
milieu  
(Partly, left-
orientated 
milieu) 
 Green milieu 
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In the east no milieu could be found which prove a clear relationship between the analysed 
variables, although a Green milieu fulfilled almost all criteria except that it missed the 
organisational membership in alternative political groups. As the development of new 
social movements like those which emerged in western democracies were impossible in 
the former GDR (cf. Schmitt-Beck/Weins 1997:324) this lack of organisational 
infrastructure is not very surprising. The existence of such a Green milieu in the east is 
rather surprising, though, and may be a statistical artefact, in particular since it is based on 
such a small number of cases. Nevertheless, as both the lifestyle and social structural 
characteristics of this group is quite similar to the Green milieu found in the west, its 
existence seems quite plausible and will thus be considered a milieu here. Furthermore, 
indications of three other milieus - “worker’s milieu”, “passive-dissatisfied milieu” and 
“left-orientated milieu” – could be found, although the latter obviously includes different 
kinds of left-orientated groups and can thus only partly be considered a social milieu. A 
religious milieu could not be found as was stated above, although the group of the 
“traditional non-working” consider the Protestant Church to represent their interests and 
vote above average for the CDU/CSU. The “worker’s milieu” may develop from the 
sports, work and family-orientated lifestyle group as this group has an above average 
number of blue-collar workers, an above average number of trade union members and of 
people who consider the trade unions to represent their interests. However, although over 
50% of the members of this group have a party preference for the SPD, this is not very 
different from the SPD preference found in other groups. This might be related to both the 
general inclination to the left rather than the right in the east as well as the fact that there 
was a wish in the electorate to replace the coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP at the general 
election which took place in the same year as the ALLBUS-survey was carried out, i.e. in 
1998. The, although only partly “left-orientated milieu”, may be considered a specific 
eastern German social milieu as it is the only one proving a close relationship with the 
PDS, nevertheless as was discussed in the overview summary this group is not 
homogeneous and has no link to any specific organisation. Finally, as in the west, there is 
also a group of passive and dissatisfied people in the east which may be considered a social 
milieu. The group is characterised by a passive lifestyle, lack of important life areas, low 
social position and lack in organisational memberships and interest representation. 
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Furthermore – as in the west - the members are below average satisfied with democracy 
and incline above average not to vote and will thus be considered a social milieu.  
With respect to manifest and latent cleavages in the east the picture is not as clear as in the 
west as too few social milieus could be found which fulfilled the criteria of being 
characterised as milieus. Thus, only the existence of possible latent cleavages between the 
Green milieu, passive milieu, the “partly social milieus” and the lifestyle groups will be 
discussed in the following. Looking at the possible social structural cleavages there is a 
difference between the “partly, left-orientated milieu” and the other groups with regard to 
church attendance. As discussed in Chapter 7.2.3.1 there is no particular religious group in 
the east, but the “partly, left-orientated milieu” is the only group with a high church 
attendance. As argued previously as well, this might be traced back to the special situation 
of the Protestant Church in the GDR as a meeting place for oppositional groups and would 
not be a measurement for religiosity in the traditional sense. There seems to be no cleavage 
between work and capital. As emphasised previously the number of self-employed in the 
former GDR is very low and even though two groups can be found which have a medium 
to high social status, no lifestyle group could be found in the east which has a significant 
number of people in the highest income category. Turning to the Stadt-Land cleavage there 
is a slight difference in the east as well. Whereas the members of the Green milieu and 
“partly, left-orientated milieu” live above average in large cities the members of the 
passive milieu live in small cities.  
Concerning ideological cleavages, the following latent cleavages could be found; a post-
materialist-materialist cleavage between the Green milieu on the one side and the “passive 
milieu” and the “traditional, non-working person” on the other side. With regard to worries 
about the environment the “traditional, non-working person” has less worries. This 
coincides with the materialist orientation of this group. The “partly left-orientated milieu” 
has – on the other hand - big worries about the environment which coincides with the 
below average materialist orientation in this group.  
Furthermore, as in the west, there is an indication of a cleavage related to the globalisation 
process (worries about number of immigrants) and a cleavage related to the modernisation 
process (worries about unemployment). Both the “worker’s milieu” and the “partly, left-
orientated milieu” have big worries with respect to unemployment whereas the members of 
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the Green milieu and the “traditional, non working person” have below average big 
worries. Nevertheless, as emphasised previously in all groups the numbers of those with 
big worries are above 80%. The “worker’s milieu” is the only group with big worries 
concerning the number of immigrants. The “partly, left-orientated milieu” is above average 
represented among those with some worries whereas the Green milieu is below average 
represented among those with big worries and above average among those with no worries 
about immigrants. Finally, although the members of the “partly, left-orientated milieu”, for 
example, place themselves above average to the left, there is no group located on the right 
which may indicate a left-right cleavage in the east.  
A summary of the results found in the east is presented in Figure 7.4. With regard to the 
east as well, only lifestyle groups which wholly or partly fulfil the criteria of being defined 
as social milieus are included in the overview. Again those characteristics which are of 
particular importance to the definition of the milieus have been marked in bold. Those 
social milieus which do not fully fulfil the criteria of a social milieu are presented in a 
weaker print to emphasise their heterogeneity and instability.  
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Figure 7.4 Social milieus in the east 
 
Cleavage:  
- medium/high social status 
- large cities 
- not materialists,  
- worries about environment 
- Conservative (voting as duty) 
- big worries about unemployment 
- some worries about immigrants 
- Left placement 
Organisational membership: none 
Interest representation:  
- Trade union, environmental organisations, PDS 
Party preference: PDS
CULEDU Partly left-
orientated 
milieu 
Cleavage:  
- medium/high social status 
- large cities 
- post-materialist 
-  no worries about unemployment 
- no worries about number of immigrants 
Organisational membership: none  
Interest representation:  
- Bündnis 90/die Grünen 
- environmental organisations 
Party preference: 
- Bündnis 90/die Grünen 
Cleavage: 
- medium social status 
- worries about unemployment 
- worries about number of immigrants 
- Liberal (voting no duty) 
Organisational membership: DGB, sports club 
Interest representation:  
- Trade union 
Party preference: none
TECNON 
SPWOFA 
Green milieu 
Worker’s 
Lifestyle group Criteria Social milieu 
Cleavage:  
- low social status 
- small cities 
- materialist 
Organisational membership: none  
Interest representation: none  
Party preference: 
-  no-vote
PANOIN Passive 
dissatisfied 
milieu 
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7.3 A comparison of lifestyle groups and social milieus in the west and the east 
The results presented in Chapter 7.1 and 7.2 prove that similarities - but also some 
significant differences - exist between the eastern and western German population with 
respect to lifestyle groups and social milieus. As can be seen from Figure 7.5 some of the 
lifestyle groups are comparable and some partly comparable. The comparison is based both 
on lifestyle characteristics and social structural characteristics. The most similar groups are 
the technologically-orientated and the modern, sports-orientated groups in the east and the 
west. Furthermore, the cultural-orientated and educated, the traditional-orientated and the 
passive groups are partly comparable. A main difference can be found in the fact that no 
particularly religious lifestyle group can be found in the east. The lifestyle group of the 
”cultural-orientated, educated” considers religion and church/politics and public life 
important and is the only group which proves an above average level of church attendance, 
but the group nevertheless does not fulfil the definition of a milieu as was emphasised in 
Chapter 7.2.3. This lack of a religious social milieu in the east could have been expected 
on the basis of the developments since World War II (cf. Chapters 3.2.2 and 4.3.2.4). Also, 
none of the East German lifestyle groups can be found in the higher income group. 
I would like to emphasise at this point, that it is not the purpose of this thesis to prove that 
the lifestyle groups found here are better than those found of the other surveys. Rather the 
solutions found here were considered the “best” ones both from the empirical criteria and 
theoretical perspective on the basis of the data available in the ALLBUS 1998. 
Nevertheless, similarities exist to lifestyle groups and “social milieus” found in other 
surveys as, for example, to post-materialist, conservative and religious “milieus” in the 
west (cf. Chapter 5.2.1) and the bourgeois-humanistic and left-intellectual “milieu” in the 
east (cf. Chapter 5.2.2). A direct comparison between all groups is rather difficult, though, 
due to the different research designs and definitions of the concepts used in the respective 
surveys. 
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Figure 7.5 A comparison of lifestyle groups in the west and the east 
 
Summarising the findings with regard to social milieus (cf. Figure 7.6) a Green milieu and 
a passive milieu could be found in both the east and west. Furthermore, a worker’s milieu 
could be found in the west and indications of one in the east, although here the above 
average party preference to the SPD is still missing. Finally, a religious milieu could be 
found in the west and a “partly, left-orientated, milieu” could be found in the east.  
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Figure 7.6 A comparison of social milieus in the west and the east 
 
Finally, the separate analyses of east and west makes it necessary to look at some of the 
differences beyond the lifestyle groups and social milieus found in the empirical part, in 
particular with respect to the assumed regional cleavage in reunified Germany. Whereas 
“worries about unemployment” did not differ significantly between the lifestyle groups in 
the west it did so in the east. Now, in both parts the number with big worries is very high – 
although a little higher in the east compared to the west. With regard to the question 
whether social differences are fair, the majority both in the east and west do not think that 
such differences are fair, although - here as well – the number of those who do not agree to 
the statement is higher in the east than the west. 
Religious milieu 
(Partly, left-
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Furthermore, the variables “worries about costs of reunification” and “socialism is in 
principle a good idea which was carried out badly” were not significant in distinguishing 
between the lifestyle groups in the east. Whereas in the east more than 2/3 of the 
respondents seem to support the idea of socialism more than half of the respondents in 
western Germany do not agree to the statement “socialism is a good idea”. Regarding the 
costs of reunification the West German population have bigger worries than the East 
Germans. Also a bigger proportion of the eastern Germans seem to place themselves at the 
left and less to the right compared to the western Germans. Finally, probably the most 
important difference is that the PDS has a fairly high support in the eastern German 
population whereas in the west the number was too low to even be included in the analysis. 
There thus seems to exist a regional cleavage between east and west which is characterised 
by a general higher support for socialism in the east and less worries about the costs of the 
reunification compared to in the west. At the party level this difference is expressed by a 
higher support for the PDS in all eastern German lifestyle groups compared to the west 
where the PDS has no influence. Although the PDS lost its faction in the German 
parliament after the 2002 general election as the party did neither manage the 5% threshold 
nor manage to win three direct candidates, the support for the PDS is still significantly 
higher in the east than the west. At the 2002 general election the PDS won 16.8% (-4.6 
compared with 1998) of the votes in the east compared to 1.1% (-0.1) in the west 
(Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 2002:9). To which extent this development will continue and 
in the end the PDS will lose its support base in the east completely, only future elections 
can tell. 
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8. CONCLUSION  
The aim of this thesis was to analyse 1. Whether social milieus which were established in 
the German Empire and Weimar Republic still exist in reunified Germany. 2. Whether any 
new social milieus have arisen in the old and new Länder and finally - based on the results 
found in 1. and 2. - whether social milieus still contribute to understand the voting 
behaviour in reunified Germany (cf. page 2).  
 
A summary of the research strategy 
The starting point of the thesis were the traditional social milieus of Lepsius and how these 
developed during the German Empire and Weimar Republic and the post World War II era 
until today. As these social milieus have declined over the past decades the argument was 
that in order to detect new social milieus, the lifestyle concept might be fruitful as it 
differentiates the population of modern societies to a larger extent. However, lifestyle 
groups and social milieus are not to be treated equally; rather lifestyle groups might reflect 
existing social milieus as well as indicate possible new social milieus in the society. Thus, 
the concepts of lifestyle and social milieus are considered to relate as was elaborated in 
detail in the theoretical part in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3 the traditional social milieus and 
their cleavage bases were presented and their separate developments in the east and the 
west after the Second World War were discussed. The decline of traditional milieus and 
the development towards more differentiated lifestyle groups is often considered to be a 
consequence of the individualisation process which has taken place in modern societies 
during the past decades. As the individualisation process is related to both socio-economic 
changes and value changes in the society the most important developments in these areas 
in both the east and west after 1945 were presented in Chapter 4. In particular, the 
differences between the east and west were assumed to be important to understand how 
different the preconditions were in the east and west with regard to the development of the 
traditional milieus and their traditional cleavage bases and the possible establishment of 
new social milieus with other cleavage structures. In Chapter 5 several lifestyle and milieu 
surveys were presented and the results of two surveys – one carried out in the east and one 
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in the west – were presented in detail and discussed with regard to cleavages and voting 
behaviour.  
In Chapter 6, the hypotheses were elaborated and the data and variables which were going 
to be used in the empirical analysis were presented. Due to the differences in socio-
economic transformations since World War II the assumption was that the old and new 
Länder would differ with respect to social milieus. The hypotheses (cf. Chapter 6.1) were 
that 1. A religious milieu would exist in the west characterised by a traditional and religious 
orientated lifestyle, religious affiliation and church attendance, membership(s) in religious 
organisations, interest representation by the churches and party preference for the CDU/CSU. 
A religious milieu was not assumed to exist in the east. 2. Furthermore, a worker’s milieu 
would exist in the west characterised by a work-orientated lifestyle, blue-collar workers, 
membership in trade union, interest representation by the trade union and party preference for 
the SPD. A worker’s milieu was not expected to exist in the east either. 3. Also, a Green 
milieu with an education-orientated lifestyle, post-materialist value orientations, membership 
in student organisations and/or alternative political organisations, interest representation by 
environmental organisation(s) and party preference for Bündnis 90/ die Grünen was expected 
to exist in the west. This milieu was not expected to exist in the east. 4. In the east only a 
typical eastern German milieu characterised by left-orientation, membership in political 
organisations and/or student organisations with an interest representation by and party 
preference for the PDS was expected to exist. 5. Finally, it was assumed that an unpolitical 
milieu would exist both in the west and east characterised by a low social status, passivity, 
lack of interest representation and an inclination not to vote.   
To test the hypotheses in the empirical part in Chapter 7, I chose a different approach than 
usually applied in the analysis of social milieus. Instead of considering lifestyle groups and 
social milieus as equivalent as some researchers do a strict separation of the concepts was 
applied: the formation of lifestyle groups in the first step was considered a useful way of 
finding more differentiated social groups in the society than what is often found when 
solely social structural characteristics are being applied. However, as was confirmed in the 
empirical analysis, even if no objective social structural characteristics are included in the 
analysis of lifestyle groups, the groups still differ with respect to these characteristics (cf. 
Chapters 7.1.3.1 and 7.2.3.1) and to a certain extent still point at social structural cleavages 
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in the society. Thus, a lifestyle is not decoupled from the social structure or from the social 
position (cf. Spellerberg 1996:224). Rather social structural preconditions for the 
differentiation of lifestyles exist – a relationship which according to Konietzka (1995:254) 
is often ignored.  
In the second step the existence of social milieus was analysed using the differentiated 
lifestyle groups found in the previous stage, analysing significant relationships between 
these groups and the cleavages, organisational memberships, interest representations and 
party preference.  
 
A summary of the results 
Based on the criteria that a relationship must exist between a lifestyle group, organisational 
membership, interest representation and party preference in order to define a social milieu 
the following results were found: 
1. In the west a religious milieu exists which is characterised by a religious orientated 
lifestyle, religious affiliation and high church attendance, materialist and conservative 
value orientations, interest representation by the churches and party preference for the 
CDU/CSU. The link to religious organisations is missing, nevertheless this was considered 
a social milieu as all other characteristics were clear. A religious milieu was not found in 
the east. Hypothesis 1 thus seems confirmed. 
2. Furthermore, hypothesis 2 may be considered to be confirmed as well, as a worker’s 
milieu seems to exist in the west. Although no particularly work-orientated lifestyle exists, 
this milieu has the largest proportion of lower white-collars and blue-collar workers, trade 
union (DGB) membership, interest representation by the trade unions and party preference 
for the SPD. In spite of the former “Arbeiter- und Bauernstaat” no worker’s milieu could 
be found in the east, but there are indications that a worker’s milieu may develop from the 
“sports-, work- and family-orientated” lifestyle group as this group has an above average 
number of blue-collar workers, an above average number of trade union members and of 
people who consider the trade unions to represent their interests. However, although over 
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50% of the members of this group have a party preference for the SPD, this was not very 
different from the SPD preference found in other groups.  
3. Also a Green milieu of post-materialists with an education-orientated lifestyle, high 
social status, past memberships in alternative political groups and youth, student 
organisations, interest representation by environmental organisations and Bündnis 90/die 
Grünen and party preference for Bündnis 90/die Grünen was found in the west as was 
expected. Surprisingly, a Green milieu which fulfilled almost all criteria except that it 
missed the organisational membership in alternative political groups could be found in the 
east, too. Thus, although it was assumed that no milieu characteristic for the modernised 
society would be found in the east, there is evidence of a Green milieu in the east. 
Hypothesis 3 may thus only be confirmed for the west. With regard to the east hypothesis 3 
was falsified. 
4. A “partly left-orientated milieu” was indicated in the east characterised by left-
orientation, interest representation by and preference for the PDS. This might be 
considered a specific eastern German social milieu as it is the only one proving a close 
relationship with the PDS. Nevertheless, as was discussed in previous chapters this 
“milieu” is not homogeneous and has no link to any specific organisation, although it has 
the second highest number of people who were former members in youth, student 
organisations and the highest number of former members in political parties. Thus, the 
fourth hypothesis can only partly be confirmed. 
5. Finally, passive dissatisfied milieus were found both in the east and the west. These 
were characterised by passive lifestyles, lack of important life areas, low social positions 
and lack in organisational memberships and interest representations. Furthermore, the 
members were below average satisfied with democracy and tend above average not to 
vote. Hypothesis 5 could thus be confirmed as well. 
In summary, all hypotheses could be confirmed with regard to the west; a religious milieu, 
worker’s milieu, post-materialist milieu and unpolitical milieu were found. With regard to 
the east the hypothesis that a religious milieu and worker’s milieu would not exist were 
confirmed. The hypothesis that a Green milieu would not exist was falsified, whereas the 
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hypothesis that an eastern German milieu would exist could only be partly confirmed. 
Finally, the existence of an unpolitical milieu was confirmed for the east as well. 
Looking at the cleavages, the results seem to support the existence of more or less the same 
cleavages as those which were assumed to exist in reunified Germany and which were 
discussed in Chapter 5.2.3; a regional cleavage between the east and the west, a cleavage 
between post-materialist and materialist value orientations, religiosity and secularism and 
work and capital. Furthermore, a cleavage between the deprived and the satisfied seems to 
exist which is related to both globalisation and modernisation and the impact these 
processes have had on the respective groups. Finally, some differences exist with regard to 
the left-right cleavage. However, both in the east and west 70% and more place themselves 
in the middle of the left-right scale. As discussed in Chapter 6.2.2, though, the items 
included in the analysis of possible cleavages are rather few. Future analyses should 
include sets of variables facilitating the analysis of attitudinal dimensions in order to 
distinguish between the impact of short-term issues and long-term ideological positions in 
the German population. Further methodological aspects will be discussed in the following. 
 
Methodological considerations and outlook 
Although the strategy of data analysis applied in the empirical part of this thesis was of an 
explorative nature the formation of social milieus the way this has been done in this thesis 
might nevertheless be quite fruitful. This approach facilitates the analysis of short-term 
lifestyle groups compared to long-term social milieus in the society. As argued in Chapter 
6.1 the analysis of the relationship between lifestyle groups and the external variables may 
point at a core of social milieus at a given time; some of these may be known to us others 
are new. Whether these old and new ones will exist in five or ten years as well, whether 
they grow or decline is not known. Also with respect to the lifestyle groups some may 
become more settled over the years and develop into real social milieus, others will be 
replaced by other lifestyle groups. Conducting surveys on a regular basis including 
lifestyle variables, cleavage dimensions, organisational memberships, interest 
representation and party preference would facilitate the transition of social milieus and 
lifestyle groups in the society and their impact on voting behaviour.  
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Furthermore, surveys of lifestyle and social milieus are today often criticised for finding 
too divergent results and too different numbers of groups; some find six, other eight, ten or 
twelve etc. Although some prove to have significant similarities as was discussed in 
Chapter 5.1, 7.3 and shown in Appendix 1 the tendency of researchers to give the 
impression that all groups/social milieus found in an analysis prove the same level of 
stability and cohesion restricts the fruitfulness of the concepts and their contribution to 
explaining attitudes and behaviour in a dynamic society (see also Hölscher 1998:303f.). I 
would argue that how many lifestyle groups have been found at one period in time by 
different researchers and how many lifestyle groups can be found five or ten years later is 
rather unimportant. Important is that researchers within the same discipline find the same – 
or at least almost the same - core of social milieus at a given time.  
However, even though it may seem quite fruitful to use the lifestyle concept in order to 
find the core of social milieus and related cleavages which may contribute to understand 
voting behaviour in the modern society, there is no doubt that certain problems arise. The 
concept does among others not work out very well for distinguishing between all kinds of 
groups. In the west, for example, those preferring a traditional lifestyle with a preference 
for folk music and Heimatfilme etc. obviously embed a very heterogeneous group and this 
is also the case with respect to a high culture lifestyle. Whether this is a problem of the 
concept or may be solved by a better operationalisation or improvements in the statistical 
procedure needs to be explored further. A more general problem is that actually all groups 
- even though some have a more homogeneous pattern which facilitated the formation of a 
social milieu – are more heterogeneous in today’s society than decades ago. With further 
specialisations on the labour market and differentiations in ways of living this process of 
pluralisation will probably increase in modern societies. Thus, the social milieus – if any 
new will be found in the future – will probably not be of the size and stability as the 
traditional ones (cf. Weßels 2000:152f.).  
Although many similarities exist between the new and old Länder, the differences show that 
Einheit ist nicht gleich Einheitlichkeit (Becker 1992:103) and that integration is not just a 
matter of economy, but also of mentalities and individuals. When considering the differences 
between the east and west the mistake of asking how fast the former GDR will assimilate into 
the old Federal Republic should be avoided since the consequences of western German 
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development into "risk society" are not only positive. Cultural features and the pre-modern 
problems of the new Länder can serve as a pause for thought for western Germans to evaluate 
the social results of their own continuous modernisation and the gap between the winners and 
losers of this process. According to Kronauer and Vogel a new group of unemployed has, for 
example, emerged in the west. This group consists mainly of men in the 40s who worked in 
industrial branches which were hit by the crisis and where the majority has been without a job 
for two years and more (cf. Kronauer/Vogel 1998:343). In addition to the economic 
consequences of long-term unemployment on these members they experience social exclusion 
(cf. Kronauer/Vogel 1998:347).  
It might be correct that the existence of social moral milieus in the Weimar Republic restricted 
democratic developments because the existing political parties could not absorb new 
cleavages and social groups. However, a stable democracy needs social groups, interest 
groups, and political parties who know they can rely on one another and who they can expect 
to represent their interests. As argued by Lipset (2001:8) 
“As noted, to endure, political parties require a base which is uncritically loyal, which will work or 
support them even when conditions go bad.” 
A consequence of the decrease in loyalties is what we experience in almost all western 
societies today; politics is based on short-term issues and political candidates show-off in the 
media to catch the volatile voter in the middle. As argued by Vester (2001:13f.), social milieus 
are no longer strongly rooted large social groups which are sharply separated from one another 
and fighting against each other - the “family tree” of social milieus has become considerably 
differentiated and modernised. In everyday life, however, traditional styles and principles of 
living still exist. Today there is thus no crisis of social milieus as a result of value change, as 
Vester argues, but rather a crisis of political representation which is a consequence of the 
increasing distance between elites and milieus. Less and less the problems and needs of a 
particular social group in the society are in the focus of party strategies, but rather the creation 
of a political party image which can be a sufficiently attractive product for many social 
groups. Whether the “new middle” actually represents a new social milieu and whether the 
parties will be successful in the long run in their strategy to concentrate on the voter in the 
middle remains open, in particular, as long as clear characterisations of this electoral group are 
still missing (cf. Eith/Mielke 2000:112ff.; Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger 2001:16). The results of this 
thesis indicate that the majority of all lifestyle groups place themselves in the middle. The 
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“middle” is thus no uniform group, but may work as a marketing concept of the political 
parties which has an appeal to the electorate on a cognitive level, but is not itself rooted in the 
social behaviour of the respective target groups.  
In conclusion, milieus can only to a limited extent contribute to understand voting behaviour 
in today’s Germany; large social milieus decline, new social milieus – where they can be 
found – are smaller and their long-term stability still needs to be proven. Nevertheless, the 
analyses of lifestyle groups and social milieus might contribute to understand differences in 
behaviour and attitudes between the eastern and western Germans. Furthermore, the analyses 
may give indications of which cleavages are latent in society and should not be ignored, but be 
brought to the surface and solved before they find loyalties in undemocratic movements or 
parties. The existence of passive-dissatisfied milieus in both the east and the west indicate that 
losers of the modernisation process are already politically important. As argued previously a 
reason why the lifestyle approach may seem so insignificant to electoral research may be 
that the lifestyle groups are simply not (yet) politicised or electoral researchers have not 
(yet) found those cleavages which uncover social conflicts between modern lifestyle 
groups or between traditional and modern lifestyle groups. Thus, in order to analyse the 
impact of social milieus on voting behaviour in modern societies it would be a big 
challenge to include lifestyle groups, cleavage dimensions and organisational membership 
structures – formal or informal - in one survey to properly test the relation and impact of 
these three dimensions on electoral behaviour.  
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1 A comparison of lifestyle groups in West Germany 
 
Schulze Sinus Gluchowski Giegler Spellerberg Otte 
Konservatives gehobenes 
Großbürgertum 
Ganzheitlich kulturell 
Interessierte 
Niveaumilieu Konservatives 
gehobenes Milieu 
Gehobene Konservative 
Etablierte beruflich 
Engagierte 
Niveautypus 
Technokratisch- 
liberales Milieu 
Aufstiegorientierter 
jüngerer Mensch 
„urban professionals“ 
(partly) 
Hedonistisches  
Milieu 
Linksliberaler integrierter 
Postmaterialist 
Alternative Hedonisten 
Selbstverwirk-
lichungsmilieu 
Alternatives linkes 
Milieu 
Postmaterialistisch 
linksalternativ 
eingestellter Mensch 
Alternative Asketen (partly)
Postmaterielle aktive 
Vielseitige 
Selbst-
verwirklichungs-
typus 
Aufgeschlossener 
integrierter Normalbürger
Traditionelle 
freizeitaktive 
Ortsverbundene 
Integrations- 
Milieu 
Aufstiegorientiertes 
Milieu 
Integrierter älterer 
Mensch (partly) 
Alternative Asketen 
(partly), 
„urban professionals“ 
(partly) Expressiv Vielseitige 
Integrationstypus 
Pflichtbestimmter 
konventionsbestimmter 
Arbeitnehmer 
Kleinbürgerliches 
Milieu 
Integrierter älterer 
Mensch (partly) 
Harmonie- 
Milieu 
Traditionelles 
Arbeitermilieu 
Isolierter alter Mensch 
Ältere Kleinbürger, 
familienzentrierte Frauen 
Traditionelle 
zurückgezogen Lebende 
Harmonietypus 
Pragmatisch 
Berufsorientierte 
Sportorientierter 
Unterhaltungs-
typus 
Freizeitsorientierte 
Gesellige 
Unterhaltungs
milieu 
Traditionsloses 
Arbeitermilieu 
Unauffälliger, eher 
passiver Arbeitnehmer 
Junge „fast-food“-Männer 
Häusliche Unterhaltungs-
suchende 
Passiver 
Unterhaltungs-
typus 
Source: The overview is based on Tables 5.1. and 5.2. in Hartmann 1999:138-139. For further detail 
concerning the assignments see Hartmann. 
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